Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE178
2006-01-27 10:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR PROTESTS SECURITY MINISTRY CRACK-DOWN ON NDI

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PROP KDEM RS TI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6544
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1342
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1376
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1381
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1311
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1252
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1343
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1285
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1248
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1144
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM FP MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1398
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0917
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1431
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7629
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000178 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PROP KDEM RS TI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PROTESTS SECURITY MINISTRY CRACK-DOWN ON NDI


CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000178

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PROP KDEM RS TI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PROTESTS SECURITY MINISTRY CRACK-DOWN ON NDI


CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 27, the Ambassador forcefully
protested to Foreign Minister Nazarov the Security Ministry's
recent crackdown on the National Democratic Insitute in
Dushanbe. Nazarov agreed to intervene with the Minister of
Security and to bring the problem to President Rahmonov's
attention. We will follow this closely until the issues are
resolved. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND


2. (C) In the wake of the "color revolutions" and propaganda
from Moscow that U.S. democracy NGOs in cahoots with
intelligence agencies fomented them, the Government of
Tajikistan reined in National Democratic Institute (NDI). The
Ministry of Justice, reportedly on instructions from the
Ministry of Security, has consistently refused to register NDI,
and AmCit directors have been unable to obtain visas, except for
brief visits for internal management reviews. Nevertheless, NDI
continued to work in Tajikistan with CIS-citizen directors and
worked openly with all legal political parties, including
President Rahmonov's Peoples Democratic Party. Current NDI
Director Gegham Sargsyan, an Amenian citizen, regularly renewed
his accreditation with the Ministry of Interior's Office of Visa
and Foreign Registration (OVIR) to live and work in Tajikistan.


3. (C) When Sargsyan's residency registration was due to expire
in January, OVIR refused to renew it because he worked for an
international NGO. They advised him to go to the Foreign
Ministry. The Foreign Ministry's Consular Section declined to
register him as well, because the Ministry of Justice has not
registered NDI. On January 23, the Ambassador raised this issue
with Foreign Minister Nazarov, who said he would look into it.
On January 24, the Ambassador again raised the problem with
First Deputy Foreign Minister Yatimov, who suggested that NDI

needs to be legally registered but agreed to consult with
Foreign Minister Nazarov.


4. (C) On January 26, Sargsyan asked to see the Ambassador
urgently. With an expired residency registration, he is now
technically in Tajikistan illegally. He had gone to the Foreign
Ministry three times, to no avail, and he feared he could be
arrested if he stayed much longer. Further, he reported that
Ministry of Security officers have been severely harassing his
local staff, both program and technical support workers like
drivers, calling them to rooms in the Hotel Tajikistan and
intensively interrogating them to "reveal NDI's secrets."
Security Ministry officials have also been calling family
members of NDI employees and their professors, if they are
students, threatening "consequences" if the employees do not
cooperate.

THIS MUST STOP


5. (C) The Ambassador asked urgently to see Foreign Minister
Nazarov at OOB on January 27. He noted that he had reluctantly
accepted the previous "compromise" allowing NDI to remain
unregistered and without AmCit directors but continuing to work.
However, it appears that compromise has now broken down.
Further, it is outrageous and unacceptable that the Ministry of
Security is pressuring the Tajik citizens who work at NDI. This
is reminiscent of the KGB excesses of the Soviet Period. While
this is now unfortunately the norm in Uzbekistan, it is unworthy
for Tajikistan to behave like this. The Ambassador reminded the
Foreign Minister that NDI has a powerful constituency in
Washington, and Tajikistan's actions against this organization

DUSHANBE 00000178 002 OF 002


risk harming the generally positive U.S.-Tajikistan relationship.


6. (C) The Ambassador added he is aware that Moscow is leading
the charge against Western democracy and human rights
organizations and, further, seeks to limit the U.S. presence in
Tajikistan. Dushanbe should not fall into this trap. We know
that President Rahmonov's foreign policy is "open-door," but
continued harassment of NDI is slamming the door on U.S.
fingers. Tajikistan certainly cannot want that perception. The
Ambassador appealed to Foreign Minister Nazarov to help him
solve this problem.

MAYBE ROGUES ARE OVER-FULFILLING THE PLAN?


7. (C) Nazarov responded that he would contact Minister of
Security Abdurahimov immediately to ask what was going on. He
also said that he would bring the issue to President Rahmonov's
attention. He was sure there would be a solution in the coming
week. Nazarov commented that sometimes individual officials
"over-fulfill the plan," to try to curry favor with their
bosses. It could be that rogue officers were behind the NDI
problems. To illustrate this, he recounted that several years
ago, a Ministry of Security officer had invited "a young woman
from the British Embassy" to the Foreign Ministry and had
"questioned her inappropriately." When Nazarov found out about
this, he'd raised hell with the Minister of Security and put a
stop to it. Nazarov assured the Ambassador that harassment of
NDI is not Government of Tajikistan policy, and he stated
explicitly, "OVIR is violating the law."


8. (C) Nazarov volunteered that the recent problem with BBC
losing its license to broadcast from Dushanbe was a result of
unilateral - and illegal - action by the new director of radio
and television broadcasting. This kind of freelancing causes
international problems for Tajikistan, and the President is well
aware of it.


9. (C) Three hours after the meeting, Foreign Minister Nazarov
telephoned the Ambassador. He said he'd spoken with Minister of
Security Abdurahimov who denied any knowledge of the NDI issue
but said he would speak with his officers to get to the bottom
of the problem. The Ambassador thanked Nazarov for his quick
action at a very busy time, but reminded him that the problem
has to be solved, not just looked into.


10. (C) COMMENT: NDI's problems in Dushanbe coincide more or
less with the recent "British spy scandal" in Moscow and
President Putin directly linking Western espionage to democracy
and human rights NGOs. We note that intelligence officers from
the Russian Embassy have nearly free run at the Ministry of
Security. By making a forceful protest to the Foreign Minister,
who will undoubtedly inform President Rahmonov, we hope that NDI
in Dushanbe can return to the status quo ante. However, we will
watch closely and not let up the pressure until Sargsyan is
legally registered and harassment against NDI's Tajik employees
stops. END COMMENT
HOAGLAND