Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN167
2006-02-17 15:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA

Tags:  PGOV KDEM GY OAS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000167 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY OAS
SUBJECT: A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71


B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350

C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271

D. 05 BRIDGETOWN 2394

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
For reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY OAS
SUBJECT: A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71


B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350

C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271

D. 05 BRIDGETOWN 2394

Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen
For reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin visited Guyana
February 13-14. Key takeaways from his visit are: a) Ramdin
wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana and will act
quickly to form a long-term mission of some sort; b) he wants
any OAS electoral observation mission to act in close
partnership with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth; and c) he
took fully on board donor concerns about Guyana's political
climate, stating publicly and forcefully that elections must
proceed as constitutionally due by August 4. We believe
Ramdin left with a far greater appreciation for the political
intransigence, rather than technical problems, that threaten
Guyana's ability to hold elections that are free, fair, and
without fear of violence. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Ramdin: OAS Wants Strong Engagement in Election Process
-------------- --------------


2. (U) During his February 13-14 visit, Ramdin met with
various stakeholders, including the GoG, opposition parties,
the diplomatic community, and CARICOM. He referred to the
trip as the first official visit of more to come as he and
OAS SYG Insulza are trying to reestablish stronger engagement
with OAS members. Ambassador hosted a lunch February 13 for
Ramdin and the international donor community (U.S., UK,
Canada, EU, UNDP, CARICOM, IDB, IMF).


3. (C) At the lunch, donors shared with Ramdin their concerns
that Guyana is on course for a political crisis. They
stressed the need for OAS to take an "early prevention"
approach to Guyana, not only by sending a long-term observer
mission for the 2006 elections, but also by establishing a
stronger political presence in the country. As an aside,
Ramdin half-joked that his job would be easy if the consensus
in Washington equaled that around the lunch table.


4. (C) Ramdin broadly agreed with donor concerns about the
elections, saying that OAS wants to be "engaged strongly in

this process". He also stated explicitly and repeatedly that
when OAS gets engaged, it wants CARICOM on its side given
that organization's "moral authority" in the region. CARICOM
A/SYG Granderson sounded a cautionary note, reminding the
group of CARICOM's extreme prudence regarding its members'
internal affairs and that regional heads are not seized by
events in Guyana.


5. (C) Ramdin accepted the donor view that delaying elections
cannot be countenanced as an option and said that OAS would
deliver that message clearly to political leaders.

-------------- --------------
Ramdin: No Country should be Held Hostage by Politicians
-------------- --------------


6. (U) Also on February 13, Ramdin and Commonwealth
Secretariat Special Envoy to Guyana Sir Paul Reeves were the

SIPDIS
keynote speakers at the Private Sector Commission's
"Elections and Democracy" lecture. Both speakers hammered
home the point that elections must proceed as
constitutionally due and that any alternative to this would
be, in Ramdin's words, "counter-productive, costly, and
damaging".


7. (U) In his remarks, Ramdin stated that elections are fair
if the state provides conditions for a "reasonably level
playing field" and that "no country should be held hostage"
by the refusal of political parties and their leaders to
accept election results. He then spelled out his key steps
to a successful election process -- an independent elections
commission; timely preparations by the commission; clear
deadlines for well-defined activities; proper training for
poll workers and robust voter education; a cleaned-up,
credible voter list; and a secure environment in which to
vote.

--------------
Debriefing Donors and OAS' Next Steps
--------------


8. (U) Ramdin met again with donors the evening of February

14. He shared his reflections on the visit and spelled out
what he sees as his plan for Guyana going forward.


9. (C) Ramdin reiterated to donors that he wants OAS to
partner with CARICOM in Guyana. He said that after meeting
with CARICOM, he still did not have a clear understanding of
how involved they are willing to get in Guyana's elections.
Nevertheless, he will make his Guyana trip report available
to them. He also wants to involve St. Lucia PM Anthony, who
has the lead on governance and justice within CARICOM.
Ramdin plans to visit him to advocate for a stronger CARICOM
role in Guyana.


