VIETNAM'S PARTY CONGRESS: CONSERVATIVES AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 001245

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KCOR VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM'S PARTY CONGRESS: CONSERVATIVES AND
PROGRESSIVES TIE, LE HONG ANH IS MVP

REFS: A. Hanoi 943; B. Hanoi 895; C. Hanoi 839; D.
Hanoi 848; E. HCMC 382; F. Hanoi 788; G. Hanoi 771; H.
Hanoi 1090; I. HCMC 503

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Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Analysis of the new membership of the
Communist Party of Vietnam's Central Committee and
Politburo following the April National Party Congress
indicates a barely perceptible victory of conservative
over progressive elements within the Party (although
Party insiders now say that the
progressive/conservative rubric is becoming
increasingly meaningless.) Restive Party Congress
delegates thwarted the Central Committee's plans to
expand the Politburo to 17 members and declined to
elect two of the favored Politburo candidates to the
new Central Committee at all. Minister of Public
Security Le Hong Anh was the surprise winner, emerging
as a power broker with a huge mandate within the Party,
but without a formal position - for now. End Summary.

--------------
Nuts and Bolts of the New Central Committee
--------------


2. (SBU) The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) announced
the list of new Central Committee members, including
160 official members and 21 alternates, during the 10th
National Party Congress on April 24 (Refs A-D).
Compared to the previous Central Committee, members
concurrently holding key Government positions decreased
from 34 to 28, including 15 vice ministers, 10
ministers, the State Bank Governor and Deputy Prime
Ministers Nguyen Tan Dzung (Ref E) and Pham Gia Khiem.
The reduction represents the fact that some key
officials are retiring or being forced out, and their
replacements have not yet been named; these successors
will almost certainly come from the new Central
Committee, so the number of Central Committee members
holding key government appointments will stabilize at
around 34, or perhaps slightly higher. Some 22 Central
Committee members are currently holding key Party
positions at central offices and media agencies, as
compared to 30 in the previous slate. Again, this
reflects retiring officials whose replacements have yet
to be announced.


3. (SBU) The military now has 16 of its own as Central
Committee members, as compared with 11 in the previous
Central Committee. Seven military generals were re-
elected, including Vice Minister and Chief of General
staff Phung Quang Thanh (who is expected to be named
Minister of Defense),General Political Department
Chief Le Van Dzung and three out of four other vice
ministers: Nguyen Huy Hieu, Phan Trung Kien and Nguyen
Van Duoc. New members representing the military in the
Central Committee include commanders of the Navy, the
Air Defense Force and all seven military regions.


4. (SBU) The Ministry of Public Security did very well
in the election, with seven of the nine top MPS
officials winning seats. These include Minister Le
Hong Anh and Vice Ministers Nguyen Khanh Toan, Le The
Tiem and Nguyen Van Huong. Furthermore, the three new
vice ministers who were appointed just before the Party
Congress opened in April also made the cut. This large
representation on the Central Committee adds weight to
the reports that the Ministry of Public Security will
split into two ministries (Ref F).


5. (SBU) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was shut out
of the Central Committee; no MFA officials are among
the regular membership, and the alternate list contains
just one mid-level (though fast rising) cadre:
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for International
Organizations Pham Binh Minh. However, MFA sources
point out, Deputy PM Pham Gia Khiem, who was elected to
the Politburo, is slated to take the Foreign Minister
position in addition to his Deputy PM job; the current
FM, Nguyen Dzy Nien, is not a member of the Politburo.
"We are in better shape with our Minister on the
Politburo and no representation in the Central
Committee, rather than lots of representatives in the
Central Committee and no spot on the Politburo," one
CPV member who works at the MFA told Poloff.


6. (SBU) As in past Central Committees, geographically,

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the new Central Committee is extremely diverse. Sixty-
three out of 64 provinces are represented, with only
the Central Highlands province of Dak Nong left out.
Hoang Cong Hoan, the former Party Secretary of Lang Son
Province, was not re-elected to the Central Committee.
In March, he was dismissed and reprimanded by the
Politburo for "signs of violations to the principle of
centralized democracy and Party's working method" after
becoming embroiled in a corruption scandal and the
embarrassing and expensive public failure of an
infrastructure project. However, Hoan landed on his
feet: in spite of being sacked in Lang Son and losing
his Central Committee seat, he was appointed a vice
chairman of the Central Committee-affiliated Commission
for Management and Finance, a position some would argue
is a promotion from his previous job in Lang Son.


