ANTI-VEHICLE MINE PROTOCOL: ENGAGING PAKISTAN ON A

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 002178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO L, ISN, PM, SA. DOD PASS TO OGC.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: MCAP PARM PREL PK
SUBJECT: ANTI-VEHICLE MINE PROTOCOL: ENGAGING PAKISTAN ON A
COMPROMISE APPROACH


Classified By: CDA Judith Chammas. Reason: E.O. 12958, 1.4(d)


1. (C) This is an action request. As recommended by
Pakistani Amb Masood Kahn to USDEL in Aug 28-Sept 6 CCW
meeting, Mission Geneva requests that Department convey the
points at para 6 to Pakistani ambassador in Washington and
that DoD request military attach in Islamabad to convey same
points to GHQ, drawing on background (paras 2-5) as
appropriate. We recommend that points be left with
interlocutor as a non-paper.


2. (SBU) Background: The USG and 30 other states proposed a
"Protocol on Mines other than Anti-personnel Mines (MOTAPM)"
at the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 2005, after several years of
discussion. CCW operates by consensus. Pakistan
consistently has opposed the conclusion of a protocol
addressing anti-vehicle mines, and has been particularly
concerned about any obligation that would establish
requirements for detectability and limit the active life of
Pakistan's MOTAPM. Pakistan has stated that its military
doctrine requires that it retain persistent non-detectable
anti-vehicle landmines.


3. (C) USG previously urged Pakistan not to block the
adoption of a MOTAPM protocol that has wide support among CCW
states. However, Pakistan has remained opposed, along with
Russia, China, Belarus and Cuba. In view of this, and in the
interest of making it possible to adopt a protocol by
consensus that makes at least some humanitarian progress, the
USG has revised its position. We accept at face value
Pakistan,s comment and are prepared to see the provisions on
detectability and active life pulled out of the protocol and
moved to optional annexes. States joining the protocol would
not be bound by those provisions unless they decided to take
on those additional commitments ("opt-in"). We believe this
should fully address Pakistan's concerns. We expect to have
some difficulty persuading the European Union and others who
continue to support our earlier position, but we may be able
to engage all delegations in this approach as a compromise if
we can obtain signals that this approach is an acceptable
basis for adoption of a protocol in November from delegations
that previously opposed. USDEL has explained the potential
compromise to each of the objecting countries in bilateral
meetings during the current CCW session, and each has
undertaken to consider seriously the new option.


4. (C) Prior to the current session of the Group of
Governmental Experts of CCW, the Brazilian Ambassador Carlos
da Rocha Paranhos, tasked by the conference as the MOTAPM
Coordinator, introduced a paper in advance of the meeting
that had no provisions on detectability or active life but
said the solution needed to be worked out separately and
inserted. On August 29, the U.S. delegation met with
Pakistani Permrep Amb. Masood Khan and explained the "opt in"
approach on active life and detectability. USDEL provided
text similar to that set out para 7 below and explained it in
detail. Khan understood that the new approach was designed
to accommodate their concerns, expressed appreciation for the
imaginative USG effort, and promised to give careful study to
the new approach. Khan said that the current Pakistani
position was the result of extensive inter-ministerial
discussion and said that it would not be possible to change
it during the current CCW session. He said that his
delegation would seriously consider it prior to the November
review conference and he recommended that (a) Dept raise the
matter with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, who is a
former chief of staff and is respected by the military, and
(b) the U.S. military attach in Islamabad raise the matter
with General Headquarters, explaining the proposal and why it
should meet Pakistani concerns.


5. (C) During the course of the CCW meeting, it became
clear to the U.S. del, and this view was shared by Paranhos,
that the U.S. proposal was the only possible grounds for
compromise. At the end of the session Paranhos forwarded a
consolidated text in a report to the November Revcon that
included a text based on the U.S. paper as a possible
consensus option(described in para 7).


6. (C/Rel Pakistan) Begin talking points:

-- As you know, the U.S. delegation has met repeatedly with
your delegation to the Convention on Conventional Weapons
("CCW") over the past several years to understand your
concerns about an anti-vehicle mines protocol and to address
them.


