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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
06DUSHANBE2227 2006-12-19 12:57:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN NOT YET AN APPROPRIATE TERRORIST-RELATED DATA

Tags:   PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS KVPR 
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VZCZCXRO8778
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #2227 3531257
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191257Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9250
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0767
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 002227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, S/CT (FRED VOGEL) AND CA (ALCY
FRELICK)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS KVPR
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN NOT YET AN APPROPRIATE TERRORIST-RELATED DATA
SHARING PARTNER

REF: 06 STATE 190832

CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)





1. (SBU) Post is engaged in informal information sharing with
Tajik Government law enforcement and security service entities.
However, the limited biometric and biographic information in
Tajik travel documents, as well as their elementary and
improperly used immigration and security databases, make the
systematic collection of terrorist-related data unreliable
(reftel).



2. (SBU) Immigration Databases: Despite a recent USG-funded
IOM project to supply computers to several main Tajik points of
entry (including Dushanbe International Airport), many Tajik
border and immigration officials do not use the automated
system, sticking to paper logs and longhand databases. Limited
training, power brownouts (particularly on the Uzbek and Afghan
border), and reluctance to use the new equipment all contribute
to partial and improper use of the computer databases that are
available. The databases are not connected to each other or to
a central server.



3. (SBU) Watchlist and Information Sharing: The computer
database uses a very general name-based Watchlist, consisting
only of information from the immigration department of the
Ministry of Interior. Even Tajik officials admit the Watchlist
is incomplete and rarely updated. Since the system is seldom
used to screen for names, there is no evidence to demonstrate
that even a properly documented name hit will be found and
matched to a person crossing the border. Though the Ministry of
Interior (other than the immigration and registration
department) and Ministry of Security keep additional databases,
we understand this information is not shared directly with the
border authorities as part of a general Watchlist system.
Specific lookouts are disseminated by longhand note and word of
mouth, or by dispatching special officers to a border point for
a specific operation. Tajik authorities cooperate with their
neighbors (Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, China, and Kyrgyzstan) on a
case-by-case basis but do not routinely share their databases or
Watchlists.



4. (SBU) Biometrics: The Tajik passport, machine readable but
of very poor quality, does not contain additional biometric
features. The passport readers currently at place in Dushanbe
Airport and at several border posts do not have the ability to
machine read Tajik passports - only better quality international
machine readable passports.



5. (C) Identifying Appropriate Partners: Due to the above
information, Tajikistan would make a very poor data sharing
partner. Though the Tajik border authorities want to upgrade
their Watchlist capabilities, internal and external systematic
data sharing, and passport quality, scant resources prevent this
from happening. The OSCE is currently considering a border
security assistance project for Tajikistan which might include
working with the Tajik Government to improve immigration data
collection and sharing.

JACOBSON