Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HARARE321
2006-03-15 17:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER DISSES MDC FACTIONS AND

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9641
RR RUEHMR
DE RUEHSB #0321/01 0741700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151700Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9750
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1156
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0988
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1160
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0780
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1214
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3558
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0986
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1614
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0420
RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1371
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000321 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
USAID/AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER DISSES MDC FACTIONS AND
ZANU-PF


Classified By: Charge d,Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz for reasons 1.5
b/d

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000321

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
USAID/AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER DISSES MDC FACTIONS AND
ZANU-PF


Classified By: Charge d,Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz for reasons 1.5
b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The chairman of the National Constitutional Assembly
(NCA),Lovemore Madhuku, told poloffs March 13 that the
opposition MDC was failing to exploit Zimbabweans' deepening
economic frustration and that civil society would take the
lead if necessary. Madhuku said ZANU-PF was doing a better
job of reaching out to the grassroots but had its own
problems, primarily over the succession issue, with Emmerson
Mnangagwa,s faction playing for time and hoping to undermine
Joyce Mujuru before open presidential elections, probably in

2010. Madhuku added that civil society had been pleased with
the March 8 IMF vote, which had underscored the regime,s
isolation. He also said he planned to remain at NCA,s helm
despite the organization,s term limits. End Summary.

--------------
Grassroots Appeals
--------------


2. (C) Madhuku said Zimbabweans were looking for firm
leadership on basic issues such as food, education, and youth
unemployment. The NCA was trying to convince the MDC to
confront the regime on these basic issues. To that end, the
NCA and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) were
organizing a civil society summit in early April. Both
factions of the MDC would be invited to present their visions
for future action. If either MDC faction agreed to take the
lead, the NCA would support their efforts. In the absence of
MDC leadership on civil action, the NCA would take the lead
itself.


3. (C) Madhuku said that most people blamed their problems on
the government, giving MDC a natural following. However, the
MDC risked becoming irrelevant with both factions inward
looking and focused on competing with each other rather than
confronting the regime. The only engagement each faction had
with the grassroots level at the moment was toward the end of
getting support for itself instead of the other faction.


4. (C) Madhuku said that ZANU-PF, by contrast, was working

hard to reach out to the grassroots. Joyce Mujuru was
speaking out on the basic issues of food and education.
Madhuku said some Zimbabweans equated her with a &good8
part of ZANU-PF, which they distinguished from bad elements
that were to blame for the country,s woes. He said that in
that regard Mujuru was having some success blaming corrupt
bureaucrats, rather than the ZANU-PF leadership, for the
country's failed state. The MDC had to do a better job of
reinforcing the fact that ZANU-PF,s leaders were to blame.

--------------
Intra-Party Dynamics
--------------


5. (C) Madhuku said he did not think prospects for the MDC
reuniting in the near future were very good. The NCA did not
want to choose sides, although the organization might
consider aligning itself with one faction if it seemed
stronger. In that regard, he said Morgan Tsvangirai still
had much more support at the grassroots level. By contrast,
Madhuku said Mutambara was out of touch and had an &internet
view of Zimbabwe8 built on his long years away from the
country.


6. (C) Madhuku noted that the intra-ZANU-PF crackdown on
Mnangagwa and his faction was continuing. However, Mnangagwa

HARARE 00000321 002 OF 003


was not out of the succession game but was instead playing
for time. Madhuku said one of Mnangagwa's people had
confided to him that Mnangagwa had decided not to oppose
Joyce Mujuru as Mugabe,s successor. However, Mnangagwa
wanted the succession to happen as soon as possible and no
later than 2008, with a presidential election scheduled for

2010.


7. (C) According to Madhuku, Mnangagwa,s plan was to let
Mujuru inherit the many crises bedeviling the country in the
expectation that she would not prove up to the task.
Mnangagwa could then use the nation's economic distress to
challenge and supplant her at the 2009 Party Congress in the
run-up to the 2010 election. Madhuku added that he believed
Mnangagwa would win an open competition with Mujuru for the
party,s presidential nomination whenever it occurred.

--------------
International Community Should Remain Firm
--------------


8. (C) Madhuku said the international community had to
maintain its pressure on the regime in order for there to be
change in Zimbabwe. In that regard, civil society had been
universally pleased with the IMF vote not to restore
Zimbabwe's voting rights, which had sent a strong signal to
the GOZ of its continuing isolation. A contrary result, he
added, would have breathed life into regime hopes for
international engagement on its terms.


9. (C) Madhuku noted that the NCA had no formal position on
sanctions but that the organization would continue to draw
international attention to the deterioration of rule-of-law
that was the foundation of sanctions. He believed that
increased civil action would force the regime to become more
repressive and unpopular, thus inviting further international
condemnation.

--------------
Madhuku,s Term Limit Busting
--------------


10. (C) Madhuku said the NCA was planning to conduct its
congress this year in two stages. The first, an
extraordinary congress in June, would amend the NCA
constitution to change the term limits to allow certain NCA
leaders to run again in NCA elections at the regular congress
slated for October.


11. (C) Madhuku, one of the leaders bumping up against the
existing term limits, said he realized that this would give
ZANU-PF an opportunity to call the organization undemocratic,
but to change key leaders at this point would cripple the
organization. All of civil society, including the NCA, was
having difficulty grooming future leaders. Promising young
leaders were taking opportunities to leave the country and
usually did not return.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Madhuku is probably correct that the MDC splinters
are too inwardly focused to confront the regime effectively
in the near future. That said, both factions know they need
to reconnect with the populace and feel pressure to do
something soon. The civil society summit in April may
stimulate action in that regard. It may also help stimulate
some sort of working arrangement between the two factions to
oppose the regime, with civil society serving as a
facilitator. As to the succession struggle in ZANU-PF, the
report of Mnangagwa,s plans has the ring of truth. The

HARARE 00000321 003 OF 003


Mujuru faction probably also would prefer an early
transition, given Solomon Mujuru,s ill health. It is
possible that this could mean Mugabe,s retirement within the
next 12-18 months, which would dramatically alter Zimbabwe,s
political landscape.
SCHULTZ