Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE322
2006-02-21 05:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KEY VISITORS FROM

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON KDEM TI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0961
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1469
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000322 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, E, SA/CEN, EUR (DAS BRYZA),DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KEY VISITORS FROM
DUSHANBE


CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000322

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, E, SA/CEN, EUR (DAS BRYZA),DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR KEY VISITORS FROM
DUSHANBE


CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) During an interagency meeting in Washington in January
to elaborate the Tajikistan section of the policy document, "A
Strategy for Central Asia," the Ambassador undertook to
recommend names of key Tajik insiders who could be invited to
Washington for low-profile but high-level conversations about
economic reform and Tajikistan's upcoming presidential election
in November 2006. A small core of "young reformers" with
intimate ties to key officials who are also members of the First
Family would ensure that any message is immediately and, we are
quite certain, accurately communicated "to the very top."

THE INNER-INNER CIRCLE


2. (C) Two family members are essential: First Brother-in-Law
and Chairman of Orien Bank Hasan Sadulloyev, and the President's
uncle (or cousin) Presidential Economic Adviser Matlubhon
Davlatov (septel). They both have an unmediated direct and
constant line to President Rahmonov. Also in this group, but
not a family member, and so once slightly removed, is Chairman
of the National Bank Muradali Alimardonov who has presided over
Tajikistan's credible steps toward banking reform and who serves
as President Rahmonov's major domo (and personal financier) for
major ceremonial events. Their teenage sons are close buddies.

TWO KEY YOUNG REFORMERS IN THE INNER-INNER CIRCLE


3. (C) Two "young reformers" are part of this inner circle
because they are Sadulloyev protigis - Chairman of the State
Savings Bank (with a Johns Hopkins PhD) Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov,
a soft-spoken but increasingly powerful Pamiri who in the one
year he has been in his current job has taken major steps (with
Presidential protection) to curb the massive corruption in the
State Pension System, and TadAZ Deputy Director (but the real
political power there) Sherali Kabirov, who has stopped the
hemorrhaging of TadAZ profits to secret and private off-shore

accounts and redirected them into the state budget. To round
out this group, as a supporting but essential actor, would be
Sadulloyev's young Executive Assistant and personal English
translator Dalar Shukrov.

OTHERS DEEMED ESSENTIAL WHOM WE KNOW LESS WELL


4. (C) While researching this initiative, two other names have
repeatedly come to our attention: Chairman of the Presidential
Financial Control Committee (which Davlatov formerly headed)
Abdujobor Shirinov, and State Adviser for Personnel Abdujobor
Azizov. The latter is especially powerful because he is the
gate-keeper for all senior personnel appointments around the
country and, thus, is totally trusted by the President.

MAYBE ONE MORE?


5. (C) Our best sources often named Tajikistan's newly
appointed PermRep to the United Nations Sirojiddin Aslov. In
our experience, his diffidence seemed to suggest he was a
relatively minor player, but on the other hand he is Dangaran,
possibly a Family Cousin, and always tried to be helpful to
Embassy Dushanbe when he was First Deputy Foreign Minister.


6. (C) Curiously, the name of Tajikistan's Ambassador to the
United States Hamrohon Zaripov did not come up. He has always
seemed to us to understand, at least in general, economic
reform, and seems to understand the ins and outs of Washington.
But he may possibly be seen as a little too ambitious to be a
fully trusted and vetted "ultimate insider." Also, he's not
Family.

FAMILY IS REALITY, AND WE CAN MAKE IT WORK FOR US


7. (C) That brings us to the issue of Family. Although it's
distasteful to us, and can be dangerously counter-productive
(e.g., the Shevardnadzes, Akayevs, and now Karimovs),it is
simply the post-Soviet reality in Tajikistan. We can distance
ourselves because of our principles, or we can work to co-opt
them. We strongly recommend the latter course of action,
especially because this inner circle includes Western-oriented

DUSHANBE 00000322 002 OF 003


reformers like Mahmadaminov and, we believe, Kabirov.

APRIL WORLD BANK MEETINGS WOULD BE OPTIMAL


8. (C) The natural timing for U.S. meetings with these key
insiders would be on the margins, or for a few days immediately
after, the annual World Bank and IMF meetings in Washington in
April. Alimardonov and Davlatov will definitely attend. It
would be no stretch at all to ensure Mahmadaminov attends. If
he understood the purpose, Sadulloyev would willingly attend.


