ENERGY: MOVING LABRADOR'S LOWER CHURCHILL PROJECT TO

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG PGOV CA
SUBJECT: ENERGY: MOVING LABRADOR'S LOWER CHURCHILL PROJECT TO
REALITY

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1. SUMMARY: Suitors have lined up for a chance to be part of
the long-anticipated project to develop the hydroelectric
resource of the Lower Churchill River in Newfoundland-Labrador.
A tough but calculated business plan by Premier Danny Williams,
coupled with new market dynamics, has economists and even the
Premier's staunchest political foes predicting that it looks
good for the multi-billion dollar project to proceed. Estimated
output from the facility could be enough to supply 1.4 million
households in eastern North America. However, until the
provincial government decides on a specific marketing and
transmission plan, just what portion of the output will be
available for export to the United States will remain unknown.
END SUMMARY


2. Danny Williams, the high profile premier of
Newfoundland-Labrador, is once again at the forefront of another
mega energy project: this time the decades-old dream of
harnessing the hydroelectric potential of Labrador's Lower
Churchill River (LCR). Since his election as Premier in 2003
Williams has developed a reputation as a bare-knuckled fighter
for his province's economic well-being. His zealous policy of
controlling development of his province's resources while
maximizing economic returns has seen him take on Ottawa and win
big on oil and gas royalties. However, his strong-arm tactics
frustrated major oil companies in their negotiations with the
Premier on a development deal for the province's fourth offshore
project, Hebron, with the result that they walked away. Whether
the Premier went too far in pushing the industry in the Hebron
case remains to be seen. However, when it comes to the LCR
project, the Premier's hard-nosed business tactics are not
dissuading some high level contenders from wanting to want to
work with him in moving the LCR project from a dream to a
reality.

Project Specifics
--------------


3. To quote the Newfoundland-Labrador government's promotional
literature, the Lower Churchill River is a significant untapped
long-term source of clean, renewable energy available for the
North American electricity market. Located 140 miles from the
existing 5,428-megawatt generating facility at Churchill Falls,
Labrador, the proposed project includes two potential sites. A
2,000 megawatt project at Gull Island has the potential to
produce an average 11.9 terawatt-hours of energy annually. An
824-megawatt project at Muskrat Falls has the potential to
produce an average 4.8 terawatt-hours per year. Combined, the
projects have the potential to produce sufficient energy to
supply up to 1.4 million households annually.


4. The cost of the project will depend on whether the Gull
Island and Muskrat Falls sites are developed at the same time
(the province's preference) and how each site is configured.
Because of the varying development options, analysts are looking
at a broad range of total costs, falling anywhere from $6 to $9
billion. Assuming the project goes ahead, the estimated
start-up date would be 2015.

Routing And Marketing Options: US Market Only One Option
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5. The provincial government is looking at two very different
options for getting Lower Churchill's combined 2,800 megawatts
of power to market. Option number one is the so-called
traditional route that would see LCR power wheeled through
Quebec and then to energy markets in that province, Ontario and
the United States. Option number two is the Maritime route
which would see the electricity moved across Labrador and then
by underwater cable to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and from
there to the United States. Until those marketing options are
settled, it is unclear just how much LCR power will be available
for export to the United States.

Getting the Project Moving: Past and Current Attempts
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6. The dream to see a second hydro project in Labrador has been
around for over 30 years and the province's history books show
several failed attempts to get the project off the ground.
Recent attempts include those proposed by Premier Williams'
immediate predecessors, Liberal Premiers Roger Grimes (2002) and
Brian Tobin (1998). As analysts have concluded, these previous
deals were doomed to fail, principally, because they were too
wrapped up in politics. The general perception in the minds of
the Newfoundland-Labrador electorate was that the premiers were
too quick to sell off a valuable energy resource to the only
suitor, Hydro-Quebec (HQ). Also, HQ was portrayed as a bully,
holding Newfoundland-Labrador ransom because it controlled the
transmission lines that the LCR project would need. To add to

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the contentious atmosphere, the ghost of the existing Churchill
Falls contract haunted any negotiations on the LCR project.
Signed in the 1960s the Churchill Falls contract allows HQ to
purchase the output from the 5,428-megawatt facility at cheap
rates with no escalator clauses. Several Newfoundland-Labrador
premiers have tried to reopen the contract to no avail, which
led them to insist on onerous conditions in a future LCR
contract as a means of compensation for Churchill Falls.


