Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HANOI782
2006-04-05 06:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

VIETNAM: PSI ENDORSEMENT UNLIKELY SOON

Tags:  PGOV KNNP MNUC PARM PHSA PREL VM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2548
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0782/01 0950636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050636Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1379
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0875
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000782 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KNNP MNUC PARM PHSA PREL VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: PSI ENDORSEMENT UNLIKELY SOON

REF: A. 05 Hanoi 2478; B. State 50811

HANOI 00000782 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000782

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KNNP MNUC PARM PHSA PREL VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM: PSI ENDORSEMENT UNLIKELY SOON

REF: A. 05 Hanoi 2478; B. State 50811

HANOI 00000782 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: Heavy Embassy pressure on the GVN has
forced the issue of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI) all the way to the Prime Minister's office, where we
are told the decision has been made to authorize Vietnam's
participation in PSI-related activities on a case-by-case
basis, but not to endorse the Statement of Interdiction
Principles (SOP) at this time. Most of the GVN's technical
concerns about PSI have been resolved. The remaining hurdle
to endorsement of the SOP is political, and it is too high
to surmount at this time. We may, however, be able to
convince the GVN to send a relatively low-level participant
to the May 31 meeting in Poland. End Summary.

Embassy Actions in Support of PSI
--------------


2. (SBU) In September 2005, the Ambassador delivered a joint
demarche on PSI with the Ambassadors and Charges from New
Zealand, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada
(Ref. A) to Vice Foreign Minister Le Van Bang. In January
2006, he and Australian Ambassador Bill Tweddell again
demarched the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in March 2006
the Ambassador delivered a letter to the MFA along with a
Vietnamese translation of a paper on PSI and the
International Law of the Sea (given by Ashley Roach from the
Office of the Legal Advisor at the March 9-12 2005
conference on the Law of the Sea in Xiamen, China) to
respond to some of the MFA's earlier objections.


3. (SBU) In December 2005, the MFA informed the Embassy that
the issue of signing on to the SOP had been tasked out by
the Prime Minister to "relevant agencies" for comment.
Armed with that information, Embassy officers provided
separate detailed PSI briefings to deputy director-level GVN
officials from the Ministries of Trade, Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Public Security, as well as the General
Department of Customs, the Communist Party's External
Relations Commission and the Office of the Government.
Consideration of PSI in the GVN was suspended, along with

all other work in Vietnam, for much of the end of January
and most of February for Lunar New Year celebrations and
activities. In March, working-level MFA officials told
Poloff that the Prime Minister would authorize participation
in PSI-related activities on a "case by case basis," but
that endorsement of the SOP is still under review.

MFA Official Delivers Bad News
--------------


4. (SBU) On March 31, Poloff delivered Ref B demarche to
the MFA's Deputy Director General for International
Organizations Le Hoai Trung. Trung said that in addition to
the information in the demarche, he had also received the
legal paper the Ambassador sent to the MFA regarding PSI and
the Law of the Sea. The information, Trung said, will be
"useful" in the MFA's discussions with other agencies.


5. (SBU) "On a purely legal basis," Trung said, "Vietnam is
beginning to accept that PSI is reasonable." The MFA has
advocated endorsing the SOP because the non-binding nature
of the endorsement and the caveat that endorsement is bound
by national and international law provide the necessary
safety valves Vietnam needs. However, other agencies (he
did not specify, but we believe the problem is with the
Ministry of Defense and possibly the Ministry of Public
Security) are concerned about specific issues of
implementation, such as the difficulty of stopping a plane
nonviolently and the technicalities of using force without
UN sanction or a clear self-defense justification. Vietnam
is aware that the PSI is "consistent" with UNSC Resolution
1540, Trung said, but 1540 does not authorize it. UN
Secretary General Annan's statements in favor are positive,

SIPDIS
but not binding. "Annan says lots of things the United
States disagrees with, or ignores. What makes this one
different?" he asked.


6. (SBU) When Poloff started to answer that Annan's
endorsement should ease Vietnam's concerns about PSI's
consistency with UN resolutions, Trung cut him off. "The
real problem here is political," he admitted. Vietnam's
laws criminalize proliferation and its foreign policy is
explicitly against it, he noted. Legal issues can be
addressed, but the determination of the Prime Minister is
that endorsing PSI will make Vietnam a part of a group of
nations that seems to be working outside of existing
multilateral channels and institutions to characterize
"other nations" as proliferators. That said, Vietnam wants

HANOI 00000782 002.2 OF 002


to signal its strong support for nonproliferation by
strengthening its compliance with international
nonproliferation norms and participating in "appropriate"
PSI activities "on a case-by-case basis." However, "PSI is
a group we are not ready to be a part of right now."


7. (SBU) Trung warned that it will not be useful to approach
the leadership on the issue of the Statement of Interdiction
Principles again any time soon, and definitely not before
the 10th National Communist Party Congress scheduled for
April 18-25. The MFA attempted to submit a paper on
Vietnam's opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to the Party leadership for inclusion in the
Party Congress' foreign policy document (a guidance paper
that gives overall direction to Vietnam's foreign policy for
the next five years),but it was returned with curt
instructions to "pursue further research with all relevant
agencies," Trung said. "That was the Party's way of saying
`not this, not now,'" he explained.


8. (SBU) Vietnam, especially the MFA, is very open-minded
about PSI and "is not ruling it out forever." In fact,
Vietnam has been one of the countries in the region that has
actively supported PSI's consideration, and has found itself
"far out in front" of other ASEANs on the subject.


9. (SBU) When pressed on the subject of Vietnam's
participation in the May 31 conference in Poland, Trung said
that it is possible that Vietnam might be able to consider
using the "case by case basis" authorization of the Prime
Minister, but participation would be at "a relatively low
level" and cannot be considered before the end of the Party
Congress. Trung promised to review the issue with us again
at the end of April, after the Congress finishes.

Comment
--------------


10. (SBU) Vietnam does not now have the consensus among its
agencies and leaders that it needs to endorse the SOP. In
advance of the Party Congress, no one is going to take
risks, and advocating PSI is a risk at this point. We
expect the Party Congress to provide a mostly new leadership
slate, including a new PM and new Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and possibly Defense, and we will raise PSI with
them as soon as we can. Attendance in Poland, though,
remains a very long shot.

MARINE