Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN248
2006-03-14 16:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS

Tags:  PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000248 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/OAS
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY
SUBJECT: EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 224


B. GEORGETOWN 205

C. GEORGETOWN 181

D. GEORGETOWN 167

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000248

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/OAS
S/CRS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM KCRM GY
SUBJECT: EMINENT GUYANESE WARN DIPLOMATS OF ELECTION THREATS

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 224


B. GEORGETOWN 205

C. GEORGETOWN 181

D. GEORGETOWN 167

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
For reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Members of the Private Sector Commission
(PSC) met with donors March 8 and 10 to discuss their deep
concerns about preparations for Guyana's upcoming elections,
the deteriorating security situation, and the disturbing
nexus between the two. These Guyanese civil society figures
are certain that the two major political parties (the ruling
PPP/C and opposition PNC/R) have heavily armed groups at
their disposal. The PSC implored the donors to intervene
somehow to defuse the situation. The donors demurred,
reminding the PSC that it is primarily the Guyanese people's
responsibility to resolve the country's political impasse.
Separately, Ambassador met March 10 with Guyana Defence Force
(GDF) Chief of Staff Edward Collins, who tried to dispel
rumors of a coup plan by expressing his commitment to
defending the state. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Private Sector Group Predicts Escalating Political Violence
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) The PSC is an advocacy group of prominent business
leaders (Guyana's wealthy and wise) that takes public stances
on various issues - including governance and security
matters. It is as active a civil society organization as
exists in Guyana, a fact that often puts it in the GoG's
doghouse, given the GoG's instinctive aversion to unsolicited
advice from outside the cabinet. In addition to Ambassador,
U.K., Canada, Brazil, EU, UNDP, IMF, and IDB Chiefs of
Mission attended.


3. (C) Norman McLean - Chairman of the PSC Subcommittee on
Governance and Security, former Commissioner of Police, and
former head of the GDF - told donors he believes that the
recent paramilitary-style assault in Agricola and Eccles and
the theft of thirty-three AK-47s and five Baretta pistols
from a storehouse at GDF's headquarters (ref B) was an act of

political violence. McLean warned that the stolen weapons
are intended for sinister purposes with national security
repercussions, rather than "to help criminals rob people".
PSC member Kit Nascimento sounded an even more ominous note,
saying the assault bore the hallmarks of an insurrection and
that the GoG is "on the verge of losing control" as criminal
elements can take over the country "whenever they wish". He
argued that these criminal elements have now proven their
ability to isolate Georgetown by blocking the city's southern
approach (the East Bank Highway) at Agricola and its eastern
approach (the East Coast Highway) at Buxton.

-------------- --------------
Opposition Thinks Election Delay Plays into its Hands
-------------- --------------


4. (C) PSC vice-chairman Jerry Gouveia, referring to
unspecified PSC sources, said that political motives were
probably behind the weapons theft and Agricola/Eccles
assault. The implication is that the political opposition is
willing to let militant factions employ violence to prevent
elections. Nascimento said the opposition leaders know they
cannot win the national election at this time, but a delay
will help them capitalize on the government's increasing
difficulty in handling economic and security issues.


5. (C) McLean and Gouveia both said opposition leader Robert
Corbin felt that the PNC had blundered in its negotiations
after the disputed 1997 and 2001 elections. The PNC accepted
the victorious PPP party's promise of constitutional reform
too hastily in exchange for ending post-election unrest.
Constitutional reform then failed because neither the PNC nor
the PPP wanted real change. The PNC under Desmond Hoyte
thought that it could somehow win an election and so did not
want to diminish executive powers. Corbin does not want to
make the same mistake again, so he is prepared to create
"mayhem" in order to drive the PPP to the negotiating table
and extract concessions giving the PNC greater involvement in
Guyana's governance. Note: It is hard to imagine the
increasingly strident President Jagdeo conceding much
executive power.

-------------- --------------
GDF's Loyalty in Doubt; Ambassador Meets with Head of GDF
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The PSC leaders doubt that the GDF and GPF are "loyal
to the state this time". This long-held theory has gained
traction in recent weeks. The PPP government has always
viewed the predominantly Afro-Guyanese uniformed services
warily. Head of the Presidential Secretariat Roger Luncheon
shared this fear with Ambassador as recently as March 3 (ref
A).


7. (C) Ambassador met with the GDF Chief of Staff,
Brigadier-General Edward Collins, before the PSC meeting
March 10. Ambassador mentioned that he had heard rumors
circulating of a possible coup plan involving former GDF
officers. Collins did not reveal any prior knowledge of
these rumors, but he did assert the need to "preemptively
destroy" any such threats while they are still at an
embryonic stage. He stated unequivocally that the GDF is
part of the government, suggesting that any coup attempt
would have to topple the GDF top brass first before it took
on the political leadership. Although Collins expressed his
commitment to defending the state, his enthusiasm for
President Jagdeo's leadership came across as lukewarm.
Collins does not appreciate Jagdeo's overly personal style of
running Guyana's affairs.

--------------
PSC Plea for Help and Donors' Response
--------------


8. (C) After warning the donors how threatening the nexus
between crime, violence, and political brinksmanship has
become, the PSC leaders called on them to intervene. The
donors responded that they are each supporting Guyana's
electoral process through bilateral channels. However, the
donors explained that they would not broker some sort of
compromise between the GoG and the opposition through
bilateral channels. Rather, it is primarily the
responsibility of the Guyanese people and influential
segments of society (like the PSC) to drive changes in the
country's ruptured political system. The donors are wary of
getting dragged too far into Guyana's political morass,
setting themselves up to be scapegoats if the election
process fails.


9. (SBU) As an alternative solution, the donors raised the
idea of appeasing the opposition through an OAS-brokered
political pact on a post-election reform agenda - as proposed
by OAS A/SYG Ramdin (ref D). The PSC found the concept
promising but thought it would require watertight guarantees
from the international community to convince the opposition
that the pact is not just a rehash of past deals. This would
require a credible threat of cutting off multilateral loans,
and possibly even bilateral aid, to Guyana if the GoG does
not fulfill its obligation under the pact.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) McLean, Nascimento, and Gouveia all had strong ties
to the pre-1992 PNC regime. Post is inclined to take their
comments seriously because, as Nascimento himself put it, "we
know how they think". The PSC highlighted three key forces
playing out in Guyana. Heavily armed, well-organized groups
are capable of conducting major operations with impunity and
without interference from law enforcement. The political
opposition mistakenly believes that preventing elections and
fueling unrest will help it gain power. The armed criminal
groups will take instructions from political interests as
long as it suits them. The donors were already aware of
these issues to some degree, but hearing Guyana's "wise men"
describe them so bluntly underscored how volatile this
election year has become.


11. (C) Comment continued: Home Affairs Minister Teixeira
made a convincing case to Ambassador and DCM the evening of
Friday March 10 that the Agricola murders were a targeted
operation by "Fine Man"'s criminal organization against the
Roger Khan organization, describing connections between the
dead (or their family members) and Khan. This does not
change the above analysis. A criminal organization was able
to cut the link between the capital and the airport for 45
minutes with impunity while conducting a search and destroy
mission against an enemy organization. While this may have
been a criminal-directed rather than political-directed
operation, it is widely perceived to be politically directed
and certainly demonstrated to the public the expanding
ability of criminal organizations to seize control from the
state. END COMMENT.
BULLEN