Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE1621
2006-08-29 12:48:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIKISTAN: UNKNOWN ASSAILANT SETS SYNAGOGUE ON FIRE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC KIRF KDEM TI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0115
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1621/01 2411248
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 291248Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8455
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1794
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1793
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1738
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1789
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1748
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1679
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1759
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1500
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1514
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1709
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1761
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1310
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1065
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9849
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001621 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/IP/SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KIRF KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: UNKNOWN ASSAILANT SETS SYNAGOGUE ON FIRE

REF: DUSHANBE 986

DUSHANBE 00001621 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



SECRET/NOFORN

SIPDIS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001621

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/IP/SCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KIRF KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: UNKNOWN ASSAILANT SETS SYNAGOGUE ON FIRE

REF: DUSHANBE 986

DUSHANBE 00001621 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



SECRET/NOFORN

SIPDIS


1. (C) SUMMARY: An unknown assailant set Dushanbe's synagogue
on fire August 18 by throwing a Molotov cocktail through a first
floor window. Fortunately, a neighbor sounded the alarm and the
fire was put out before it was able to spread and engulf the
entire building. Dushanbe's Fire Department has officially
acknowledged that the fire was deliberate and will investigate.
In the days leading up to the fire, a series of strangers
visiting the synagogue and a break-in at the rabbi's residence
indicate the fire may have been well-planned and orchestrated by
an undeclared group. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) According to Rabbi Mikhail Abdurahmonov, on Friday,
August 18 at 10:00 pm, an unknown person or possibly a group of
people walked up to Dushanbe's only synagogue, snuck behind a
protective wall and threw a Molotov cocktail (a bottle with fuel
and packed with paper lit on fire) through a window into a small
prayer room. The bottle broke the window, completely burned the
curtains, charred a large section of the prayer room's wall and
damaged a table and chair. Fortunately, a vigilant neighbor,
alarmed by his dog's barking, alerted synagogue officials and
authorities. The fire department put out the fire and stopped
it from spreading. Synagogue members had finished Friday night
prayers earlier in the evening at approximately 9:00 pm and left
the room vacant. Friday night is the beginning of the Jewish
Sabbath and prayers are always held after sunset. No one was
hurt.


3. (C) Police and fire department officials investigated the
fire the same night and returned three days later to assess the
damages. They have officially concluded the fire was a
deliberate act and not an accident, but have no leads on who is

responsible for the fire. According to the congregation's
rabbi, officials also told him not to tell anyone about the
fire, explaining that nothing should ruin the government's
Independence Day celebrations, planned for September 8-9. No
media reported the news and post may never have known about the
incident, had an American citizen not visited the synagogue
August 17.


4. (C) Police promised to investigate the fire, but have no
leads yet. Several days prior to the incident, police went
door-to-door in the neighborhood occupied by several Jewish
residents, and told them to beware of suspicious packages lying
around. They warned that some people may try to cause problems
leading up to Tajik Independence Day, September 9.
Specifically, they instructed Rabbi Abdurahmonov to refuse entry
to any strangers into the synagogue, even if they claim to be
Jewish.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRE


5. (C) Several days prior to the fire, someone broke into
Abdurahmonov's residence, locked his dog up in a small room and
broke a window. Nothing was stolen from his house. The rabbi
said the break-in was designed to intimidate him.


6. (C) Rabbi Adburahmonov informed EmbOffs of a series of
visitors to the synagogue in the weeks before the fire. The
first suspicious visitor was a Tajik male who asked detailed
questions about the building's layout and prayer times. He

DUSHANBE 00001621 002.2 OF 003


attempted to take photographs of the synagogue, but when
confronted by synagogue staff, he claimed to be a journalist.
When asked for his documents, he ran away.


7. (C) The second visit involved two Tajik men and one male
who the rabbi presumed to be "a foreigner." The staff, noticing
the third male had a darker complexion than the average Tajik,
asked where he was from. The two men replied jokingly that he
was from Lebanon. The third male did not speak during the
visit, so his origins could not be determined. They were
interested in the layout of the synagogue, times of prayer, and
entered the small prayer room that was later the site of the
fire asking about it.


8. (C) A third visit was by a stranger asking for Gourevitch's
phone number. Gourevitch is a rabbi based in Tashkent who has
been attempting to assist the Dushanbe synagogue resolve its
forced relocation problem with the government (reftel). In a
small town where the rabbi knows everyone in the Jewish
community, and strangers rarely visit the synagogue, suspicious
visitors stick out.


9. (C) Concerned about future attacks, members of the
synagogue community now guard the building on a 24-hour basis.
In Abdurahmonov's years at the synagogue, this is the first act
of vandalism that he can recall.


10. (C) COMMENT: Up to this point, Tajikistan's population
overall has not overtly displayed feelings or acts of
anti-Semitism. Conspiracy theories from locals include a
response to the events between Israel and Lebanon and an action
by the GOTI in order to more quickly move the synagogue out of
the neighborhood where the new Presidential Palace is being
built (REFTEL).


11. (C) It is doubtful the fire is related to the land dispute
between the government and the synagogue, as the issue has been
going on for years. Knowing that the international community
keeps a watchful eye on the synagogue, government officials
would not want to risk an international religious freedom
incident prior to Tajikistan's Independence Day or the November
presidential election.


12. (C) the series of visits prior to the fire by strange men
indicate an organized group may have conducted pre-operational
surveillance of the site and planned the fire. The motivation
for setting the synagogue on fire is unclear. Typically, if the
act were politically motivated, for example to protest Israel's
attacks in Lebanon, the perpetrator would have issued a public
statement, or made his goals clear.


13. (S/NF) The GOTI's response to this event is equally
puzzling. The Ministry of Security (MB) would normally
investigate acts of terrorism, political violence, or any
possible threat in the lead-up to Independence Day. Not wanting
to publicize such an event before Independence Day is in line
with the Tajik way of doing business, but this does not explain
the MB's failure to investigate this case. It is possible that
a low-level Fire Department official made the decision
independently believing it to be consistent with the GOTI's
desire to keep events such as this out of the public eye.


14. (C) Although a week has passed without additional
incidents, the activity leading up to the fire shows a pattern
consistent with a terrorist operational cycle: pre-operational
surveillance, planning, rehearsal, attack, and escape. This one
incident shows that the small Jewish community in Tajikistan may
need to be more vigilant in case these same individuals are

DUSHANBE 00001621 003.2 OF 003


planning to carry out additional attacks. Likewise, the Embassy
will remain vigilant concerning the overall security climate and
our own safety in Tajikistan.

END COMMENT.HUSHEK