Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE779
2006-04-27 08:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN'S SHARIPOV DISCUSSES CORRUPTION, IRAN, RUSSIA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ENRG SOCI KCOR KMCA KDEM IR RS 
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OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0779/01 1170835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 270835Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7343
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1577
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1587
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1559
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1556
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1510
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1516
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1501
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1388
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1332
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1547
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1586
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1116
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0903
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8556
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000779 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, E, S/P, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL, MCC
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG SOCI KCOR KMCA KDEM IR RS
TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S SHARIPOV DISCUSSES CORRUPTION, IRAN, RUSSIA,
HYDRO-POWER POLITICS

REF: A) DUSHANBE 0768 B) DUSHANBE 0752 C) DUSHANBE 0616 D) DUSHANBE 0583

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000779

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, E, S/P, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL, MCC
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG SOCI KCOR KMCA KDEM IR RS
TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN'S SHARIPOV DISCUSSES CORRUPTION, IRAN, RUSSIA,
HYDRO-POWER POLITICS

REF: A) DUSHANBE 0768 B) DUSHANBE 0752 C) DUSHANBE 0616 D) DUSHANBE 0583

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) The Ambassador met April 26 with Director of the
President's Strategic Research Center (SRC) Suhrob Sharipov for
a wide-ranging discussion on the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC),anti-corruption efforts in Tajikistan,
Iranian-Tajik relations, and Tajikistan's increasing unease with
Russia's Central Asia policies. Sharipov also provided
unusually frank insight into the recent firing of Minister of
Energy Nurmahmadov (reftel A). Sharipov appears to be an
increasingly influential voice for progressive policy and reform
in the President's inner circle.

MCC THRESHOLD STATUS LINKED TO ANTI-CORRUPTION, GOOD GOVERNANCE


2. (SBU) The Ambassador requested to meet with Sharipov to
present him with background documents in Russian about the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, since Sharipov is leading a
new effort to define the extent of corruption in Tajikistan and
to develop strategies to try to bring it under control (reftel
C). Sharipov's SRC, with UNDP support, is engaged in a series
of nation-wide public-opinion focus groups and research studies
to identify sources of corruption, define its extent, and
propose pragmatic solutions


3. (C) The Ambassador told Sharipov there is no reason, in
principle, Tajikistan could not begin to negotiate to be
considered for MCC threshold status during the next year,
especially if the Tajik Government begins to show serious and
sustained efforts to rein in corruption. Taking careful notes,
Sharipov responded that he credits President Rahmonov himself

with anti-corruption initiatives to counter "government
ministries that act as family businesses." (COMMENT: We know,
in fact, that this key portion of the President's annual speech
to Parliament on April 20 (reftel B) originated with Sharipov.
Thus, he was being dutifully deferential to his boss. That does
not, however, in any way mitigate the importance of what
Rahmonov said in public to the nation about corruption. END
COMMENT.)


4. (C) Sharipov readily agreed MCC would be an important step
forward for Tajikistan, which is "legitimately trying to create
a democratic reality." He acknowledged the recent nearly $300
million MCC contract with Armenia had generated keen interest at
the top levels of the Tajik government. Sharipov repeated his
deep concern that corruption was the leading cause of the
erosion of public support for the government, a lesson learned
from the last two years of CIS "color revolutions." The
Ambassador told Sharipov governments that rule justly, support
economic freedom, and invest in their own people can become MCC
candidates. Sharipov said he clearly understood and that his
SRC was working towards that goal.


5. (C) The Ambassador and Sharipov brainstormed several
anti-corruption strategies, both agreeing that the culture of
institutionalized and deeply rooted CIS corruption will not be
solved overnight. Sharipov said his main goal was to paint a
full picture of the problem for President Rahmonov, and that
major institutional changes could be expected to come as a
result. He noted that he had just concluded the second phase of
his nation-wide focus-group study that had included about 2,500

DUSHANBE 00000779 002 OF 004


participants from all levels of society. The Ambassador
suggested that an independent blue-ribbon commission of highly
respected citizens and specially vetted law-enforcement units
might help to give the process credibility, especially since
Sharipov volunteered that the very worst corruption is among the
law-enforcement agencies, specifically, he said, the Ministry of
Interior and Prosecutor General's office. Sharipov fully agreed
with this suggestion, taking a note, and added that the
establishment of an independent ombudsman would also be an
option, so that the people would have a legitimate institution
to take their complaints to.


