Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE1599
2006-08-23 12:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RAHMATULLOYEV MEETS DAS

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ENRG KDEM KISL TI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001599 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SCA FOR DEUTSCH; NSC FOR MERKEL;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG KDEM KISL TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RAHMATULLOYEV MEETS DAS
FEIGENBAUM

REF: Dushanbe 1587

CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001599

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SCA FOR DEUTSCH; NSC FOR MERKEL;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG KDEM KISL TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RAHMATULLOYEV MEETS DAS
FEIGENBAUM

REF: Dushanbe 1587

CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Advisor on Foreign Policy Erkin
Rahmatulloyev waxed philosophical on Central Asia's history and
role in U.S. policy and the challenges facing his country, but
agreed with Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum that the
U.S. and Tajik governments share the same priorities and
concerns about regional integration and stability. Democracy,
he added, will not happen in Tajikistan overnight, and the Tajik
government fears instability. But there are indications that
the Tajik mentality is changing step by step. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) In an 80 minute meeting August 21, Rahmatulloyev told
DAS Feigenbaum he was very pleased with the current bilateral
relationship, particularly because during the 1990s the United
States had given only "episodic" attention to Tajikistan and its
neighbors. Now, the relationship reached across many sectors
and cooperation was clearly growing stronger. DAS Feigenbaum
agreed but offered a slightly different characterization of
early U.S. policy in the region, noting it had not been
"episodic" since the US had maintained a consistent interest in
the region since 1991. But it might have seemed one-dimensional
- for example, focused mainly on opening new embassies and
denuclearization in the early 1990s, and later on responding to
the Global War on Terror. Many observers in the 1990s had
argued that U.S. policy was simply a function of geo-strategic
competition with Russia and China, reducing Central Asian states
to the objects of their struggle. Feigenbaum noted we have now
reached a new moment where the United States is pursuing a
genuinely multi-dimensional relationship with Tajikistan and its
neighbors and where the Central Asian countries themselves are
at the center of our regional policy.




DEMOCRACY TAKES TIME




3. (C) Rahmatulloyev observed that the U.S. vision for the
region almost mirrored the Tajik government's priorities,
although he suspected that the United States sometimes feels
that democracy and human rights were not shared priorities in
the region. Unlike neighboring countries, "We don't have that
allergy" to democracy, he joked. However, he cautioned that the
"mentality" of the Tajik population was not ready for a dramatic
democratic transition that could lead to "undesirable
consequences." "One reason for the Civil War was that political
demonstrators tore down a Lenin statue before the population was
ready for such a change. This led directly to confrontation."
Five years later, he noted the government changed the name of
Lenin district to Sughd district, with nary a complaint from the
public.




4. (C) It was all about gradual timing of new ideas, he opined.
"For a long time we lived in a society of single-mindedness, but
now we are used to multiple opinions. We cannot come to this in
a day." Feigenbaum noted that democracy was by no means a
uniquely American idea and many countries had developed their
own democratic traditions. He said Washington would like to see
Tajikistan develop more democratic processes but in a manner
that would be unique, not a carbon-copy of the United States.
He noted the great deal of interest in Tajikistan's November
presidential election.



DUSHANBE 00001599 002 OF 004



ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY




5. (C) Rahmatulloyev noted that neighboring countries were not
always pleased Tajikistan allowed an Islamic-based political
party to operate legally. Rahmatulloyev called the existence of
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) a compromise between
Islamic and secular movements, noting that it has reduced the
basis for fundamentalism in the country. He also suggested that
the IRPT's legal status should demonstrate to neighboring
countries that not all Islam js radical and political.




6. (C) Rahmatulloyev doubted that acting Party Chairman
Muhiddin Kabiri would run for president in November, noting that
his candidacy could reduce his political prestige. (Reftel A)
"It would be catastrophic for him if the party nominates him!"
said Rahmatulloyev. There is no alternative to President
Rahmonov, and any opposition candidate will receive such a small
percentage of the vote, he will seem politically insignificant
and fade away. "Look at Usmonov!" he said, referring to the last
candidate who opposed Rahmonov. "He got two percent of the
vote, and now he's gone." When the Peace Agreement was signed in
1998, added Rahmatulloyev, the opposition received 30 percent of
government positions, representing its approximate share of
support among the population. Now, Rahmatulloyev estimated the
support for any opposition to President Rahmonov to be much
lower.



