Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN489
2006-05-24 20:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

REQUEST AND RATIONALE FOR DEA OFFICE IN GUYANA

Tags:  SNAR PREL KCRM GY 
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VZCZCXYZ0020
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGE #0489/01 1442005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 242005Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3554
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0314
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 4281
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3883
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN SAN JUAN PR
RUEABND/DEA MIAMI FL
UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000489 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
INL/LP
CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT
PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT
SAN JUAN FOR HARRIS AND BERGMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PREL KCRM GY
SUBJECT: REQUEST AND RATIONALE FOR DEA OFFICE IN GUYANA

REF: (A)GEORGETOWN 424, (B)GEORGETOWN 112, (C)GEORGETOWN
22

UNCLAS GEORGETOWN 000489

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
INL/LP
CARACAS FOR DAO AND LEGATT
PORT OF SPAIN FOR DEA AND LEGATT
SAN JUAN FOR HARRIS AND BERGMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR PREL KCRM GY
SUBJECT: REQUEST AND RATIONALE FOR DEA OFFICE IN GUYANA

REF: (A)GEORGETOWN 424, (B)GEORGETOWN 112, (C)GEORGETOWN
22


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In light of the great and increasing
influence of the narcotics trade and related
transnational crimes in Guyana, Post requests the formal
establishment of a DEA office at Embassy Georgetown.
Guyana is well on its way to narco-statehood -- a
prospect that poses a real threat to U.S. interests. A
permanent DEA presence would significantly improve USG's
ability to fight drug trafficking in Guyana. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The level of narco-trafficking influence on the
political, judicial and economic systems in Guyana
creates ripe conditions for the emergence of a narco-
state. Because Guyana is a country of only 750,000
people with an official GDP of less than USD 1 billion,
it does not garner much USG attention relative to more
powerful and/or troublesome nations in the region. Narco-
criminals, on the other hand, do not underestimate
Guyana's attributes. They see a country with porous
borders, corrupt and ineffective law enforcement, little
or no control over its airspace, vast swaths of
uncontrolled land, ready access to the Caribbean, North
America, and Europe, and a government that has been
lukewarm about clamping down on the drug trade. In other
words, these narco-criminals see Guyana as a country
where they can operate with impunity.


3. (SBU) Guyana shares borders with Venezuela, Suriname
and Brazil -- three neighbors that provide a steady
illicit flow of contraband across its borders. An
especially disturbing development is Guyana's involvement
in "drugs for arms" financing for insurgent groups like
the FARC throughout the region. In addition, large-scale
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) infiltration into
Venezuela has led to their playing a significant role in
narcotics smuggling activities on the Guyana/Venezuela
border.


4. (SBU) "Disrupting Criminal Organizations" is the
primary objective in Post's FY2008 Mission Performance
Plan (MPP). However, accomplishing this goal is made
difficult by the lack of a permanent DEA presence at
Post. The DEA mission in Trinidad also covers Guyana,
but is fully pre-occupied with the counter-narcotics
initiatives in their host nation. DEA has done an
excellent job serving both nations, but Guyana demands
greater focus and its own DEA staff to fully address the
severe narco-trafficking situation on the ground. A
permanently manned office at Embassy Georgetown would
ensure that DEA can work more effectively to accomplish
the critical MPP counter-narcotics objectives and provide
more sustained support to local law enforcement agencies
in Guyana.


5. (SBU) Plans are already in train for DEA to assist in
the establishment of a vetted counter-narcotics unit in
Guyana. An important challenge facing this unit is the
pervasive corruption in the country, which has undermined
previous Guyanese counter-narcotics initiatives.
Establishing a DEA office will allow close and constant
monitoring of the vetted unit to help alleviate this
problem.


6. (SBU) In economic terms for USG, a DEA office in
Guyana would be more cost-effective over the long term.
Without this office, the high level of activity generated
by drug trafficking organizations in Guyana would result
in ongoing, costly TDY expenditures relative to ICASS
costs.


7. (U) Ambassador plans to meet with Michael Braun, DEA
Chief of Operations, in June to discuss the formal
establishment of a DEA office at Post via the NSDD-38
process.


8. (U) This messge was cleared by DEA Port of Spain.

BULLEN