7. (SBU) Hanoi has three representatives in the new
Central Committee, including Party Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong, Deputy Party Secretary Phung Huu Phu and
Chairman of the Municipal People's Committee Nguyen
Quoc Trieu. For Ho Chi Minh City, Party Secretary
Nguyen Minh Triet, Deputy Party Secretary Le Hoang
Quan, Chairman of the HCMC People's Committee Le Thanh
Hai and Vice Chairman of the People's Committee Nguyen
Thien Nhan were named to the Central Committee.


8. (SBU) The "election" of the Central Committee went
according to the CPV's plan. According to official
sources, all members of the new Central Committee
(official and alternate) were nominated by the previous
Central Committee; none of the two self-nominated or 33
"independent" candidates nominated by other delegates
at the 10th Party Congress succeeded. The failures
included widely disliked Minister of Public Health Tran
Thi Trung Chien and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nguyen Phu Binh.


9. (SBU) The presence of alternates in the new Central
Committee is important, and this is the first time in
20 years the Central Committee has included alternates.
According to local interlocutors, all 21 alternates are
successful mid-level officials, and their alternate
membership in the Central Committee marks them for
promotion in the future. The last time the CPV Central
Committee elected alternate members, in 1986, the
alternates were already high-ranking officials.
Alternate membership at that time was a form of
recognition of achievement without real significance,
commented local observers.

---
Politburo Structure: Narrow Victory for "Conservatives"
---


10. (SBU) According to our interlocutors, Nong Duc
Manh's re-election reflects a narrow victory for
conservative over progressive elements within the
Party's Central Committee after a surprisingly tough
battle. Ngo Cuong, Editor-in-Chief of the Supreme
People's Court-affiliated Judicial Journal, said
conservative elements favored the "safe choice" of
retaining Manh in office for another term, instead of
replacing him with challenger Nguyen Minh Triet from Ho
Chi Minh City, despite Triet's popularity among
delegates attending the Party Congress. According to
Cuong, over the past five years, Manh has proven to be
an incompetent and indecisive leader, which in fact
made him attractive to those in the Party who do not
want a strong leader who might challenge the
deliberative consensus-based decisionmaking process in
the Party. Conservative elements within the Party, who
favored the "status-quo" scenario, successfully
insisted on having the Central Committee elect the
Party Chief rather than adopt an alternative proposal
to open up the Party Chief election to the entire
Congress, a setback for the "progressives."


11. (SBU) According to Cuong, these conservative
elements were counting on the new Central Committee
members to demonstrate loyalty to Manh, whose
"Personnel Task Force" recommended their selection by
the previous Central Committee. The failure of any non-
sanctioned candidate to win election to the Central
Committee and the rejection of the proposal to expand
voting for the Politburo to the entire Congress were
victories for the conservatives, former Office of the
National Assembly Vice Chairman (and failed candidate
for the Central Committee) Nguyen Sy Dzung told Poloff.

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12. (SBU) Party Chief Nong Duc Manh held off a
challenge from Nguyen Minh Triet, but his allies had to
yield key State and Government positions to the so-
called "southern progressive factions" in the
Politburo. This is a clear reflection of the current
power struggle within the country's top institutions,
commented Prof. Ngo Van Hoa from the Institute of
History. Among southerners coming out on top, former
HCMC Party Secretary Truong Tan Sang, chief of the
Party Central Economic Commission in the previous
Central Committee, has been named Permanent Standing
Member of the Politburo Secretariat, a powerful
position that is sometimes considered deputy to the
Party Chief. Similarly, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai
has publicly endorsed Permanent Deputy Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dzung (also from the south) to replace him
as PM at the end of the ongoing National Assembly
session. Finally, current HCMC Party Secretary Nguyen
Minh Triet is expected to become the State President.
This represents a net gain on the Politburo for the
supposedly progressive southerners, but Manh's survival
as Party Chief means the status-quo conservatives
maintain the upper hand, slightly.

---
Rank and File Thwart the Establishment's Plans
---


13. (SBU) When the Congress' votes for Central
Committee members were counted, it was clear that Manh
and his allies had received a bloody nose. Two
Government ministers, Home Affairs Minister Do Quang
Trung and Minister of Education and Training Nguyen
Minh Hien, were not elected to the new Central
Committee despite being nominated by the previous
Central Committee, demonstrating a clear lack of
confidence in their abilities among the Congress
delegates. Party insiders said that both Hien and
Trung were expected to be named to the new Politburo.
The two ministers, however, were blamed for
shortcomings and mistakes that took place in their
domains that outweighed their Party connections and
ideological loyalty, Cuong asserted.


