Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN815
2006-08-14 17:42:00
SECRET
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

(U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121)

Tags:  PINR PGOV SNAR GY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0034
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGE #0815/01 2261742
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141742Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3941
INFO RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4297
S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000815 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2031
TAGS: PINR PGOV SNAR GY
SUBJECT: (U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121)

REF: A. SECSTATE 130068

B. GEORGETOWN 804

C. GEORGETOWN 787

D. GEORGETOWN 743

E. GEORGETOWN 725

F. GEORGETOWN 679

G. GEORGETOWN 433

H. GEORGETOWN 235

I. GEORGETOWN 205

J. 03 GEORGETOWN 1150

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T GEORGETOWN 000815

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2031
TAGS: PINR PGOV SNAR GY
SUBJECT: (U) GUYANA ELECTION PREPARATIONS (C-AL6-01121)

REF: A. SECSTATE 130068

B. GEORGETOWN 804

C. GEORGETOWN 787

D. GEORGETOWN 743

E. GEORGETOWN 725

F. GEORGETOWN 679

G. GEORGETOWN 433

H. GEORGETOWN 235

I. GEORGETOWN 205

J. 03 GEORGETOWN 1150

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael D. Thomas
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Post presents response to ref A.


2. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE
GUYANA ELECTIONS COMMISSION (GECOM)? HOW IS CHAIRMAN STEVE
SURUJBALLY VIEWED WITHIN GECOM?

(C) The much-maligned GECOM has withstood constant criticism
and is on track to deliver free and fair elections August 28.
One commissioner resigned in late July. Then an internal
memorandum from the Deputy Chief Election Officer, in which
he threatened to resign and cast doubt on the feasibility of
an August 28 election, leaked to the press. But the
inexorable momentum towards elections has now taken over and
steamrolled these obstacles. This does not mean that
Surujbally has suddenly become a unifying, admired figure --
deep fissures remain in GECOM. But the professionalism of
the technical staff, who care deeply about their reputations,
is now the driving force. And because preparations are in
their final operational stage, the politicized commissioners
have less opportunity to undermine the process.


3. (C) HOW UNIFIED IS THE PPP GOING INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS?

(C) The PPP is trying very hard to present a very unified
campaign face, but divisions lurk beneath the surface.
Jagdeo and the party are not on the same page. The PPP was
scrambling until just before Nomination Day to assemble its
list of candidates.

(S) Jagdeo told Ambassador Bullen July 11 that there will be
"substantial" cabinet changes after the elections and he has
already informed these ministers. One casualty may be Head
of the Presidential Secretariat Dr. Roger Luncheon, who has
held that position as Guyana's de facto number two since the
PPP came to power in 1992. Luncheon has even criticized
Jagdeo in recent meetings with Ambassador and DCM, and
described conflicts between the PPP government (Jagdeo,

essentially) and PPP party headquarters. Other observers
have described the split between the idealistic Communist
wing of the party (who, ironically, are fairly well-disposed
to the U.S.) and the opportunists who entangled the
party/government into dealing with narco-criminal Roger Khan.

(C) Khemraj Ramjattan told PolOff in June that his contacts
on the PPP's Executive Committee said there is a real split
in the party leadership over Jagdeo. The old-timers fear
that Jagdeo will force them out if he wins another term in
office.


4. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT NAGAMOOTOO HAS GONE BACK TO THE
PPP. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PPP, GOING INTO THE
ELECTIONS?

(C) The PPP hopes that charismatic party-veteran Nagamootoo
will bring in another 3 to 4 percent of the popular vote.
This is a coup for the PPP, letting him back into the party
-- chastened but in a much weaker position. Nagamootoo's
presence on the PPP candidate list allows it to court young
voters (who might be drawn to the AFC) while still appealing
to older, traditional PPP supporters. But relations between
Jagdeo and Nagamootoo are reportedly poor. No doubt,
announcing in 2003 that he would seek the 2006 PPP
presidential nomination did not endear him to Jagdeo (ref J).
Nagamootoo has been virtually non-existent at PPP campaign
events, which focus on Jagdeo, PM Hinds and new faces on the
PPP list. Rumor has it that Nagamootoo is out of the country
for all of August.


