Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN833
2006-08-21 18:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST,

Tags:  PGOV PINS KDEM GY 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGE #0833/01 2331808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211808Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3967
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0992
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0368
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0145
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2173
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0081
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000833 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/OAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY
SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST,
COALITIONS

REF: GEORGETOWN 743

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/OAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM GY
SUBJECT: GUYANA ELECTION SCENARIOS: POSSIBLE UNREST,
COALITIONS

REF: GEORGETOWN 743

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) SUMMARY: With elections just a week away, Guyana's
65-seat National Assembly is still up for grabs and the
security situation remains on edge. While Bharrat Jagdeo
looks all but certain to win another term as president with a
plurality, his People's Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) may
fall short of the absolute majority it needs to control the
National Assembly. If the PPP/C gets less than fifty percent
of the vote, it will usher in a new era of coalition politics
in Guyana. Opinion is divided over whether Georgetown will
descend into post-election violence again this time. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Latest Polling Figures
--------------


2. (U) Despite the difficulty in conducting statistically
valid polls in Guyana, the non-partisan North American
Caribbean Teachers Association (NACTA) has a proven track
record of political polling in Guyana.

Support by party (percent):

Aug. 21 Aug. 7 July
-------------- -------------- --------------
PPP/C 47 45 42
PNC/R 27 28 29
AFC 16 15 13
JFA 4 5 5
ROAR-GAP 2 2 1
TUF 1 1 1
Undecided 3 4 9

--------------
AFC Plays Kingmaker for Either PPP/C or PNC/R
--------------


3. (C) The primary aim of the Alliance For Change (AFC) is to
hold the PPP to less than fifty percent of Parliament. AFC
Presidential candidate Trotman tells us the AFC will not
enter a formal alliance with either the PPP/C or the the
PNC/R, but rather prefers for the AFC to work as a
constructive, responsible, and independent member of the
Parliamentary opposition -- supporting the government when it
deserves support and opposing measures that deserve
opposition.


4. (SBU) However, if it AFC gains six to ten seats in
Parliament, the AFC could find itself in position to
negotiate with the PPP/C or People's National

Congress/Reform-One Guyana (PNC/R) to control a majority in
the National Assembly. There are two major obstacles to
either coalition forming: 1) The AFC's presidential candidate
Raphael Trotman and prime ministerial candidate Khemraj
Ramjattan split acrimoniously with the PNC/R and PPP/C,
respectively, in the past two years; 2) AFC supporters may
feel disillusioned by a coalition, since its existence is
predicated on rejecting Guyana's two dominant parties. On
the other hand, by playing one off against the other the AFC
could put itself in a strong position as kingmaker.


5. (C) If it linked up with the PPP/C, the AFC could be in a
position to demand a few key Cabinet seats as the junior
partner in government. Given the lack of a PPP/C track
record in working constructively with another party and the
AFC's vehement criticism of the PPP/C government, this
scenario would surely cause friction. Furthermore, Trotman
tell us that he is wary of linking with the PPP/C unless it
cleans house. He is specifically worried that major PPP/C
figures may be indicted in the U.S. for narco-trafficking and
does not want to be associated with a PPP/C government if
that happens. Post thinks a PPP/C-AFC alliance would either
break down quickly or, in an optimistic scenario, provoke a
salutary upheaval within the PPP/C as incompetent and/or
corrupt party cronies get eased out.



6. (SBU) A PNC/R-AFC combination of the two largest
opposition parties could provide them with enough seats to
control the National Assembly. This would give the coalition
a strong hand in developing legislation with the PPP
executive and allow them to push their own initiatives. The
AFC would be bolder in negotiating with the PNC/R -- a party
in long-term decline that now appeals almost solely to
Afro-Guyanese -- than with the PPP.

--------------
PPP/C and PNC/R Gang Up to Keep AFC Out in Cold
--------------


7. (SBU) Another potential scenario -- widely rumored in
Georgetown -- is that the PNC/R will join forces with the
PPP/C. Although these two parties have been bitter rivals
for over forty years, they could grudgingly enter a coalition
in order to preserve the status quo and shut out the AFC.
Both parties have enjoyed the benefits of an entrenched
two-party system, so the threat of having to share power with
the upstart AFC may drive them together. "Re-merging" with
the PPP (the PNC originally splintered from the PPP in the
1950s) would effectively spell the PNC/R's end -- but its
leadership is so desperate to get back into the corridors of
power that it might not care.

--------------
No Clarity on Post-Election Violence
--------------


8. (SBU) In the run-up to election day, Georgetown is
crawling with "Guyana watchers" from far and wide (i.e., OAS,
The Carter Center, CARICOM, UK, USG) who have followed the
nation's electoral scene since Guyana's first free election
in 1992 -- yet there is no consensus around the potential for
post-election violence. There are too many new variables at
play, including the potential impact of the AFC. During much
of the past year it looked like the PNC/R was trying to
derail the election process to provoke a constitutional
crisis and/or an international response. The PNC/R is hotly
contesting the election. But this does not necessarily
indicate that PNC/R elements -- still convinced that the
PNC/R will lose -- may not try to use violence as a tool to
secure a role in government. Many Guyanese seem resigned to
violence because it happens after every election, but no one
has specific information about what could happen this time.


9. (SBU) The Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) intends to
announce final election results to the public by 20:00
Wednesday August 30. The intervening 48 hours is a critical
period for those who would foment unrest. But if the
announcement of results drags out longer or appears
disorganized, it will give disgruntled factions an excuse to
mobilize and protest. Much is riding on GECOM's performance
to reduce the chance of violence. Unfortunately, GECOM is
behind on key communictions and logistics issues despite the
donor community's repeated urging over the past several
months. GECOM is still sorting out the plan and funding for
setting up a media center to announce the results. Also,
they have not finalized its strategy for transmitting the
results from the field to GECOM. Guyana has been in this
position before -- hectic, last-minute election preparations.
Odds are that something will go wrong.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) If the PPP/C pulls off an absolute majority, then the
next five years will just be more of the same for Guyana.
Forty years of single-party dominance of all branches of
government have served Guyana poorly (first by the PNC, then
the PPP/C since 1992). The legislature has serious work
ahead of it in order to implement the reforms Guyana needs to
secure stability and development. A scenario that includes a
third party block in Parliament positioned to be the balance
of power gives all major parties political a real stake and
has the best chance of shaking up Guyanese politics. END
COMMENT.


Thomas