-- The United States and other CCW states parties
consistently have argued for strong provisions on active life
and detectability, because we believe this would address most
effectively the humanitarian problem posed by anti-vehicle
landmines.

-- In response, Pakistan has made clear it is not currently
in a position to accept binding obligations related to
limitations on active life or detectability.

-- Given that firm position, we are prepared to seek as a
solution a protocol that does not contain commitments on
detectability and active life, but rather would allow states
that join to decide whether to undertake supplemental
commitments in these areas.

--Under this approach, a state that wished to be legally
bound could "opt in" to these requirements, either at the
time it acceded to the Protocol or at any time in the future.
A state that did not wish to be legally bound would not need
to "opt in," but would be bound by the provisions in the body
of the Protocol, including provisions on transfers and
cooperation.

--This approach is analogous to adherence to the CCW itself,
which allows State Parties to "opt in" to protocols. It
recognizes that each state must make its own decision to be
bound by new legal obligations, but offers the opportunity
for states willing to do so - now or in the future - to make
a broader commitment.

--We explained this approach to Geneva Permanent
Representative Amb. Khan at the CCW meeting on August 29. We
urge that you consider it favorably. Although much work will
be involved, we are prepared to engage the co-sponsors of our
previous proposal in accepting this approach.

-- We hope this new approach will allow for adoption by
consensus of an anti-vehicle mines protocol in November.

End points.


7. (U) U.S. proposal presented to Amb. Khan at the
beginning of the negotiations was modified slightly after
extensive discussions with other delegations. The MOTAPM
Coordinator set out the substance of this text as an option
in his report to the RevCon:

Proposal Concerning Detectability and Active Life


1. Insert the following article in place reserved for Article
3 and 4 in CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, and renumber the subsequent
articles accordingly:

Article 3
Detectability and active life of MOTAPM/AVMs


1. At the time of submittal to the Depositary of its
instrument expressing its consent to be bound to this set of
provisions, a State may submit a written declaration agreeing
to be bound by Optional Annex A on detectability or Optional
Annex B on active life, or agreeing to be bound by both.


2. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 may also be
submitted to the Depositary by a State that has previously
expressed consent to be bound by this set of provisions at
any time after the entry into force of this set of provisions
for that State.


3. A declaration referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 may
stipulate that it is effective immediately or may stipulate a
specific date upon which it shall be effective.


2. Replace paragraph 1(b) of article 9 in CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1
with the following:

(b) which does not meet the standards for detectability and
active life of MOTAPM/AVM contained in Optional Annex A and
Optional Annex B, except for the purpose of destruction or
for development of and training in mine detection, mine
clearance, or mine destruction techniques;


3. Add the following two annexes at the end of
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1:

Optional Annex A

Detectability of MOTAPM/AVMs


1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVMs which are not
detectable.


2. An MOTAPM/AVM is detectable if, upon emplacement, it
provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight
grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass buried five
centimetres beneath the ground and can be detected by
commonly-available technical mine detection equipment.


3. MOTAPM/AVMs used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded
from the detectability requirement of this Annex.

Optional Annex B
Active life of MOTAPM/AVMs


1. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVMs that do not
incorporate a self-destruction mechanism or a mechanism for
self-neutralization designed and constructed so that no more
than ten percent of activated mines will fail to
self-destruct within forty-five days after arming.


2. It is prohibited to use MOTAPM/AVMs that do not
incorporate a back-up self-deactivation feature that is
designed and constructed so that, in combination with the
mechanism referred to in paragraph 1, no more than one in one
thousand activated mines will function as a mine one hundred
twenty days after arming.


3. MOTAPM/AVMs used in a perimeter-marked area are excluded
from the requirements of this Annex.


4. Delete paragraph 4 of Technical Annex B in
CCW/GGE/XV/WG.2/1, renumber paragraph 5 accordingly, and
conform the cross-reference in article 12

End text of proposal.


7. (U) Please ask Embassy Islamabad to slug cable report of
any response for L, ISN, PM, SA, DOD and JCS, and to info
Mission Geneva. Mission also requests that Dept inform
Mission of any response to Washington demarche.
TICHENOR