5. (C) WHAT IS MOSES NAGAMOOTOO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE (AFC) PARTY AND ITS LEADER KHEMRAJ
RAMJATTAN?

(C) They are close personally and professionally, but
Ramjattan must have been disappointed that his friend and
colleague went back to the PPP. The younger but more
successful attorney Ramjattan shepherded Nagamootoo's late
entry into law practice. And Nagamootoo publicly stood by
Ramjattan during his 2004 expulsion from the PPP.


6. (C) WILL NAGAMOOTOO TRY TO CHALLENGE JAGDEO WITHIN THE
PPP? WHAT IS NAGAMOOTOO'S SUPPORT BASE WITHIN THE PPP? WHAT
IS HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE?

(C) It is very unlikely that Nagamootoo has the support
within the party hierarchy to mount a serious bid to
challenge Jagdeo. His principled 2005 "disengagement" (or
expulsion) from the PPP over the Gajraj affair surely
alienated the inner circle. However, Nagamootoo is
undoubtedly thinking of ways to use post-election
negotiations over control of the National Assembly to gain a
significant position.

(C) Nagamootoo has broad appeal with the general public and
those nostalgic for the PPP of the Cheddi Jagan era (see
opinion poll results para 7). But as time passes, the PPP
becomes more and more Jagdeo's party and less Jagan's.
Nagamootoo is a genial, well-liked man. However, he has
spent most of his adult life in the confines of the PPP
structure and frankly does not have much chief executive
style leadership experience.


7. (C) DOES JAGDEO HAVE THE MAJORITY OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE
PPP AND ITS CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO REMAIN LEADER OF
THE PARTY? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S POPULAR SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF THE
PARTY? WHAT INFLUENCE DOES JANET JAGAN EXERT WITHIN THE PPP,
ON JAGDEO, ON OTHER KEY POLITICAL ACTORS? WHAT IS JAGDEO'S
LEADERSHIP STYLE WITHIN THE PARTY AND WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT?
HAS IT CHANGED IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS,
AND IF SO, HOW? WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAGDEO OF
KHAN'S IMPENDING TRIAL?

(C) Jagdeo enjoys greater support outside the party than he
does among the old guard of the PPP inner circle. That said,
the PPP Executive Committee realizes that Jagdeo is the best
shot they have at winning an outright majority. An October
2005 poll of politicians' popularity showed that 58 percent
of respondents had a favorable view of Jagdeo, second only to
TV muckraker and small party leader C N Sharma. 53 percent
of respondents had a positive opinion of Nagamootoo; former
President Janet Jagan scored 51 percent.

(C) Jagdeo has tried to personalize his leadership as much as
possible, with the help of his gaggle of "Presidential
Advisors" whose allegiance is largely to Jagdeo rather than
the party (e.g., Robert Persaud - media, Kellawan Lall -
political, Manniram Prashad - investment, Odinga Lumumba -
Community Development). For example, the state-run TV
station (NCN) bombarded the airwaves this summer with spots
declaring that the "personal intervention of His Excellency
President Bharrat Jagdeo" made World Cup soccer coverage
possible. (Note: Despite the overt suggestion that Jagdeo
forked over cash himself, he actually just directed NCN to
buy the broadcast rights at a loss due to scarcity of
advertisers.) This episode may seem innocuous, but it
underscores the extent to which Jagdeo and the state media
try to portray him as benevolently overseeing his fiefdom.
Not so long ago, Jagdeo was still considered by most
political observers as a pawn of the party hierarchy. Now
some PPP stalwarts must be fretting over the president they
created.

(C) There are no signs that Jagdeo's micro-managing
leadership style has changed in the run-up to elections. In
fact, the August 28 election date is largely a product of his
determination to have elections before the September 2
extended constitutional deadline.

(S) Even at 85 years old Janet Jagan remains the matriarch of
the PPP, although her role will decline rapidly as her health
continues to decline. She still appears in public at party
events and writes a column in the PPP organ "Weekly Mirror".
Tellingly, Jagdeo apologized to Ambassador Bullen July 11 for
Jagan's vitriolic column that described the "stench of
rendition" in relation to Khan's expulsion. Jagdeo took
pains to make clear that Jagan does not speak on behalf of
the GoG. (Note: This is the first Guyanese election in over
fifty years that has not featured Janet Jagan as a prominent
member of the PPP slate.)

(S) The possibility that Khan reveals the PPP's dirty laundry
is the big wild card. Post understands that Khan may have
compromising information about Jagdeo. If Khan does reveal
this information in a proffer, it would spell the end for
Jagdeo. Nagamootoo could benefit in this scenario -- but it
is a long shot. The conventional wisdom says that the
highest levels of the GoG will go to great lengths to prevent
Khan from spilling the beans.


8. (C) WHAT IS THE AFC'S SUPPORT BASE?

(SBU) EmbOffs have observed very mixed crowds at AFC events
-- cutting across ethnic, age, social and economic lines.
The question is whether the AFC will retain this support into
the polls. In past elections, similar levels of support for
"up and coming" parties disappeared at the ballot box.
Please see ref B for a more thorough status report on the AFC.


9. (C) WILL THE AFC SUPPORT THE PPP OR PNC/R IN THE
ELECTIONS?

(C) The AFC will support neither party in the elections.
Depending on the results, the AFC will probably be open to
joining a coalition after the elections to control the
National Assembly.


10. (C) WHAT IS FORMER PNC/C MEMBER RAPHAEL TROTMAN'S
CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH RAMJATTAN?

(C) EmbOffs have met on numerous occasions with Trotman and
Ramjattan, both together and individually, in recent months.
There is no indication that their relationship is strained.
They are united in a shared disgust for what the PNC and PPP
have done for Guyana. Ramjattan appears comfortable with
being the AFC's prime ministerial candidate behind Trotman's
presidential bid.


11. (C) HOW UNITED IS THE OPPOSITION PNC/R AND WHAT ARE THE
PARTY'S MOTIVES IN TRYING TO DELAY ELECTIONS? REF H
INDICATES THE PARTY HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION APPROACHING THE
ELECTIONS SINCE 2002, AFTER THE DEATH OF ITS FORMER PARTY
LEADER DESMOND HOYTE. REF C INDICATES THE PNC/R IS
DELIBERATELY DELAYING THE VOTE BECAUSE PARTY OFFICIALS DO NOT
BELIEVE THEY CAN WIN.

(C) Please see ref D for more on the image problem facing the
PNC (or the PNC/R-One Guyana platform, as it is now known).
Despite continuing to complain about the voters list, the PNC
leadership appears resigned to an August 28 election and
probably realizes that pushing for further delay at this
point would be self-defeating. However, we cannot discount
the possibility that the recent surge in violence may be part
of an effort by PNC extremists to force an election delay,
causing a constitutional crisis that would require a
politically negotiated solution.


12. (C) HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES THE CURRENT PNC/R LEADER
ROBERT CORBIN HAVE WITHIN THE PARTY? ARE THERE ANY OTHER
PARTY MEMBERS THAT COULD CHALLENGE CORBIN'S LEADERSHIP? WHO
ARE CORBIN'S KEY ADVISERS? WHAT IS THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF
HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE? DOES HE HAVE A SHADOW CABINET, AND IF
SO, WHOM DOES IT CONSIST OF?

(C) Corbin is on shaky ground within the party heading into
elections, but that is nothing new. Rumors of his stepping
down have circulated for years -- yet no one has staked a
convincing claim to replace him. Trotman was an up-and-comer
until he split with the party; Winston Murray is widely
admired but not seen as Afro-Guyanese enough; Vincent
Alexander is a steady and loyal deputy but lacks sufficient
charisma; Stanley Ming is winding down his involvement in
politics; and then there are a number of PNC firebrands who
possess no more voter appeal than Corbin. So the party is
stuck with a man whose well-known history as a rapist and an
enforcer under Hoyte and Burnham prevent him for winning many
votes outside of Afro-Guyanese. He does not have a formal
shadow cabinet, although some PNC MPs focus on specific
issues (e.g., Debbie Backer, Hamley Case, and Basil Williams
- security; Winston Murray, Jerome Khan, and James McAllister
- economic development).