6. (C) Sharipov admitted that many current ministers and
government officials were "patriots in word only, quickly
becoming corrupt after assuming power themselves." The
Ambassador noted that true anti-corruption moves need to take
place through a transparent, non-political, objective, and
absolutely fair process. Anti-corruption moves cannot be used
to sideline political opponents. Sharipov said he himself fully
agreed. He informed the Ambassador that his SRC would soon open
seven branch offices throughout Tajikistan to get close to the
people and sources of information on public opinion and
corruption. He added that corruption and poverty go hand in
hand, and that Tajikistan would need a complete overhaul to
address all levels of the corruption issue. He said,
"Tajikistan must meet international standards or it will fail."

IRAN


7. (C) Sharipov then on his own accord turned to foreign
affairs. About Iranian-Tajik relations, he said Tajikistan, as
a Persian-language and -culture country, understands Iran more
than other countries and, no matter how small, could play a role
to assist Iran and the West understand one another. He asserted
Iran is behaving recklessly by insisting publicly on moves that
clearly agitate Western nations. He noted that he did not want
Tajikistan to lose the goodwill and cooperation of the
international community, gained over many years of cooperation
on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and security matters, by
supporting Iran. He said the top levels of the Government of
Tajikistan fully understand "international opinion," and he
repeated Tajikistan's desire to play a positive role in Iranian
affairs.


8. (C) COMMENT: Tajikistan has never been swayed by Iran's
political ideology or religious extremism. But Tajikistan,
nevertheless, carefully welcomes, and needs, Iranian financial
investment in infrastructure projects, like the Anzob Tunnel and
Sangtuda-II hydroelectric station. As Foreign Minister Nazarov
once told the Ambassadir, "All money smells the same." END
COMMENT.

RUSSIA


9. (C) Continuing his analysis of the direction of Tajikistan's
foreign policy, Sharipov bluntly stated, "our political elite
are genuinely Russia-leaning." He described this as a
"mistake," and said that he often reminds his government
colleagues to maintain a more objective stance with the other
major countries. Sharipov said he is criticized for this
attitude, but he feels that Tajikistan needs to move beyond a
"brotherly relationship" with Russia, and, in fact, a "younger
brotherly relationship." (COMMENT: During the past 18 months,
this is the core message the Ambassador has given President
Rahmonov, especially when it has appeared that the Government of
Tajikistan was letting the "balance of relationships" become

DUSHANBE 00000779 003 OF 004


unhealthily unbalanced toward Russia. END COMMENT.) Sharipov
outlined the benefits Tajikistan would derive from more open
competition for investment between Russian and international
corporations.


10. (C) The Ambassador told Sharipov he is frankly dismayed
with recent trends in Russian foreign policy in the CIS. The
United States has never denied that Russia has historic,
cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and economic special interests in
Central Asia. For the past five years the United States has
worked hard to seek to build a constructive partnership with
Russia that would be to the benefit of the Central Asia states.
But it appears Russia has not only rejected these positive
overtures, but now even wants to try to push the United States
out of the region. Sharipov, taking close notes, nodded his
agreement as the Ambassador explained that U.S. policy in the
region is frankly open and transparent without hidden agendas,
focusing on supporting the independence, sovereignty, and
stability of the Central Asian states, and, more recently,
finding ways to promote the development of energy resources and
infrastructure integration in the region.


11. (C) Sharipov averred he, others, and President Rahmonov
himself are increasingly appalled by the alarming xenophobic and
even fascist tendencies in Russian life and politics. (COMMENT:
We do not believe this was said for our benefit. We have
increasingly heard it from others in the Tajik government,
including the avuncular Foreign Minister Nazarov. It is also an
increasingly frequent topic of Tajik press op-eds. END
COMMENT.)