7. Enter Danny Williams in 2003 who with his successful
business background was quick to take a fresh look at the LCF
project. The result was a whole new strategy featuring a
pragmatic, business approach, not politics or emotions. The
first notable change with the Williams' game plan was that the
ghost of Churchill Falls would no longer have any influence. As
Williams told Newfoundlanders and Labradoreans, "just get it
over it." Also different this time is the premier's decision to
have the provincially-owned utility, Newfoundland-Labrador
Hydro, not politicians, on the frontlines of the process.
Furthermore, the premier made another business decision by
calling in some high-priced help, hiring independent industry
consultants to advise the new LCR team.


8. By far the most radical difference from previous attempts to
get the project kick-started was the Premier's move to dispel
the notion that LCR could only be developed by the direct
participation of HQ. Instead, the Premier embarked on an
ambitious plan to see just who else might be interested in
getting the project moving. What followed was his release of a
competitive, five-phase strategy aimed at finding the best
entity to develop the project, with no preference to any one
group that might have had a past interest in the project, i.e.,
HQ. Phase one of the strategy was letting the world know about
LCR and inviting expressions of interest. Phase two is the
assessment of the different proposals. Phase three, the
negotiation of commercial principles with the selected entity;
and phase four, detailed commercial negotiations.

Where we are now - Assessing the Proposals
--------------


9. In January 2005 the government launched Phase one by sending
out individual invitations to private companies and government
jurisdictions and by running ads in global business newspapers
and magazines. By March 31, 2005, 25 interested parties
responded. From that list, the LCR team found three development
proposals to their liking and three financing options. The
review team is currently crunching the numbers and finishing the
risk analysis for each. Speculation is there will be a final
cut by the last half of 2006.

Who Made the Cut?
--------------


10. The three development proponents under consideration are:

a) Hydro Quebec/Ontario Energy Financing Company/SNC-Lavalin.
Hydro Quebec is owned by the government of Quebec; Ontario
Energy Financing Company is one of the five components
established by the restructuring of the former Ontario Hydro;
and SNC-Lavalin is a privately owned engineering and
construction company.

b) TransCanada Corporation, a publicly traded North American
energy company, headquartered in Calgary.

c) The Tshiaskueshish Group, a consortium comprised of
Australian, Canadian and First Nation business interests in
Labrador.

The three financial proponents are:

a) Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Limited, a Hong Kong
diversified infrastructure company.

b) Borealis Infrastructure Management Inc. a subsidiary of the
Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, one of Canada's
largest pension plans.

c) Altius, a Newfoundland and Labrador based royalty and mineral
exploration investment company focused on resource development
in Newfoundland and Labrador.

The Other Contender - The Newfoundland-Labrador Government
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11. Consistent with his government's policy of maintaining
control over the province's resources and maximizing economic
returns, the Premier also has another option, going it alone.

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The Premier's thinking is if the 25 interested parties who bid
on the project believe they can develop it, there is no reason
why the Newfoundland-Labrador government cannot do the same.
With the money from the new offshore royalty agreement, the
Premier believes this cash provides the province with the
required leverage in dealing with any potential developers or
financial partners in a Newfoundland-Labrador led project. To
let all the parties know that the Williams government is serious
in its intent to be an equal contender, it formally applied to
Hydro Quebec's transmission division for approval to wheel the
LCR power through its transmission system. The province has
already made a refundable deposit of $17 million, which presents
an estimate of one-month tariff for using HQ infrastructure
through its Open Access Transmission Tariff. At present, HQ is
studying the application, but will have to come up with a
response at some point.

Comment: Is It Really LCR's Day In The Sun?
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12. With a number of serious propositions on the table and a
changed energy market which now favors new, clean power sources
like the LCR, many economists, joined surprisingly enough by the
Premier's political foes, believe it is time for LCR's day in
the sun. Moreover, the Premier's steadfast business approach
should mean that the province can get the most realistic and
cost-effective development plan possible. While finding an
interested party now appears likely, there are still several
hurdles to overcome before the project can move ahead. The
premier has been very forthright in discussing what these are:
environmental and aboriginal issues and equally important,
national political considerations. A specific issue will be to
determine just what role the new Harper government may play in
the project.


13. Considering the Premier's record of never shying away from
a battle, he will be looking to Ottawa for such things as loan
guarantees or other forms of financial involvement. However,
just how interested the Conservative government in Ottawa will
be in helping to finance a project where the bulk of the power
might leave the country, remains to be seen. While these
considerations will be complicating factors further down the
road, for now the Premier and his LCR team are focused on the
immediate task of reviewing the different proposals. Once that
is completed, then the next battle starts: Premier Williams
going head to head with a would-be developer in the commercial
negotiations of Phase three. Given his tenaciousness as a
negotiator, our money is on Williams to take every possible
nickel off the table. END COMMENT
HILL