13. (C) PAST REPORTING INDICATES THE PNC/R IS STALLING
ELECTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS DEMAND OF VERIFICATION OF THE VOTER
LIST. HAS THE GOVERNMENT INDICATED ANY IMPENDING DECISION ON
THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT TO VOTE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS?
HOW DOES THE PNC/R SEE THE SITUATION PLAYING OUT IF ELECTIONS
CONTINUE TO BE PUSHED BACK?

(C) A lawsuit dealing with the residency requirement issue is
now before the court. But given how slowly cases crawl
through Guyana's court system, no one expects a quick and
final decision on the matter. So the lawsuits are unlikely
to affect the August 28 date. However, a decision in the
future in favor of a residency requirement could give PNC
supporters reason to discredit the 2006 election results.
There is precedent in Guyana -- Justice Claudette Singh ruled
on a case that vitiated the 1997 election results just weeks
before the 2001 election.


14. (C) THE PNC/R CALLED FOR A RALLY IN OPPOSITION OF THE
GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MAY. HAVE ANY OF THE
OPPOSITION'S RALLIES OR PROTESTS MATERIALIZED?

(SBU) The PNC has held campaign rallies with moderate
success. But the protests they tried to mobilize against
GECOM failed to catch on.


15. (C) WHAT IS THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN GUYANA?
HOW WELL EQUIPPED ARE GUYANA' S SECURITY FORCES TO HANDLE ANY
POSSIBLE ELECTION VIOLENCE? HOW SOLID IS INTERIM COMMISSAR
HENRY GREENE'S AUTHORITY OVER THE POLICE? WHAT IS HIS
LEADERSHIP STYLE?

(C) The security situation had improved after the Guyana
Police Force (GPF) and Guyana Defence Force (GDF) began joint
raids on suspected drug traffickers' properties in March 2006
and after U.S. law enforcement took leading narco-criminal
Shaheed "Roger" Khan into custody in June 2006. However, the
calm was shattered August 8 when gunmen attacked the
Eccles/Bagotstown area just south of Georgetown. This
rampage culminated in the execution-style killing of five
staff at the printery of the independent Kaieteur News (ref
C). This operation bore similarities to the February 2006
Agricola/Eccles massacre (ref I). The capital is now very
much on edge as people try to decipher what this means. A
series of bank robberies August 11 and rumors of a planned
break-out at the main prison are also contributing to the
fearful atmosphere.

(C) Guyana's security forces have received riot control
training from the UK and may be capable of handling a level
of violence associated with previous elections -- mob
activity in central Georgetown. However, the more powerful
weapons and sophisticated tactics used by criminals in Guyana
since 2001 pose a greater threat. The GPF is incapable of
preventing or responding to this type of threat; the GDF
would need to get involved.

(S) Doubts remain as to how vigorously the predominantly
Afro-Guyanese GPF and GDF ranks would quell aggressive
protests by Afro-Guyanese PNC supporters. The PPP leadership
is paranoid that the security forces are not loyal to the
government. However, they do see Acting Police Commissioner
Henry Greene as their man, which may have played into
Jagdeo's thinking in elevating him. Greene wants to satisfy
his political patrons and cement his position as permanent
commissioner -- so is likely to cooperate with the PPP's
wishes when it comes to handling election violence. However,
Greene is also known to be on the payroll of
narco-traffickers who have connections to some in the "Buxton
resistance" -- whose members are responsible for recent
horrific crimes, none of which Green solved in his former
role as Crime Chief. Note that the PPP does not mind some
pre-election violence, as that props up their cynical pitch
to Indo-Guyanese that they must vote PPP or else suffer at
the hands of Afro-Guyanese criminals (ref H).

(C) Greene's authority over the police appears to be holding.
Although some senior GPF members detest Greene, there have
been no mass resignations yet as some had predicted. (Note:
These may still happen if Greene is made permanent
commissioner.) Greene's leadership style (if it can be
called that) is to compensate for his professional
incompetence and serial sexual assault of female subordinates
through sycophancy, intimidation, bureaucratic manipulation,
and cultivating relationships with well-connected criminals
(ref E).


16. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SECURITY FORCES ARE CONNECTED TO THE
PNC/R AND ARE NOT LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT?