9. (C) It might take a bit of work, but we are certain that we
could ensure TadAZ's Kabirov also attends, if for no other
reason than he told us February 18 during a private bowling
party he has never been to the United States, but very much
wants to meet with leaders of the U.S. aluminum industry to
begin to build contacts to balance the predatory maneuverings of
RusAl's Oleg Deripaska whom it increasingly seems Tajikistan
distrusts because of his high-profile sucking up to the Karimov
family in Uzbekistan. (NOTE: The Swiss-registered but U.S.
privately held company Glencor trades 70 percent of TadAZ's
aluminum production, a 10 percent decrease from before because
Hyundai now has a piece of the action. END NOTE.)

PRESENT THE INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE


10. (C) Any senior U.S. Administration meetings with the core
group should have two separate messages. The first would be
easy and very well-received, and would set a feel-good tone. We
would recommend a luncheon in the Secretary's Dining Room during
which an approved version of the Secretary's Greater Central
Asia Infrastructure Initiative would be presented, perhaps by
Under Secretary Shiner. (The slides should be translated into
Russian, and hard copies should be presented to the Tajik
participants.) A brief drop-by by the Secretary herself, even
for only five minutes, would be extremely well-received, and
demonstrate our serious commitment to the bilateral relationship
and to our respect for Tajikistan's place in Greater Central
Asia.

THE POLITICAL MESSAGE: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION


11. (C) The second meeting should be about the upcoming
Presidential election. We would leave it to Washington to
determine the venue, but would suggest the Roosevelt Room in the
West Wing of the White House, because of the enormous power and
prestige of the U.S. Presidency. We thoroughly understand the
constraints on his time, but a very brief, five-minute drop-by
by President Bush would most certainly underscore the message in
no uncertain terms and would be understood as a mark of
highest-level interest. An alternative to the West Wing would
be a luncheon in Blair House.


12. (C) This would be the slightly more difficult meeting, and
the message would need to be carefully calibrated and presented
with careful diplomatic gentility. We would be glad to work
with Washington to elaborate the message, but the core elements
would include the following:


13. (C, RELEASABLE TO TI) Begin proposed talking points:

-- We recognize Tajikistan, an increasingly important partner
for Afghanistan, as a key state in Greater Central Asia.

-- Since 2000, Tajikistan has made remarkable progress
recovering from the 1992-97 Civil War and getting the economy
growing again. As you have seen from our Infrastructure
Initiative presentation, we are with you.

-- Tajikistan generally has increasing respect in the
international community, in large part thanks to President
Rahmonov's "open-door" foreign policy and relatively moderate
and progressive governance. We want that respect to grow.

-- We will not embarrass you by making demands we know your
government cannot fulfill. Partners in a mature relationship do
not do that to each other.

-- But as a friend of Tajikistan, we do want to make several
recommendations that we believe will benefit Tajikistan
internally, that will actually improve longer-term stability,
and that will further improve your government's international

DUSHANBE 00000322 003 OF 003


image.

-- We will be frank and tell you we understand that President
Rahmonov will win the November election, in part because he is
truly respected for having established stability in the country
following your tragic civil war.

-- We know President Rahmonov understands that events in
Georgia, Ukraine, and even Kyrgyzstan occurred in recent years
in part because of chronically weak economies and endemic
corruption at the top levels of society.

-- We have noted with admiration President Rahmonov's attempts
to build Tajikistan's economy and to rein in corruption, and we
understand he is doing this in a most complex arena with
competing interests.

-- Because President Rahmonov will win the November election, as
friends of Tajikistan we want to recommend strongly that the
election be conducted so that it meets international standards.
President Rahmonov is strong enough that he can now afford this
"luxury." If he does so, it would enormously increase his
international prestige.

-- The steps we recommend would include equal and fair radio and
TV broadcast time for all political parties, no matter how weak
or strong they may be; provision for Tajik civil society
organizations to serve as poll monitors; and - most important -
absolute transparency in reporting accurate and honest vote
tallies [known in Tajikistan as "protocols"] at the local and,
especially, district levels.

-- We ask that President Rahmonov make clear in public, long
before the actual date of the election, that he will not
tolerate local and district officials "over-fulfilling the
plan," and that if they do so, they will face clear and certain
consequences.

End proposed talking points.


14. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to working closely
with Washington on this initiative. Please advise our next
steps.
HOAGLAND