14. (SBU) Trung's downfall involved the PMU 18
corruption scandal (Refs G and H),disclosed shortly
before the Party Congress opened. That case involved
both the Minister and a Vice Minister of
Transportation, both of whom were supposed to become
members of the new Central Committee, with the Minister
expected to be promoted to Deputy Prime Minister.
Trung, the Minister of Home Affairs, was implicated
because of the work he did in his position to
facilitate the promotion of the central figure in the
scandal. Though he escaped investigation and
prosecution, the Congress delegates registered their
anger at his involvement in the scandal by withholding
votes for him for the Central Committee. As a result,
he is likely to lose not just his elevation to the
Politburo, but also his job, despite the efforts of
Party insiders to protect him.


15. (SBU) The other "missing member" of the Politburo,
according to Prof. Hoa, is Phung Huu Phu, currently
standing vice chairman of Hanoi Party's Committee and a
protege of Hanoi Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong. Trong,
currently heading the CPV Central Committee's
Theoretical Council, has long been seen as a truly
conservative ideologue and is expected to replace
Nguyen Van An as Chairman of the National Assembly
during the May-June 2006 session of the National
Assembly. Phu was supposed to be elected to the
Politburo, ensuring his succession to Trong's Hanoi
Party Chief position. However, he failed to win a
majority of Central Committee votes and was thus left
out of the Politburo, Hoa asserted. Pham Quang Nghi,
the conservative Minister of Culture and Information,
who was elected to the Politburo, is now expected to
replace Trong. With the absence of Hien, Trung and
Phu, the Politburo stands at 14, despite the earlier
decision to elect 17 members. No other candidate
received a more than 50 percent approval rating. That
said, some HCMC contacts report that the Politburo will
expand membership to 17 later in the year.

---
Choice of Manh versus Triet: Role of Le Hong Anh
---

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16. (SBU) Echoing Cuong's assertion regarding Nguyen
Minh Triet's popularity as the challenger to Nong Duc
Manh for the position of Party Chief among delegates
attending the Party Congress, Professor Hoa said
Triet's chances of unseating Manh were good until
Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh, who has a
strong powerbase in the Party and was the top vote-
getter in the Politburo after Manh's coronation,
withdrew his support for Triet at the last minute. One
government official, speaking to Poloff on the deepest
of background, noted with disgust that following the
Party Congress, "Anh is in the kingmaker seat, and
suddenly all the PMU-18 pressure on Manh goes away."


17. (SBU) That official noted that Le Hong Anh is the
lead official directing the investigation of the PMU-18
case, which was widely considered to be very damaging
to Manh because PMU-18 employs several of his proteges,
including his son-in-law. Now, however, investigators
have "failed to reach the end of the trail because
powerful figures have seemingly put a stop to them."
The official noted that soon after the conclusion of
the Congress, the Ministry of Public Security conducted
another meeting, after which Major General Cao Ngoc
Oanh stood with a relaxed smile at a press conference,
side by side with his fellow investigators who
confirmed that they are "still on the same boat." Oanh
had lost his ticket to attend the Party Congress, as
well as his widely-expected election to the Central
Committee and promotion to Vice Minister of Public
Security, after press reports of his involvement in the
case appeared.


18. (SBU) Cuong and Hoa quoted other local observers as
saying there appears to have been a significant change
in MPS's approach to the PMU-18 case since the Party
Congress, which must relate to a change in Le Hong
Anh's attitude about it. Local observers say Anh, who
is still relatively young at the age of 57, is likely
to take a more important portfolio within the Party.
They noted that for the first time, the list of members
to the new Politburo was made public in the order of
votes each member received, instead of in rank of
importance/top positions. Anh received the second
largest number of votes of support, after Manh, who
received everyone's vote by virtue of already having
been chosen Party Leader.

---
Conservative vs. Progressive: Consider Corruption
---


19. (SBU) Despite our desire to frame Vietnamese intra-
Party politics as a competition between two well-
defined factions, our interlocutors caution that
"conservative/progressive" labels have become much less
meaningful. Cuong, Hoa and Senior Colonel Tran Nhung,
a senior journalist of Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's
Army) newspaper, said there is no clear difference
between progressive and conservative elements in terms
of ideological belief and only a limited difference in
terms of geographic origin. The only significant
difference between them might be their attitude on how
to promote national anti-corruption efforts and deal
with corrupt officials and the speed they prefer for
economic (and, to a lesser extent, political) reform.
There exists a common belief that current prominent
southern figures like Triet, Dzung and Sang have not
been as involved in corruption cases and/or the use of
corrupt officials, which makes them better candidates
for top leadership positions (although Sang lost his
luster for many years because his oversight of HCMC
during the heyday of mobster Nam Cam). For this
reason, more corrupt elements within the Party often
insist on "safe choices" when it comes to personnel
issues, using the pretext of maintaining stability in
order to avoid "disruption" through overzealous pursuit
of corrupt cadres, said Nhung.