10. (C) Ramdin described three key areas in the election
process that he felt require far greater attention. First,
the political leaders themselves (President Jagdeo and PNC/R
opposition leader Robert Corbin in particular) need to
establish a dialogue, preferably informal and agenda-free.
Second, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) must do more
to facilitate ongoing dialogue with the political parties and
the public at large, working specifically to settle the
dispute over the voter list. Third, civil society must
participate more actively in the process, holding more events
like the previous evening's "Elections and Democracy" lecture.


11. (C) As for OAS' plans, Ramdin will discuss his findings
with Insulza and define their position in advance of an
Insulza visit. Between Monday noon and Tuesday evening
Ramdin changed from saying that he hoped to get Insulza to
visit Guyana, to saying that Insulza would visit, hopefully
soon.


12. (C) Ramdin clearly wants to increase OAS' involvement in
Guyana, concentrating on crisis prevention, and preferably in
close cooperation with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth. He
envisions the OAS observer as someone who is actively
involved in the election process -- the political as well as
technical aspects. Ramdin intends to move very quickly on
getting a long-term observation mission to Guyana (i.e., by
early March, before the March 19 end of continuous
registration). This was after getting assurances from
President Jagdeo and from the major political parties that
they all would welcome a long-term mission. (Note: Post
subsequently learned that SYG Insulza had received a letter
from the GoG inviting OAS to send long-term observers, about
which Ramdin was apparently unaware.)


13. (C) Ramdin laid out a range of options for what the OAS
observer mission might look like: a) Special Envoy, as in
Haiti, although Ramdin felt this was the least likely option;
b) Permanent Mission; c) Technical mid-level staff; or d)
High-level person from the region who would come to Guyana
periodically, although Ramdin said it would take at least two
months to prepare this last option.


14. (C) Ramdin sounded a little skeptical that the technical
preparations for the election are entirely satisfactory. He
intends to put someone at OAS to work assessing GECOM's
activity timeline and progress to date. Post has e-mailed
the Joint International Technical Assessor's monthly reports
to Ramdin's advisor to assist.


15. (C) The Canadian High Commissioner repeated to Ramdin
that his government is willing to fund 2 or 3 long-term
observers, but needs to obligate its money quickly before the
March 31 end of Canada's fiscal year. He also gave Ramdin a
copy of the Terms of Reference they are using for these
observers.


16. (C) As the meeting wrapped up, Ramdin suggested a
bargaining chip that might be used to mollify the opposition
-- a pre-election agreement signed between the political
parties, and with the international community as a guarantor
in some fashion. This agreement would contain an agenda of
important issues that the political parties would be
committed to discuss and resolve after the elections. This
would address one of the opposition's principal grievances --
that the governance reform process agreed to in 1997 is still
unrealized. Donors responded favorably to the concept.

--------------
Comment
--------------


17. (C) Before moving to OAS, Ramdin lived and worked for two
years in Georgetown as A/SYG of CARICOM (Granderson's
predecessor),including the period of the last election. He
is very familiar with the players and issues in Guyana, as
well as with the history of OAS' 2001 observation mission.
He didn't say anything directly, but did just once allude
briefly to "issues" that need to be worked out with the OAS
bureaucracy regarding OAS' involvement in Guyana. He also
described how he and Insulza are "shaking up" OAS, including
by traveling frequently to the field rather than staying in
Washington.


18. (C) Ramdin seems to be a realist when it comes to
elections. He repeatedly alluded to the fact that no
election is perfect, but should be the best possible given
local circumstances. He referred specifically to his
experience observing the December 2005 election in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines (ref D). The voter list there
contained 91,000 names -- demographically impossible given a
general population of 110,000. But Ramdin walked away from
that experience confident that the will of the electorate had
prevailed. Such common sense does not prevail in Guyana's
political opposition, which makes unrealistic demands while
discrediting simple solutions like properly using indelible
ink on election day. End Comment.
BULLEN