(S) There is no concrete information to substantiate rumors
that GDF Chief of Staff Brigadier General Collins is
connected to the PNC. Greene has divided loyalties -- to the
government on the one hand (see para 15),but also to the
various narco-traffickers, alien smugglers and other criminal
elements he consorts with. Ninety percent or more of GDF and
GPF personnel are Afro-Guyanese and the conventional wisdom
is that they must then be connected to the PNC -- but this is
an over-generalization. Many GPF officers take their jobs
seriously but lack the resources to take on better equipped
and organized criminals, just as many GDF officers take pride
in their professional duty to defend the state. What is
clear, though, is that certain ex-GDF officers (both in
Guyana and overseas) are aligned with the PNC. For example,
ex-GDF Oliver Hinckson -- who is believed to have links with
the "Buxton resistance" criminals -- openly associates with
the PNC and may act in some security advisor capacity within
the party.


17. (C) IS THERE ANY INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THE
ALLEGATIONS THAT THE GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCES ARE STAGING A
COUP D' ETAT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT?

(C) No. Collins told his peers at the May 2005 Caribbean
Heads of Defense conference that there has never been a coup
in Guyana and there never will be. He and all of his senior
staff had expected to visit Washington for a high-level visit
in late July, until Jagdeo quashed all travel by security
forces until after elections. Such a trip would seem unusual
for a cabal of coup-plotting officers just prior to elections.


18. (C) PRESS INDICATED THAT WEAPONS WERE STOLEN FROM A
GUYANESE DEFENSE FORCE DEPOT. IS THERE ANY FURTHER
INDICATION OF THE LOCATION OF THE STOLEN WEAPONS OR THEIR
INTENDED USE?

(C) One of the AK-47s, still in its packaging, was found by a
joint services operation June 3 in Enterprise, near Buxton.
It is widely believed that the weapon was planted there. The
joint services have reportedly recovered three more of the
missing AK-47s as part of its ongoing operation to take down
the August 11 bank robbers. The search to locate the missing
weapons has lost some steam over the past two months, despite
USG assistance in administering polygraph exams to GDF
personnel.


19. (C) THE PRIVATE SECTOR COMMISSION CLAIMS THE TWO MAJOR
POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE HEAVILY ARMED GROUPS AT THEIR
DISPOSAL. WHO, IF ANY, ARE THE ARMED GROUPS AT EACH PARTY'S
DISPOSAL? WHAT WEAPONS AND OTHER RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO
EACH PARTY AND/OR ARMED GROUP? HOW HAS ROGER KHAN'S
EXPULSION TO THE US AFFECTED THE SECURITY BALANCE ON THE
GROUND? TO WHAT EXTENT DO ANY OF KHAN'S LIKELY SUCCESSORS AS
HEAD OF GUYANA'S CRIMINAL UNDERWORLD MAINTAIN TIES TO EITHER
POLITICAL PARTY?

(C) Both parties appear to have access to weapons and armed
groups. Khan's armed group was believed to be at the PPP's
disposal -- although it might be more accurate to say that
the PPP was at Khan's disposal. Another armed group -- the
so-called "Buxton resistance" -- includes notorious local
criminals such as Rondell "Fine Man" Rawlins. It is
definitely anti-PPP but is not necessarily at the PNC's
disposal, and it also has links to Khan. Some interlocutors
refer to three or more armed groups. Regardless of the
number, these groups are driven primarily by criminal
agendas, but are susceptible to political manipulation.
(Note: Speculation about possible PNC involvement in recent
criminal activities to be reported septel.) All groups have
access to AK-47s and handguns, but have the resources to
acquire other weapons through drug trafficking, money
laundering, or other criminal proceeds (ref G). For
instance, during a July 30 skirmish between the joint
services and criminals camped out in the "backlands" behind
villages along East Coast Demerara, one criminal threw a
grenade at the security forces (inexpertly, as he blew his
arm off in the process). Some observers speculate this might
be related to the grenades stolen recently from a Surinamese
army depot.

(C) It is not yet clear how Khan's departure from the scene
has affected the security balance. Khan's potential
successors -- such as Clayton Hutson, Omprakash "Buddy"
Shivraj, Bramhanand Nandalall -- are all believed to have
some ties with the PPP government that has been in power for
fourteen years. They have all built criminal enterprises and
substantial wealth under the PPP's nose, which they could not
have done without the government's acquiescence.

Thomas