FORMER ENERGY MINISTER - PROBABLY A CROOK, MAYBE A SELL-OUT


12. (C) When asked if the recent dismissal of Minister of
Energy Jurabek Nurmahmadov (reftel A) portends any policy
shifts, Sharipov replied that any high-profile shift like this
one is driven by policy. He specifically cited recent Tajik
negotiations with RusAl Chairman Oleg Deripaska over the Rogun
hydropower project, and alleged Nurmahmadov had done little to
advocate Tajikistan's national interests. Sharipov hinted
strongly Nurmahmadov had had personal interests foremost in mind
and had not made a strong enough case for Tajikistan's view of
how the project should be developed. Sharipov added that ever
since Deripaska had gone to Uzbekistan to court Karimov and
First Daughter Gulnora, and had announced publicly he would not
do anything at TadAZ that would harm Uzbekistan's environment,
President Rahmonov had been incensed, suspecting Deripaska had
reached a secret understanding with Uzbekistan to limit
Tajikistan's ability to truly benefit economically from its own
hydropower potential. Sharipov hinted broadly that former
Minister of Energy Nurmahmadov had prospered privately from
RusAl "inducements." Sharipov claimed he personally had
insisted to President Rahmonov that a third country, maybe
Pakistan or China, had to be brought into the Rogun negotiations
for the sake of Tajikistan's own national interests.
Surprisingly, Sharipov took personal credit for Nurmahmadov's
dismissal, claiming he had argued sovereignty and national
interests to Rahmonov.


13. (C) (COMMENT: Although it's possible Sharipov might have
been hyping his own role in this drama, he does not really
strike us as an exaggerator. Others with insider information
have told us Nurmahmadov is a "Tajik oligarch" who cares first
and foremost about lining his own pockets, and has significant
business and real estate interests in Dubai and, more recently,
staggeringly expensive residential real estate in Moscow. END

DUSHANBE 00000779 004 OF 004


COMMENT.)


14. (C) Sharipov lamented Russia's recent self-serving
"imperial" moves in Central Asia, contrasting Russia's actions
with other more benign former empires like Britain and France.
The Ambassador concurred it is difficult for a country to learn
how to become "a former colonial power." Sharipov heatedly
pointed to Tajik labor migrants in Russia, their lack of
protection under Russian law, and how Russia contantly abuses
"the blacks." Sharipov concluded that Russia seems to be
spurning Tajikistan as a partner and is acting in its own
arrogant and rapacious interests in most areas. He added, "For
only a nominal cost in protection and cooperation, Russia could
solve most bilateral problems and calm most Tajik fears - but it
won't do so."


15. (C) COMMENT. In this long, unusually informal and frank
meeting, Sharipov consistently used the words "pragmatic" and
"objective" throughout this conversation, especially when
talking about the direction Tajikistan wants to take - not in
the Soviet-style usage, but in a way that seemed reasonably
modern and international. He praised the United States for its
restrained, sensible, and "objective" analysis of Tajikistan.
He told the Ambassador he had closely followed his public
speeches and activities in Tajikistan, and was especially
pleased to begin to build this new personal relationship with
him that he hoped would be increasingly productive. He hinted
strongly that President Rahmonov had personally encouraged him
to build a more in-depth relationship with the Ambassador and
others at the U.S. Embassy. Later in the day, the SRC
telephoned the Embassy and asked permission to publish the
Ambassador's recent speech on economics, investment, and
corruption (reftel D) as an official Tajik Government document.


16. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED. We have no illusions that we are
experiencing a sudden positive turn for the better. We fully
understand that a small and weak state like Tajikistan must work
hard to balance its power relationships, and has a natural
tendency to play one power against another. That said, we have
noticed increasing hints and circumstantial evidence in recent
months that Tajikistan is rethinking its large-power
relationships. We know there will likely be any number of
heart-stopping plunges on this roller coaster. We know the
Russia-dominated Tajik Ministry of Security is a formidable
challenge, to say the least. But we suggest we should take
every advantage we can in this endlessly fascinating game. We
are especially grateful that Assistant Secretary of State
Boucher will soon be in Dushanbe, and also that USCENTCOM and
the Marshall Center are co-sponsoring the first-ever regional
counter-narcotics conference in Dushanbe in mid-May. Both are
opportunities to move forward U.S. foreign policy in the region.
We further suggest that Assistant Secretary Boucher may want to
consider making MCC one of his several key talking points with
President Rahmonov on May 8. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND