CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: REPORT ON AUG

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 002180

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: MCAP PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: REPORT ON AUG
28-SEPT 6 MEETING OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS

REF: A. STATE 132511

B. STATE 143153 (NOTAL)

C. MOSCOW 9672 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CDA Judith Chammas. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4(d)


1. (C) Summary: The August 28-September 6 session of the
Group of Governmental experts of the states parties to the
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW),which also served
as the final preparatory committee for the November Review
Conference of CCW states parties, spent a significant amount
of time preparing documents for the November CCW RevCon, but
the main issue remained efforts to reach consensus on a
possible new protocol on Mines Other than Anti-Personnel
Mines (MOTAPM)/anti-vehicle mines. The U.S. delegation
provided all key participants with a compromise proposal;
early signs from Russia, China and Pakistan were not
promising, but the text remains in play. Spurred by the
Lebanon war, the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) discussions
focused on cluster munitions. Several delegations and NGOs
proposed negotiations cluster on munitions. End Summary.

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MOTAPM
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2. (C) The U.S. began the session with an all-out effort to
persuade other delegations to accept a compromise ) a MOTAPM
protocol containing optional annexes on detectability and
limitations on active life to which states parties to the
protocol could choose to adhere or not. The delegation held
a series of informal discussions with supporters of legally
binding provisions on detectability and active life
(including various EU members and the EU troika),as well as
with states such as Russia, China, and Pakistan that have
objected to an instrument along those lines. First reactions
to the U.S. compromise were reserved on all sides, but no one
rejected the concept out of hand, and most promised to
consider it. Meanwhile the MOTAPM coordinator, Amb. Paranhos
of Brazil, consulted bilaterally and in small groups to
discuss both the general concept of a protocol with optional
annexes and the draft MOTAPM &set of provisions8 he had
circulated, which had left these key provisions blank.
Paranhos pointed out that there were three options available:
(a) including legally binding provisions on detectability and
active life in the protocol, (b) an approach with optional
legally binding annexes, and (c) a &best practices8
approach, which would merely include guidelines. He made
clear that he considered that only the middle option (along
the lines of the U.S.-drafted compromise) had a chance of
achieving consensus.


3. (C) By the end of the session positions on both sides
seemed to have hardened. The supporters of option (a),
especially within the EU, faced with no sign of movement from
China or Russia, formally requested insertion into the main
text of legally binding provisions drawn from the previous
coordinator,s November 2005 text, although they did not
formally reject the possibility of a compromise. Some in the
EU, however, seemed to believe that no agreement was
preferable to a compromise with optional annexes. Russia,
China, Pakistan and Belarus made clear to us privately that
their positions for this meeting were firm, but that they
would consider the compromise option (b) subsequently in
capitals (but Russian military reps disagreed). Publicly,
Russia and others repeatedly indicated that they could accept
only a protocol with non-binding &best practices8 on
detectability and active life. Russia read out language
along those lines, and Pakistan circulated a paper taking
that position. While some states (e.g., Belarus) argued that
more time was needed to consider all issues, the U.S. and the
Netherlands made clear that the November RevCon was the end
of the line; after five years, consideration it was time for
CCW parties either to adopt a MOTAPM protocol or conclude
that no agreement was possible. At the end of the meeting,
Paranhos forwarded a consolidated text stating the three
options noted in para 2, and including texts for options (a)
and (b).

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Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)
--------------

4. (U) Cluster munitions became the clear focus and source of
contention within the ERW discussions during this session of
the GGE. Several states and NGOs made presentations on
cluster munitions. The discussions focused on
discrimination, proportionality, the failure rate of cluster
munitions, and the impact of cluster munitions that became
ERW, particularly in Lebanon. The underlying issue is whether
Protocol V to the CCW (on ERW) and international humanitarian
law in general sufficiently already address the appropriate
use of cluster munitions or whether a new instrument is
needed in regard to this specific munition.


5. (U) Austria, the Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand
and Sweden proposed that the RevCon adopt a mandate for
governmental experts to negotiate a protocol to restrict or
ban cluster munitions. Sweden and Germany proposed
governmental experts meetings to study &feasible precautions
which could be taken with a view to improving the design of
military laser systems in order to avoid the incidence of
permanent blindness8. The EU proposed at a minimum
extending the current mandate for discussion of ERW by
governmental experts. The U.S. delegation opposed these
efforts in bilateral contacts and in the plenary. It urged
CCW state parties to instead focus on efforts to implement
Protocol V on ERW, which will enter into force only in
November. The U.S. proposed specifically the completion of
the matrix for self-implementation of Protocol V.

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Compliance
--------------

6. (C) After years of discussion of a CCW-wide &compliance
mechanism8 without agreement, French CD Amb. Rivasseau (the
conference chairman) took over active coordination of the
draft compliance text from erstwhile Coordinator Croatian
Ambassador Markotic. In a series of side meetings with
USDel, Rivasseau agreed to accommodate all of the main U.S.
objections to the draft and agreed that the text could be
adopted as a RevCon decision rather than as a new amendment
to the CCW, but he was unable to get all delegations to agree
to a final text. As a result, the text that will go forward
presents both the option of an amendment and the option of a
decision. U.S., supported by Japan, China, Russia, and
Pakistan, has firmly rejected the amendment approach but that
approach is favored by the EU states and Mexico. Key
objections to the text continued from Pakistan, which was not
satisfied with a paragraph that calls on UN SYG to choose the
expert if a state makes a request for an expert to review its
compliance with its own obligations, or with language that
would ensure that any party could ask for a copy of the final
report of the expert. While we had worked to ensure that the
text would not allow a state to ask experts to opine on
obligations of another state, Israel continued to express
concern about any expert mechanism and, in any event, asked
for further clarification of the language to ensure this.
At the end of the meeting, Rivasseau distributed a paper
stating that agreement had not yet been reached on this
matter but that he believed it could be by or at the RevCon.

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Sponsorship
--------------

7. (U) The Swiss agreed that the Geneva International Center
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) could manage a sponsorship
program to permit less developed states to participate in
CCW-related activities. Switzerland will provide the GICHD
with funds for the administration of the program on the
condition that only donor states and the UN Department of
Disarmament Affairs (DDA) are members of the steering
committee. The inclusion of the UN was a compromise between
potential donor states and Switzerland, which wanted only
donors on the committee, and the NAM, which wanted regional
representation. A consensus draft decision on the
sponsorship program was forwarded to the RevCon for approval.
The program is voluntary and at the discretion of donor
states, and, although the U.S. does not plan to participate,
US del sees no compelling reasons to block consensus.

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Preparations for the November Review Conference
-------------- ---

8. (SBU) From the U.S. perspective, the meeting spent an
inordinate amount of time on preparations for the RevCon, in
particular consideration of a draft Final Document/Final
Declaration, which the delegation found repetitious and
contentious. After long consultations with the U.S.,
Rivasseau agreed to streamline the document, deleting a
reference to a 2011 RevCon and making clear that states could
commit themselves to implementing only those protocols to
which they are parties. In the end we expect that the Final
DoQent will be overshadoQd by whatever substantive results
or failureQemerge from the November RevCon.

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Comment
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9. (C) With too many plenary meetings, the GGE dels made
position statements multiple times, most of which had also
been made during prior sessions. We told many other
delegations that this is a costly and unnecessary process
since the discussion on these topics has been exhausted. We
stressed that we need to conclude the negotiations on MOTAPM
in November and that that will complete the program of work
on matters where consensus might be achieved. We see no
further topic that would warrant discussion at this time. We
therefore maintained that instead of six weeks of meetings in
2007, the November RevCon should agree to come back for one
week to assess the situation in November 2007, including in
that week all CCW-related meetings ) the required meeting of
states parties to Amended Protocol II on anti-personnel
mines, the compliance meeting, and the meeting under the ERW
protocol that enters into force in two months. This may be a
tough sell and will have a political cost, since the natural
inclination of many will be to continue the discussions in
experts meetings and some of our allies will argue that
continuing the discussion on ERW protects against this topic
being pursued elsewhere. (Of course, since the U.S. is not
yet a party to the ERW protocol, we will not be able to
prevent parties to that protocol from convening additional
meetings.)
CHAMMAS