TEN WEEKS TO ELECTIONS, TAJIKISTAN MOVING SLOWLY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MERKEL;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM TI
SUBJECT: TEN WEEKS TO ELECTIONS, TAJIKISTAN MOVING SLOWLY TO
IMPLEMENT CHANGES

REF: A) DUSHANBE 960 B) DUSHANBE 1599 C) DUSHANBE 1587

CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Ten weeks out from the November Presidential
election, Tajik authorities are moving very slowly to implement
improvements to the electoral process. After a significant step
forward in May, when Tajik authorities presented donors with a
the first government plans to address previously election
inadequacies, the Central Committee on Elections and Referenda
(CCER) has largely been working behind the scenes with NGOs and
donors. IFES, the UN and OSCE are pushing the CCER to issue a
decree on the conduct of the election, but the ball rests with
the CCER, which may not have much power without a distinct
directive from the President's office. Top advisors to the
president acknowledge the importance of holding a more
transparent election, but seem more concerned with checking
boxes on a checklist for international approval than
strengthening the actual process. They do not seem to
understand the structural changes to make an election more fair
and transparent, including media access and an election campaign
free from pressure or government intimidation. The election
support funds Post requested in May have yet to make their way
to Tajikistan, and few other donors plan to invest in an
election where the result is a foregone conclusion. Post still
believes it is in our and Tajikistan's interest to train
officials and an electorate in proper election procedures, in
preparation for a day when the race is truly open. END SUMMARY.



VERY SMALL STEPS




2. (C) Since a May 17 meeting presented international donors
with a very concrete set of actions to improve the election
process (Reftel A),movement on election issues has been slow
and almost entirely behind-the-scenes. United Nations
Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) held a July 27
roundtable with the President's Center for Strategic Research
(CSR),the CCER and political parties to discuss a possible
decree to be issued by the CCER prior to the elections. The
decree would offer district-level election commissions specific
guidance to implement better practices on election day. The
decree belongs to the list of changes identified by CCER, IFES
and CSR, in response to Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) criticisms of the February 2005
Parliamentary elections. After the July 27 meeting, UNTOP told
other donors the ball was "firmly in the CCER's court" to
release a statement on the election. In late August/early
September, the CCER expects to send to parliament a decree to
institute changes in the election procedure after conferring
with the political parties.




3. (SBU) In early August, OSCE gave the Tajik authorities an
assessment on the Law on the Election of the President, which
the Tajik Parliament amended in January. The assessment
criticized the law for restricting campaign free speech and
imposing overly strict requirements for candidates. The OSCE
assessment recommended a number of new amendments to the
election law, to provide non-partisan domestic observers; an
independent, pluralistic election administration; fair
allocation of state resources to candidates; and improved
process of verifying signatures to nominate a candidate.



CHAIRMAN BOLTUYEV



DUSHANBE 00001613 002 OF 004




4. (C) CCER Chairman Boltuyev had difficulty articulating the
changes his agency had already implemented, or the general CCER
goals for the November election. In an August 18 meeting with
Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum and PolOff, he stressed
the CCER's independence and the autonomy of the individual
district election commissions, separate from the Presidentially
appointed local government. He noted Parliament would convene
August 31 to set the official date for the Presidential election
- most likely November 6. When DAS Feigenbaum repeated the
question about the changes CCER hoped to make, Boltuyev only
mentioned attempts to eliminate "family" voting, where the male
head of the family filled out ballots for multiple registered
voters. Boltuyev hinted that the CCER would issue procedural
guidance to local level election officials, but offered no
comments on the action plan developed with IFES and CRS.




5. (C) Boltuyev faulted the OSCE for issuing their report on
the February 2005 election "six months later" and not
identifying the specific polling stations where violations
occurred. "They should have come to us that night, so we could
immediately correct the mistake." He also criticized the OSCE's
assessment, noting "the CCER cannot just change the law." (NOTE:
He's correct. END NOTE.) Despite several leading queries,
Boltuyev did not mention his work with IFES, which has been a
driving force behind the matrix of changes to be implemented
before the election. He made no mention of scheduled
poll-worker trainings or voter education, as the CCER previously
proposed to donors.




