Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06GEORGETOWN153
2006-02-13 20:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE

Tags:  PGOV PINS SOCI GY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GEORGETOWN 000153

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINS SOCI GY
SUBJECT: EDITORIAL ON GUYANA'S SECURITY CHALLENGE

REF: GEORGETOWN 111

The editorial in Sunday's Stabroek News describes very
well the conundrum of security in Guyana and the state's
limited capability to police its territory. The Stabroek
News is Guyana's leading independent daily newspaper.

Begin quote:

An effective state
Sunday, February 12th 2006

Given all the circumstances the police undoubtedly made a
wise decision not to go into Buxton during the funeral of
Mr Ronald Waddell last Saturday, although they did
accompany the procession up the East Coast highway, and
armed ranks lined both sides of the road as the motorcade
passed through Annandale. While the judgement of the
police cannot be faulted on this occasion, nevertheless,
the fact that Buxton is still a no-go area for the
authorities speaks volumes about the capabilities of the
state.

Last week at a press conference in Freedom House, the PPP
had one of its periodic grumbles about the failure of the
police to rid the village of gunmen, as if in some split
personality sense, it was no longer the party in
government with its hands on the levers of power. It is
clear that despite all that has happened, the party has
not yet come to terms with how this situation evolved and
its role in the process. Which is a pity, because we live
in troubled times, which require a realistic approach in
assessing events and a sensitivity of judgement when
making decisions.

The PPP/C came into office at a disadvantage in 1992, in
the sense that it did not trust the security forces,
whose members were seen as being loyal to the main
opposition. In addition, where the GPF was concerned, the
professionalism of this force had been seriously
undermined under the PNC and corruption was already a
major problem. Also noteworthy was the fact that the
previous government had depended on a special unit in the
force which had become notorious for its association with
extra-judicial killings.

One might have thought that the new government would have
regarded it as a priority to build a genuinely
professional police force with forensic and investigative
capability, deal with corruption among its members, move
away from a reliance on what was popularly known as the
"death squad," invest some real money in equipping the

GPF, explore ways of encouraging Indians to join, and
negotiate with the IMF over the matter of salaries so
that officers would at least be beyond temptation where
petty bribes were concerned.

History, however, got in the way, and the experience of
the 1960s blinded the government to a rational approach
to the problem of their security. Instead of enhancing
the professional capacity of the police, they undermined
the institution of the GPF. It was starved of equipment,
and there was political interference at various levels in
its operations, because the administration placed its
trust in those individuals and groups within the force
with whom it felt comfortable, rather than in the force
as a whole. Inevitably this subverted the normal chain of
command.

In addition, the administration placed its trust in the
Target Special Squad - taking the same route as its
predecessor - which became notorious for the allegations
of extra-judicial killings made against it. Furthermore,
it defended the TSS vigorously, despite the fact that the
latter was perceived as targeting African victims,
thereby raising the political temperature, and despite
the fact that it emerged during a grand jury hearing in
the United States into a US visa scam that some of its
members were involved in corrupt activities and had hired
themselves out as an enforcement squad.

And then 2002 hit the country, and the government found
itself with a thoroughly demoralized, totally ill-
equipped police force with neither the human nor
technical resources to confront the crisis. Furthermore,
because of the level of corruption among its officers,
the public did not trust the GPF with information, which
effectively ruled out any intelligence-led
investigations.
It is true that eventually the government was prevailed
upon to disband the TSS and pour some funds into the
police force, but in the meantime the immediate problem
of the major Buxton gunmen was dealt with by shadowy
death squads, whose possible association with the state
has never been elucidated because the government has
never held a comprehensive enquiry into the matter - or
even into the origin and development of the Buxton
phenomenon in the first instance. The limited enquiry
which was held, while it cleared then Minister of Home
Affairs Ronald Gajraj from any association with such a
squad (or squads),did not address the larger question.

As it is the death squad(s) are still around, while a new
generation of gunmen haunts the southern reaches of
Buxton. And the weakened enforcement arms of the state
have so far been unable to deal with either. On an
ominous note we have started this election year with the
killing of a political activist, and given the tensions
and the number of gunmen of whatever affiliation around,
we say again, it is imperative for the health of the
nation that this case be solved. We say again too, if the
police cannot make progress, then the government must
seek external assistance.

Rebuilding the Guyana Police Force is going to take time,
but the administration should do all it can to facilitate
that process by among other things implementing the
recommendations of the Disciplined Services report. It
should also start confronting problems directly, rather
than indirectly as is its wont. It is only when the state
is seen to exert itself in a lawful fashion that it will
be perceived to be strong and not weak. And the state
needs to be perceived as effective at the moment; after
all, the warlords are waiting in the wings.

End quote.

BULLEN