Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE2219
2006-12-14 13:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TRADING PLACES: TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET OF OLD HANDS WILL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EAID ENRG SNAR KDEM TI AF 
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9239
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1907
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1936
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1945
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0754
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002219 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EAID ENRG SNAR KDEM TI AF
SUBJECT: TRADING PLACES: TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET OF OLD HANDS WILL
NOT CHANGE OVERALL DIRECTION

REF: A) DUSHANBE 2171 B) DUSHANBE 2201 C) DUSHANBE 2205 D) DUSHANBE 2209

DUSHANBE 00002219 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EAID ENRG SNAR KDEM TI AF
SUBJECT: TRADING PLACES: TAJIKISTAN'S NEW CABINET OF OLD HANDS WILL
NOT CHANGE OVERALL DIRECTION

REF: A) DUSHANBE 2171 B) DUSHANBE 2201 C) DUSHANBE 2205 D) DUSHANBE 2209

DUSHANBE 00002219 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: With a few exceptions, Tajik President
Rahmonov's post-election appointments simply shuffled loyalists
and favorites into different positions, further concentrating
power in the hands of those from his home region of Kulob.
Instead of naming new, younger officials or educated technocrats
to help guide Tajikistan's economic and social development,
Rahmonov continued to reward his relatives and close allies.
With the dismissal of the ministers of Emergency Situations,
Industry and Labor, Rahmonov removed the last opposition cabinet
members designated under the 1997 power sharing agreement that
helped end the Tajik Civil War.


2. (C) After a presidential election victory November 6,
orchestrated in large part to please international audiences,
Rahmonov will maintain his chosen course, balancing regional
pressures and cooperating with the United States where we have
shared priorities or where the U.S. can provide significant
financial assistance. Economic and social reforms will continue
at the same glacial pace, but no substantive progress on
democracy or human rights can be expected. Strong historical
and economic connections will keep Rahmonov in Moscow's orbit.
Tajikistan is a poor country that cannot afford to act on
principle alone. Its foreign and domestic policies may be driven
by those players who offer the most help. If the United States
wants to remain engaged and relevant during Rahmonov's next
term, we will need financial support to back up intensified
diplomatic relations. END SUMMARY



3. (SBU) This cable concludes a series of four reports on how
the November 30 government restructuring and early December
cabinet appointments impact U.S. interests in Tajikistan and the
region (reftels).

REGIONALISM RISING


4. (SBU) Some advisors told us before the election that
Rahmonov should bring in new specialists to invigorate his
administration, but Rahmonov instead reassigned cabinet
positions to trusted relatives and allies, mainly from his home
town, Dangara, and his home region, Kulob. Kulobis now dominate
the cabinet and Presidential Administration, and control the
most powerful ministries-Interior, Defense, Security, and Energy
and Industry.


5. (C) This regionalism means government decisions may
increasingly be made to protect clan interests first, and
national interests second. This course could start to
exacerbate regional tensions that have been dormant since the
civil war; although we have seen no signs of this so far. More
concretely it also disadvantages educated specialists from other
regions from advancing within the government, further
contributing to Tajikistan's diminishing human resources and
human capacity. Unfortunately, the poor performance of many
presidential favorites from Dangara and Kulob has done nothing
to dissuade the small intelligentsia in Dushanbe and Khujand of
the Kulobis' reputation as badly educated and incompetent
villagers.


6. (SBU) In the Kulob club:

-- Sherali Gulov, Minister of Energy and Industry: Rahmonov's
son-in-law's father.

-- Hairriddin Abdurahimov, Chairman, Committee on National
Security, Rahmonov's nephew.

-- Davlatali Saidov, Chairman, Committee on Youth, Sport and
Tourism, Rahmonov's nephew.

-- Matlubhon Davlatov, State Economic Advisor to President,
Rahmonov's cousin and neighbor.

-- Sherali Khairulloev, Minister of Defense, Rahmonov's distant
relative, from Dangara.


DUSHANBE 00002219 002.2 OF 003


-- Mamadnazar Solehov, Minister of Interior, from Dangara.

-- Amirsho Miraliev, Chief, Presidential Administration,
Rahmonov's Dangara classmate

-- Asadullo Ghulomov, Deputy Prime Minister, longtime Rahmonov
family friend, from Vose, next to Kulob

-- Safarali Najmuddinov, Minister of Finance, from Dangara

-- Hasan Sadulloev, Chairman, Orien Bank and Ismoili Somoni
holding company, arguably Tajikistan's most powerful business
man, and Rahmonov's brother-in-law

-- Sharifhon Samiev, Head of Barqi Tojik state electricity
utility, Rahmonov's neighbor from Dangara (also rumored to be
the husband of Rahmonov's driver's sister.)

