South China's Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GUANGZHOU 031861

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM AND INR
NRC FOR COMMISSIONER JAZCKO
PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2021
TAGS: ENRG KNNP KSCA ECON CH
SUBJECT: South China's Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station:
Commissioner Jazcko Tours Ling Ao Facility


CORRECTED COPY

(U) Classified by Consul General Robert Goldberg for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: During a September 26, 2006 tour of the
Ling Ao units of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station near
Shenzhen in Guangdong Province, Steven Lau, Senior Vice
President of the Daya Bay Operations and Management Co.,
told NRC Commissioner Gregory Jazcko that Chinese plans for
nuclear power development envisage a combination of
indigenous and imported pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
China will have to import the reactor vessels for the units
under construction at Daya Bay, likely from Japan, but
plans to roll and weld them locally. Lau also explained
the need to hire new staff to handle an expanded nuclear
power program. Security measures at Daya Bay's reactor
sites include a mixed civilian and military guard force,
fences, closed-circuit TV cameras, microwave and infrared
sensors, and hydraulic bollards. Coordinated security
drills are conducted regularly. End Summary.


2. (U) Lau told Commissioner Jazcko that Daya Bay has six
pressurized water reactor (PWR) units - four units are
currently in operation and two are under construction. The
units are primarily constructed of components supplied by
Framatome/Areva.

FUEL
--------------


3. (SBU) Lau said that the fuel elements are fabricated in
China from components imported from France. Although China
has the ability to produce the full fuel elements
domestically, the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Co.
(GNPJVC) prefers to continue with the current system using
proven materials. GNPJVC had only one slight leak problem
two years ago and one potential leak that was never
identified. GNPJVC keeps two quality control personnel at
the fuel fabrication plant. Lau noted that spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) costs are much greater than in the United States
- about 0.5 cents per kWh to a contractor. SNF is stored
in the Spent Fuel Pool for at least eight years. Daya Bay
started moving SNF to a wet storage facility in Lanzhou two
years ago. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) plans
to build a reprocessing plant in Lanzhou but has not yet
received funding. The NRC delegation visited the nearly
empty Spent Fuel Pool at Ling Ao, which contains only 22
fuel elements.

PLANNED LING DONG REACTORS
--------------


4. (SBU) GNPJVC is building two 1080 MW reactors at the
Daya Bay Ling Dong site, which are updated versions of the
systems at Ling Ao, to be completed in less than 60 months
for approximately USD 3 billion. GNPJVC expects a minimum
of 50% self reliance for unit 1 and 70% for unit 2. China
will have to import the reactor vessels, probably from
Japan, but plans to roll and weld them locally. China's
nuclear power development plan envisions a combination of
indigenous and imported PWRs. Lau noted that he did not
know why China purchased the CANDU reactors at Qinshan
Phase III, but he assumed it was a political decision.


5. (SBU) For the Generation III reactors currently in the
bidding process, GNPJVC is asking for a 55 to 58 month
building term. Lau stated that anything longer than 60
months is unacceptable.

POWER GRID PROBLEMS
--------------


6. (SBU) GNPJVC's main electricity distribution problems
come from upstream in the mainland network - every
transmission irregularity in the grid effects Daya Bay,
notably from Three Gorges, Guizhou, and Guangxi, which use
DC lines. These irregularities sometimes cause reactor
shutdowns ("SCRAMs").

GUANGZHOU 00031861 002 OF 003



BEST PRACTICES
--------------


7. (U) In the briefing, and while touring the facility, Lau
emphasized GNPJVC's commitment to business acumen, safety
management, safety culture, and human performance. As a
result of following industry best practices, Daya Bay has a
capacity factor close to 90%, and plans to decrease annual
outage time from 31 days to 26 days within five years.


8. (U) The areas of the station seen were modern and well-
maintained. The NRC delegation noted that the Chinese take
a very conservative approach with respect to protection
from contamination, which requires the removal of all
except modesty garments before donning station-provided
clothing.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
--------------


9. (SBU) According to Lau, Daya Bay cannot be a member of
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) because
Taiwan's nuclear facilities are members. However, Daya Bay
participates in the World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO) program.


10. (SBU) The off-site review board for Daya Bay is
composed primarily of Americans, including two former NRC
employees - Jack Martin, former Regional Administrator of
Regions III and IV, and Clay Warren, a senior resident
inspector at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant in
Massachusetts and at the Arkansas nuclear power plant, who
transitioned to senior management at several licensees.

EXPERIENCE DILUTION
--------------


11. (SBU) Lau explained that one of the main challenges for
GNPJVC, and China's nuclear power program as a whole, is
experience dilution. China has a small group of reactor
operators, technicians, and maintenance staff who have
around 10 years of experience. As the program grows, many
new personnel will be hired, effectively diluting the
overall experience in the industry. GNPJVC has started a
training program, recruiting engineering students from
around China to receive nuclear specific training at the
Daya Bay site (a new dorm is under construction at Daya Bay
to house the students). Lau noted that most of the
students come from outside Guangdong Province, as the
engineering education in Guangdong is considered
substandard.

SITE SECURITY
--------------


12. (S) Lau said the security program at Daya Bay relies on
a total guard force of about 300 people from three
organizations - the local guard staff of about 100, 42
local police, and about 150 from the military who are
stationed adjacent to the reactor site. The facility has
two security fences, closed-circuit TV cameras, and
microwave and infrared sensors inside the fences.
Hydraulic bollards prevent unauthorized vehicle access to
the reactor sites. In an emergency, about 600 People's
Armed Police (PAP) can be called up almost immediately, and
up to 1,000 PAP can be called up within an hour. The plant
management cannot communicate directly with the military
forces on site; the military uses a separate radio
communication frequency. The local guard force and the
military also have different shift schedules. However, all
three security forces hold coordinated drills. Lau
described an unplanned drill, where he and another staff
member disguised themselves, purposely breached the outer
fence and timed the response. During the unplanned drills,
responders were instructed by Lau not to report in once
they arrived at the scene, thereby triggering the next
level of security. The local guard staff arrived within
one minute, the police force within five minutes, and the

GUANGZHOU 00031861 003 OF 003


military within eight minutes.

WASTE STORAGE
--------------


13. (S) The delegation also visited Daya Bay's low-level
waste storage site, which is directly adjacent to the
Guangdong Province low-level storage site for medical and
research waste. The Daya Bay site consists of two rows of
open crates - an older Westinghouse design, according to
Lau. Once a crate is full, it is covered with dirt. The
waste is retrievable if a new site or disposal system is
established. Lau stated that the provincial storage site
was simply a low building, holding drums of waste. While
the site is fairly remote and surrounded by hills, the only
security at the site appeared to be a fence and a guard at
the entrance building.

GOLDBERG