STATUS OF PLANNING FOR ANNAN VISIT TO ZIMBABWE

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 000165

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/S - B. NEULING; NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR C.
COURVILLE; USAID FOR M. COPSON AND E. LOKEN; DEPARTMENT
PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ZI
SUBJECT: STATUS OF PLANNING FOR ANNAN VISIT TO ZIMBABWE

REF: A. A) 2005 HARARE 1663

B. B) 2005 HARARE 928

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER W. DELL, REASON 1.4 (B) (D)


1. (C) During a February 10 meeting, UNDP Resident
Representative Agostinho Zacarias told the Ambassador that
the UN Secretariat was still actively working on plans for a
visit to Zimbabwe by SYG Annan. According to Zacarias, the
issue had been raised during a one-on-one session between
President Mugabe and visiting US SYG Jan Egelund during the
latter's December 4-7 visit to Zimbabwe (ref A). In that
session, Mugabe proposed "talks about talks" between the GOZ
and the UN, joined by the UK and Norway as representatives of
the international community. Subsequently, State House had
run a series of emissaries past Zacarias, supposedly to flesh
out the details for such talks, and Harare was pressing for
Annan to come in March. Recently, Foreign Minister
Mumbengegwi had traveled to New York to meet U/SYG Gambari to
further preparations for the visit, but Zacarias claimed he
did not yet have a readout on their discussion, although he
believed New York would still insist that Gambari visit
Harare first to prepare for an eventual Annan trip here.


2. (C) Zacarias said the Zimbabweans felt isolated, under
tremendous pressure and were desperate for relief. However,
Zacarias claimed that he opposed holding unconditional
discussions with the GOZ and seconded the Ambassador's
observation that international re-engagement with and support
to Zimbabwe had to be predicated on a willingness to engage
in serious and substantive political and economic reform.
Expounding further, Zacarias said that an Annan visit was a
one-time, "last chance" event and he had recommended that
Annan not come unless the agenda was clear and the prospects
for success good. There was no point in having the SYG come
if the GOZ's only goal was to persuade him to disavow the
strong public criticisms made by Egelund and Anna Tibaijuka
in her report on Operation "Restore Order" (ref B).


3. (C) During a meeting with recently arrived British
Ambassador Pocock, the Ambassador asked about the status of
the "talks-on-talks" initiative. Pocock said the UK Mission
in New York had told Gambari in no uncertain terms that
London had no interest in the initiative if it was
"unconditional," as this was tantamount to acceding to
Harare's agenda from the outset. Pocock said London shared
the view that re-engagement with Zimbabwe would only be
possible on the basis of a "concrete and sustained" policy of
reforms, which he opined probably did not square with
Mugabe's intentions.


4. (C) Comment. Although the Brits haven't exactly been
forthcoming with us previously on their potential role in any
"talks about talks," their basic approach would largely track
with ours. The UN's views, however, may not square with ours
as closely. Both Gambari and Zacarias are African diplomats
of the "come let us reason together" school. They will be
sorely tempted to pursue talks for their own sake in the
hope, no doubt vain, that they can produce some kind of
"breakthrough." For their part, the Zimbabweans are
desperately throwing out a variety of signals in the hope
that someone can be lured into a process that will buy them
time and stave off economic collapse and political ruin just
a little bit longer. We recommend that USUN approach Gambari
and the Secretariat staff to repeat the message AF/S recently
gave the Zimbabwean Ambassador to the U.S.: we're ready to
engage and help, provided that Zimbabwe is prepared to bite
the bullet on reforms. Absent that we would not support
talks with the GOZ for their own sake. DELL
DELL