THE NET RESULT


7. (C) Rahmonov's new administration -- old wine in new bottles
-- will likely have the following effects in the short- and
medium-term:

--Tajikistan will continue to look to Moscow first: Rahmonov's
loyal advisors trust Russia, or at least understand how Moscow
operates and thinks. Russia remains Tajikistan's top trading
partner and foreign investor. Russian advisors exerted a strong
influence on Abdurahimov as Minister of Security. President
Rahmonov will not try to distance himself from a country where
up to one million Tajiks work each year, supplying up to
one-half of Tajikistan's $3 billion GDP.

--Tajikistan's human capacity will continue to decline. The
crumbling and corrupt education system results in meaningless
degrees and technically incompetent professionals and workers.
Foreign companies and donors trying to open businesses or
projects lament the poor quality of the Tajik work force, but
the education system is not equipped to produce qualified labor.
Exchange programs to the United States, India, China and Europe
provide a small number of smart young Tajiks with their only
opportunity for quality education.

-- Border security, counterterrorism and counternarcotics
cooperation will remain on track as long as donor money flows.
Tajikistan shares international concerns about drugs and
terrorists, but needs help developing institutional and
operational capacity to effectively monitor its border and train
and equip its armed forces. These security concerns may
outweigh Abdurahimov's distrust of the United States, but may
also cause Tajikistan to look for additional partners in border
activities. Our goal of dismantling and prosecuting drug
trafficking and organized crime syndicates may find less support
from this cabinet. It is suspected, although difficult to prove,
that many Kulobis have ties to drug trafficking. With clan
loyalty rewarded by Rahmonov himself, it is unlikely anyone will
have the authority to go after the top traffickers.

-- No real free speech, no real free media, no real political
opposition. After the November 6 presidential election,
international attention will be much less focused on the state
of democracy in Tajikistan and we expect Rahmonov will feel
little pressure to continue democratic reforms or allow
opposition political parties to organize or express themselves.
The government is poised to pass strict laws on associations
(modeled on the Russian NGO law) and religion, and may make it
harder for certain U.S.-funded NGOs to register. The already
timid Tajik press will probably not provoke Rahmonov or his
administration by criticizing his actions or policies.

-- Infrastructure investment will buy influence. Examples
abound: China's $639 million low interest loans for transmission
lines, roads and a tunnel; Russia's support for hydropower
stations at Sangtuda-I and Roghun; Iran's construction of the
Anzob Tunnel and Sangtuda-II; our $37 million bridge at Nizhniy
Pyanj, and even India's modest $12 million rehabilitation of the
Varzob hydropower station all give certain countries a louder
voice that commands the Tajik government's attention.
Assistance for economic and social reform, health, and education
are not as alluring as mega-projects; hence the EU and European
countries' relatively limited influence despite average annual
assistance of $50 million over the past few years.

DUSHANBE 00002219 003.2 OF 003



-- Regional economic integration will focus on northern routes
to Kazakhstan and Russia, at least for the short term.
Electricity trade aside, the Tajiks have not developed the road
network or products to trade with South Asia when the bridge
opens at Nizhniy Pyanj in 2007 connecting Tajikistan and
Afghanistan. A lack of English language capacity among Tajik
officials also means they cannot easily communicate with their
South Asian neighbors. Russian language skills are also
declining among the younger post-Soviet generation of Tajiks,
ensuring the majority of the migrant workers in Russia will be
stuck with menial jobs.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES


8. (C) Our common fight against terror and narcotics should
continue as planned, but we must consider how to engage a
government that does not always understand or agree with our
goals of democracy and economic reform. The following steps are
not new ideas but initiatives we know will have traction with a
government entrenched in its ways.

-- Increased visits and diplomatic engagement: Visits from
high-level U.S. officials get a lot of mileage. Some of most
irksome bilateral issues - NGO registration, anti-corruption and
investment climate issues - get the most attention when raised
by a visitor. In a place where personal relationships matter,
we can engage more often at a higher level.

-- Joint programs with Afghanistan: To encourage Tajikistan to
think more about trading south, we need to provide opportunities
for Tajikistan and Afghanistan to develop together. Energy,
security, water, health, education, agriculture, customs reform,
trade, and tourism are all sectors where Tajikistan and
Afghanistan can work together. We will provide a list of
project ideas septel.

-- Increased exchanges: High school, university, graduate and
professional exchanges all help open the minds of Tajiks who
otherwise have almost no exposure to Western media or ways of
thinking.

-- Peace Corps: No institution is better tailored to provide
technical assistance and public diplomacy than Peace Corps. The
volunteer model is ideally suited to Tajikistan, where our best
access remains at the community level, where personal
relationships mean everything, and where the extremely young
population has no alternate access to outside ideas short of
migrating to Russia. Given the paucity of English language
instruction and the need for small business development in
Tajikistan, and the U.S. policy goal of training more Americans
as Persian (Farsi, Dari, Tajiki) speakers, it is time to start a
program in Tajikistan.JACOBSON