NEXT STEPS




7. (C) In response to DAS Feigenbaum's question about what else
or new the United States could do in the region, Rahmatulloyev
suggested stimulating regional development. Referring to the
UNDP's recently published Human Development Report,
Rahmatulloyev noted that Central Asian countries would
experience a 50 percent growth in GDP just by reducing tariffs
and trade barriers. "Tajikistan supports this policy." He
called the U.S.-funded Bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj a regional, not
bilateral project, for the transport connections it would
facilitate. "When we proposed building that bridge, you were
still friends with Uzbekistan, and the Uzbeks urged us to
refuse, because there was already a bridge across the Pyanj.
Now look how important our bridge is." The United States'
presence in the region is a catalyst for development, he said.




8. (C) The United States' role should be to facilitate regional
integration, Rahmatulloyev said, helping Central Asia
diplomatically and economically. He gave the example of
Tajikistan's excess summer electricity, noting that until 1996,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan swapped excess power. The Uzbeks
abandoned the agreement for political reasons, and chose instead
to expend resources on domestically produced power at "three
times the price of Tajik electricity. It overturned economic
logic." DAS Feigenbaum noted the region's interdependence, and
regretted the political obstacles to realizing the integration
opportunities. The United States, he said, wants to be a
facilitator, a convener in helping to realize precisely these
opportunities.


DUSHANBE 00001599 003 OF 004





9. (C) Rahmatulloyev reported he was writing a book that
addressed Tajikistan's traditional problems and new challenges.
Traditional issues included hydropower and water sharing,
transport and communication links, regional relations-"issues we
inherited" from the Soviets. New problems meant radical Islam,
narcotrafficking, and terrorism. "U.S. policy must take into
account these realities," he advised. DAS Feigenbaum repeated
that we shared many of the same concerns. He noted that we
would like to see more U.S. businesses opening in Tajikistan,
but the current investment climate remained risky for many.
Enhanced economic rule of law could help to attract more private
investors at this exciting time. Ultimately, an American
Chamber of Commerce would help demonstrate that Tajikistan had
assimilated international commercial practices.



"THE BEST BUREAUCRACY IN THE WORLD"




10. (C) Rahmatulloyev complained that U.S. bureaucracy - "the
best bureaucracy in the world" -- led to long gaps between
agreements and implementation. He noted the Chinese supported
three major infrastructure projects, signing the official
agreements in June. Within ten days, they had sent machinery
and the projects had started. "As the United States intensifies
its economic ties, it would be beneficial if it could move
faster," he subtly counseled, particularly in energy, where
Afghanistan and Pakistan have a growing demand for electricity.




ONE LAST THING~ ABOUT THAT DEBT RELIEF




11. (C) Rahmatulloyev observed that since independence, the
United States had given Tajikistan almost one billion dollars in
assistance. "We are most grateful,' he said. "But I have a
little question." He noted that Tajikistan had requested
several times the United States to forgive the $17 million in
debt for food purchases, and added that President Rahmonov had
asked about this issue. Other highly-indebted poor countries
received debt write-offs, the IMF forgave almost $100 million in
Tajikistan debt, and Pakistan has also forgiven $30 million.
"We don't understand, but we attribute this to your U.S.
bureaucracy." DAS Feigenbaum pledged to look into the matter.



COMMENT:




12. (C) Rahmatulloyev had a very analytical bird's eye view of
regional policy, and a realistic perspective on the U.S role in
the region. However, his complaints about U.S. bureaucracy
reflect what many in the Tajik government think: the U.S. is all
talk, and slow action. Particularly on infrastructure projects,
like Sangtuda-I hydropower station, the south-north highway and
transmission lines, the Russians and Chinese have, in Tajik
eyes, moved quickly to deliver on promises. Rahmatulloyev did
not acknowledge that often the Tajik bureaucracy holds up
movement on projects, such as the Ministry of Energy's
month-long period to consider the AES contract for a feasibility

DUSHANBE 00001599 004 OF 004


study on transmission lines to Afghanistan. He, like many in
the Tajik leadership, welcomes the idea of more U.S. investment
and involvement in the region, but may not entirely understand
to what extent that would entail transparency and enhanced rule
of law. END COMMENT.




13. (U) DAS Feigenbaum cleared this cable.
HUSHEK