ZVOBGO ON ZANU-PF, CHANGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: ZVOBGO ON ZANU-PF, CHANGE

REF: HARARE 200

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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1. (C) Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., the popular son of Robert Mugabe's
late principal intra-party rival of the last ten years, told
the Ambassador on March 1 that the ZANU-PF faithful all
recognized the need for substantive change, including
realignment to the West. Nonetheless, change probably would
wait for Mugabe's passage from the stage, he predicted, as
most remained too cautious and fearful to push the
octogenarian for now. He urged the USG to remain engaged
with a country that desperately needed its help and would
turn to it when the time came. He welcomed Arthur
Mutambara's emergence as a political player but bluntly
stated that ZANU-PF would continue to consciously exploit MDC
divisions to its own advantage. End summary.

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Party Faithful Roiling but Patient
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2. (C) A businessperson and ZANU-PF provincial official in
Masvingo, Zvobgo told the Ambassador that party unity would
likely remain intact for now, despite wide intra-party
dissatisfaction and the collapsing economy. Zvobgo said that
all would agree that Mugabe had outlived his time, but
caution and fear borne of the party's history made open
action to hasten his departure by aspiring successors or a
disgruntled membership unlikely. Mugabe's stature as a
founding father further inhibited action against him even if
all regarded his policies as folly.


3. (C) That said, Zvobgo agreed that much was happening in
the ruling party apart from Mugabe, but maintained that it
all nonetheless revolved around Mugabe and his
"disproportionate power." The leadership would continue to
posture to him, even as they maneuvered behind the scenes to
position themselves for his departure. He allowed that some
individuals might "strike out on their own" if they felt
their prospects waning too much - a circumstance Mugabe would
seek to avoid.


4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador when Zimbabwe could reach a
"breaking point", Zvobgo suggested that a true breaking point
would require a revolt, which he did not see in the
foreseeable future. He acknowledged that decline was
accelerating, but asserted that there were still ways to make
money, even in a hyperinflationary environment. Zimbabwe
still had a long way down to go, and he did not know when it
would hit bottom.

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Looking for Face-Saving Out
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5. (C) Zvobgo confirmed that the leadership appreciated that
the country was in too deep a hole to climb out without
significant help from the West. Political realities would
not permit them to overtly admit failure, he asserted, so the
leadership needed a face-saving way out. Zvobgo suggested
that the prime minister position under consideration in
constitutional discussions might offer promise in this
regard. A Prime Minister could work with the international
community on necessary policy changes, effectively moving

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forward with reform but insulating the President from a "mea
culpa" he could not swallow.


6. (C) Zvobgo asserted that recent developments such as the
GOZ's dropping plans to nationalize fertilizer companies and
amending its disastrous education bill indicated that many in
the party "wanted to stop digging" the hole it was in. He
suggested that the Senate had surprisingly proved some worth
in this regard, especially elder statesman such as his
Masvingo political ally Dzikamayi Mavhaire. He was
optimistic that cooler heads could stem the impetus for bad
policy while Mugabe remained in power.


7. (C) He urged the USG in any event to look for
constructive ways to steer the country out of the mess for
which ZANU-PF was undeniably responsible. He asserted that
ZANU-PF would likely lead the country into the post-Mugabe
era so it was in our mutual interest to cultivate more
rapport. Zvobgo suggested that Mugabe's recent outreach to
Blair represented a softening of rhetoric that could precede
a softening posture; he urged the Ambassador to meet with
Mugabe in this regard.

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On Mugabe's Departure
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8. (C) Zvobgo would not venture a guess as to when Mugabe
planned to step aside. Echoing conventional wisdom, he
suggested Mugabe would not go until he felt sufficient
confidence in a successor to protect him. In this vein,
Mugabe had an interest in keeping all players off balance and
in keeping succession unsettled. Zvobgo viewed Justice
Minister Chinamasa's recent floating of three scenarios, one
of which could keep Mugabe in place until 2010 (reftel),as
indicative of Mugabe's intent to remain in the game for now.
Mugabe could always find a pretext on which to remain as long
as he wanted and had always defied prediction in any event.

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After Mugabe...
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9. On the Ambassador's inquiry about post-Mugabe Zimbabwe,
Zvobgo predicted there would be ferment but whoever emerged
atop the party would have to be practical. This would
require s/he reach out initially to heal internal divisions,
at least until s/he became more confident to consolidate
broader power. He agreed with the Ambassador that the next
leader would have to deliver an economic turn around to stay
in power and would need Western support to make that happen.
He concluded that "a national sigh of relief" at Mugabe's
passing would permit a successor some time and good will to
administer unavoidably painful medicine.


10. (C) Zvobgo suggested the succession game had yet to be
played out. He offered a positive portrayal of Vice
President Joyce Mujuru as a "mother" figure - not well
educated but effective in applying the common sense needed
for political success. He acknowledged there was discomfort
with her in some quarters but maintained it was too early to
conclude that the President had "backed the wrong horse,"
with reference to rival Emmerson Mnangagwa. He said there
were other possibilities as well, but dismissed RBZ Governor
Gideon Gono and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni as
talented individuals who lacked the political clout to emerge
on top.


11. (C) The Ambassador stressed the importance of not

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permitting anyone with blood on their hands to remain in the
post-Mugabe leadership if there was to be any hope of Western
support. He further noted that the USG was not opposed to
ZANU-PF per se and did not care about making anybody eat
crow; bilateral relations, however, could not improve without
the GOZ first implementing fundamental political and economic
reforms. He observed that regime change would happen on its
own if ZANU-PF continued its current policies and dug itself
into a deeper hole but said the USG did not have an interest
in seeing Zimbabwe collapse.

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ZANU-PF Exploiting MDC Divisions
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12. (C) Zvobgo acknowledged that ZANU-PF had seen to the MDC
pro-senate faction getting all the opposition's Z$8 billion
(US$80,000 at the official exchange rate) entitlement under
campaign finance laws. The ruling party continued to favor
the pro-senate faction at the exclusion of the anti-senate
faction, which posed a greater threat in view of Tsvangirai's
broad appeal. ZANU-PF hoped that the party divisions would
provoke by-elections for the opposition seats. In that
event, he said the anti-senate faction would likely retain
its Matabeleland representation but by exploiting MDC
divisions, ZANU-PF could make significant inroads in other
opposition constituencies. If neither faction pushed for
by-elections, the GOZ might find a pretext on its own, he
allowed. Zvobgo welcomed the emergence of Arthur Mutambira,
a distant uncle who he said would stimulate needed debate on
important issues.

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Comment
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13. (C) One of the Mujuru camp's more engaging and pragmatic
young turks, Zvobgo is a bridge figure with friends in the
MDC and Mnangagwa camps. His candid insights into the
party's restiveness buttress our conviction that ZANU-PF
remains a party very uncertain of itself despite outward
party discipline and Mugabe's unchallenged power. They
further confirm our growing potential leverage here as the
party lurches toward a different world in which it knows it
cannot survive without the West.

DELL
SCHULTZ