6. (C) In a series of unrelated comments, Boltoyev thanked the
United States for its support, went into details about the
mechanics of getting 3 million registered voters on the voting
rolls and to the ballot box and emphasized the close working
relationship with UNTOP. He rejected the offer of additional
material support or funding, even when the offer was restated so
as to be clear that there could be funding to help with the
balloting. His deputy Dodjonov, sitting next to him, quickly
interjected that the CCER could indeed use assistance with some
publications, including 40,000 copies of the election laws and
constitutions. Boltuyev emphasized the need for observers, and
closed the conversation by asking "Why would we violate
(international standards)?"




7. (C) An NGO director and UNTOP head Ambassador Sotirov told
PolOff in later conversations that Boltuyev was drunk on the job
with increasing frequency. Sotirov noted that Boltuyev often
called him for drinking binges. "I give my liver for
democracy!" he smiled, in order to maintain the working
relationship with the CCER. The NGO head reported that the CCER
tried to maneuver events so that Boltuyev gave prepared remarks,
and then left the floor and the work to Dodojonov and other
department heads. The NGO head noted that after Boltoyev's wife
passed away, he became an alcoholic and Dodojonov runs the CCER
with Boltoyev only as its chairman by name. The NGO head also
commented that CCER has tried to keep its activities with the
NGO and political parties very quiet, until they can formally
announce the decree.



WE WANT CLEAN ELECTIONS



DUSHANBE 00001613 003 OF 004




8. (C) CSR head Suhrob Sharipov told PolOff August 19 the
government wanted to have a "clean" election-and President
Rahmonov himself had told his administration that the balloting
was supposed to follow international standards. "We must do
away with family voting, and make sure that every local election
official understands that the President wants them to follow the
rules." Sharipov acknowledged that in a culture where
connections were everything, no local official wanted his
district to be the one that delivers less support to the
President. "The President has gotten a good chuckle out of the
Americans telling him he doesn't need 99 percent of the vote,"
said, Sharipov, possibly referring to Presidential Advisor on
Economics Davlatov's meeting with former-DAS John Gastright in
Washington in April.




9. (C) Sharipov predicted Islamic Renaissance Party acting
chairman Muhiddin Kabiri would run against Rahmonov (Reftel C).
When pressed about access to the media and state television for
any opposition candidates, Sharipov appeared thoughtful, but
somewhat unconvinced it was a necessary step. "The President is
really popular," he noted. "He has done so much for this
country. We know he's going to win." Like Boltuyev, Sharipov
was reticent about collaboration between his Center and IFES on
election reform



COMMENT:




10. (C) Although the CCER may have cooperated with international
organizations, it is clear that it has limited authority. In
Tajikistan, particularly with the presidential election, top
government officials are still in firm control.




11. (C) Sharipov and Bolutyev's comments suggest the Tajik
authorities are very interested in appearing to make changes to
win international favor, but may not entirely understand why
certain reforms have been recommended. In Tajikistan's
unsophisticated democracy, focus is still on rectifying
culturally-based violations like family voting, or absentee
voting, rather than understanding and undertaking structural
changes needed such as creating more independence from
government pressure and a fair campaign season.




12. (C) Sharipov's throughts echoed a later statement by
Presidential Advisor Rahmatulloyev (Reftel B) on the danger of
political irrelevance for any opposition candidate, in light of
Rahmonov's overwhelming popularity. For Sharipov and Boltuyev,
a clean election seems to be a hoop to jump through for an
international audience, not something that could benefit their
own institutions.




13. (C) The clock is ticking, but reform is slow and
underfunded. Funding from Post's May request for election
support has yet to be hit the ground (Reftel A) and few other
donors, aside from UNTOP and OSCE, plan to invest in the
election. Although the result may be a foregone conclusion.
Post still believes it is in the U.S. and Tajikistan's interest
to help the CCER train its poll workers and the electorate, in

DUSHANBE 00001613 004 OF 004


anticipation for a day when Tajikistan's political field is
truly open. END COMMENT.




14. (U) DAS Feigenbaum did not clear this cable.
HUSHEK