20. (SBU) The Party is attempting to make the right
noises on the subject of corruption. Speaking at the
opening session of the 10th Party Congress in April,
Party Chief Nong Duc Manh made a shocking statement (by
Vietnamese standards),saying that corruption is "one
of the major threats to the survival of the system."
"The degradation in terms of political ideology, moral
quality, lifestyle, opportunism, individualism and
bureaucracy, corruption and wastefulness by cadres and

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civil servants is serious," he said.


21. (SBU) Furthermore, in May, Prime Minister Phan Van
Khai said the Party will assign a Politburo member to
be Deputy Prime Minister in charge of anti-corruption
efforts. According to Ngo Cuong and Tran Nhung, it is
likely that Truong Vinh Trong, current CPV Central
Internal Commission chief and a strong voice for anti-
corruption and Party reform, will be assigned to that
position. Ngo Cuong, however, expressed doubt that
Trong will be able to make much progress. Local
observers who followed the Party Congress were
disappointed that the Congress focused too much on
reviewing 20 years of Doi Moi (economic renovation),
and failed to map out the political reform that is
essential to the promotion of democracy and
transparency and to efficient anti-corruption efforts,
Cuong asserted. He quoted former Party Chief Le Kha
Phieu as saying that "corruption is guarded by the
perpetrators and even defended by outside sources.
This really is a fierce battle in which, if we wish to
win, the Party and the State must take a closer look at
themselves." The slowdown in PMU-18 prosecution (in
particular Gen. Oanh's rapid rehabilitation) suggests
that anticorruption efforts will not be too radical.


22. (SBU) Troels Vester, a program manager and law
enforcement expert in Hanoi for the UN Office of Drugs
and Crime, pointed out that although MPS's prosecution
of the PMU-18 case may not have been a triumphant
success from the perspective of crime fighting, it was
a devastatingly clear demonstration of Le Hong Anh's
power over any Government or Party official, up to and
including the General Secretary. Considering that:
public sentiment is so clearly disgusted with public
corruption; the main current mechanisms for
investigating and prosecuting corruption now fall under
the Ministry of Public Security; nearly every senior
Government and Party official in Vietnam (or their
families) is guilty of at least some corrupt activity;
and, Minister of Public Security Anh received a
commanding mandate in the Poliburo election, he has
amassed more power than any Vietnamese official in a
generation, Vester said.

---
Comment
---


23. (SBU) Public Security Minister Le Hong Anh was the
clearest winner in the 10th National Party Congress. A
relatively low-profile member of the Politburo with
ties to Nguyen Tan Dzung, in the months before the
National Party Congress, Anh was the key figure
directing the investigation and prosecution of the PMU-
18 case. Considering the smorgasbord of possible
corruption investigations available to the MPS in
Vietnam, the timing and targeting of this one (a few
months before the Congress, at an agency stacked with
Manh proteges, including Manh's son-in-law) could not
have been accidental. Weakened conservative
northerners rallied around Manh, but ultimately had to
yield both the State President and the PM jobs to
southerners (in the past, only the PM job went to a
southerner) before they secured Anh's support for
retaining Manh.


24. (SBU) The drama of the 10th Party Congress may not
be over. The Party took the unprecedented step of
acknowledging that Anh received the most Politburo
votes of any Central Committee member other than Manh.
Listing Anh as number two in the Politburo, a position
normally accorded to the State President regardless of
vote counts, is a loud signal that Anh will hold
significant authority. His specific job title is not
yet decided; he may stay as Minister of Public
Security, or take over the previously dormant position
of National Security Committee head on the Politburo
and oversee MPS or its successor agencies from there.
And there is another possibility that is increasingly
whispered about in Hanoi and HCMC: that Manh had to
agree to step down early in his second term as the
price of his re-election, just as General Secretary Do
Muoi was forced to yield to Le Kha Phieu in 1997.


25. (SBU) Regardless of what eventually happens to
Manh, the 57 year-old Anh has positioned himself to be
a powerful force in Vietnamese political life, which
after the 10th Party Congress appears to be more

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personal and less geographic and ideological. End
Comment.

BOARDMAN