Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUSHANBE1435
2006-07-27 13:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dushanbe
Cable title:  

IRANIAN AND AFHGAN PRESIDENTS' VISIT TO DUSHANBE BRINGS NO

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON ENRG TI AF IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2821
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1435/01 2081311
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 271311Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8208
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1730
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1718
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1689
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1702
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1659
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1655
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1624
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1018
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1240
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1445
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1641
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1689
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9522
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001435 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG TI AF IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN AND AFHGAN PRESIDENTS' VISIT TO DUSHANBE BRINGS NO
SURPRISES, JUST PERSIAN BROTHERLY LOVE

REF: A) DUSHANBE 1420 B) STATE 19436

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001435

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ENRG TI AF IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN AND AFHGAN PRESIDENTS' VISIT TO DUSHANBE BRINGS NO
SURPRISES, JUST PERSIAN BROTHERLY LOVE

REF: A) DUSHANBE 1420 B) STATE 19436

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iranian President Ahmadinejad's July 25-26
visit to Dushanbe confirmed the close linguistic and cultural
ties between Tajikistan and Iran; the multiple agreements signed
further strengthened the bonds forged during Tajik President
Rahmonov's January visit to Tehran. When Afghan President Hamid
Karzai joined the party July 26, the three leaders reaffirmed
their common cultural ties and agreed to meet annually as a part
of an Intergovernmental Coordination Council. Aside from paying
enthusiastic lip service to the construction of a hydropower
mega-project at Dhosti-jhum on the Afghan-Tajik border, the
visit produced little more than autographed agreements that may
or may not be implemented. Tajik counterparts, understanding
the optics of welcoming an official Iranian delegation while
nuclear issues and support for Hezbollah go unresolved, tried to
downplay the political aspects of the meeting and highlighted
the economic points. END SUMMARY.

IRAN


2. (SBU) Ahmadinejad arrived from Turkmenistan July 25 to an
immediate meeting with President Rahmonov and top advisors. In
addition to a joint declaration on the development of bilateral
relations, Tajik television reported that during the bilateral
meetings, the Tajiks and Iranians signed five agreements
relating to cooperation in:
--Justice;
--Labor and social protection;
--Tourism 2006-2009;
--Establishment of free economic and trade zones;
--Preferred tariffs on imports and exports.


3. (C) Ahmadinejad also attended the inaugural ceremony for
the Anzob tunnel, a $40 million project financed by the Iranians
linking northern and southern Tajikistan. (NOTE: Despite the

ribbon cutting, the tunnel still requires several months more
work before it is open to the public. The project is rumored to
be rife with embezzlement and corruption on both the Tajik and
Iranian sides. END NOTE.)


4. (U) Ahmadinejad made only brief remarks to the press the
first day of the visit, saving his comments and vitriol for the
press conference that followed the tri-lateral meeting. After a
well-publicized telephone conversation with Russian President
Putin during his sojourn in Dushanbe, Ahmadinejad told the press
only that they discussed "international issues," including the
situation in Lebanon.


5. (C) Ahmadinejad's arrival did not include the usual
high-level diplomats reserved for a visiting head of state. The
German, French and British Embassies sent lower-ranking
diplomats to his airport reception in place of their
Ambassadors, although Tajik protocol introduced all diplomats on
the tarmac as "Ambassador."


6. (C) According to the British DCM and French Ambassador, a
week prior to Ahmadinejad's visit, the German, French and
British Embassies in Dushanbe received instructions to deliver a
joint demarche to FM Nazarov concerning Iran's nuclear program.
Nazarov acknowledged that Iran has a right to develop nuclear
energy, but agreed that Iran should refrain from any military
nuclear program and should cooperate with the appropriate

DUSHANBE 00001435 002 OF 003


international bodies. Nazarov promised to pass the European
message to President Rahmonov, a commitment he apparently kept
as evidenced by press accounts which noted that Rahmonov and
exchanged views on Iran's nuclear program and Rahmonov urged
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.


7. (C) COMMENT: Interestingly, when the subject came up in
Ambassador Hoagland's farewell call on Rahmonov (Ref A) prior to
the EU demarche, the president indicated he did not intend to
raise such a contentious issue and would keep the upcoming
bilateral with strictly focused on cultural, commercial and
assistance matters. The EU demarche, perhaps with some credit
due to our own message on the P5+1 incentive package (Ref B)
delivered just prior to Ahmadinejad's visit, appears to have
nudged Rahmonov to overcome his instinct to avoid politicized
issues during the visit. END COMMENT.

ENTER AFGHANISTAN


8. (C) Afghan President Hamid Karzai joined the duo July 26 to
attend the first trilateral summit of the three countries.
(NOTE: The summit was meant to take place in Tehran in January,
but Karzai, after consultation with the United States, backed
out, citing "domestic issues." END NOTE.) The three leaders
signed several memoranda in Dushanbe on economic cooperation and
combating drug trafficking and terrorism. They also signed a
charter to establish the Intergovernmental Coordination Council.
Press quoted Rahmonov as saying the council would be set up
within two months and hold its first meeting in Kabul. The
council will meet once a year "to tackle existing problems."


9. (SBU) According to some press reporting, it appeared as if
the three leaders spent all of July 26 together. In fact, there
was very little Ahmadinejad and Karzai overlap. Karzai arrived
in Dushanbe at 16:20 hours, and Ahmadinejad departed by mid- to
late evening.

MEET THE PRESS


10. (C) Rahmonov, Karzai and Ahmadinejad addressed 136
journalists after their meeting to announce the new agreements
and jointly call for fighting in the Middle East to stop
immediately. One press article reported that Ahmadinejad
responded to questions about Iran's support for Hezbollah, by
stating, "The United States has spread this slander in order to
conceal its shortcoming."
(NOTE: Foreign Minister Nazarov pulled aside the Ambassador
July 26 while diplomats were waiting for Karzai's arrival. He
emphasized that the Tajiks had stressed to Ahmadinejad that he
should not say anything against the United States during his
press conferences. Nazarov expressed relief Ahmadinejad had
honored their request during his first (July 25) media
opportunity, but Nazarov said he couldn't guarantee that
Ahmadinejad still wouldn't respond to "provocations" by
journalists, which he clearly did on July 26. According to a
BBC eyewitness, Ahmadinejad honored the Tajik request but
lingered at the press table after Rahmonov and Karzai had left.
He then reportedly said, "Ok now I will tell you what I really
think," and let loose on the United States. END NOTE.)


11. (U) During the July 26 press conference, the leaders also
announced support for construction of Dhosti-jhum, a proposed
4000 MW hydropower project on the Pyanj River between
Afghanistan and Tajikistan that the Tajiks continue to press
with investors and donors.


12. (SBU) The leaders spoke in Farsi, which posed a difficulty
for many international journalists used to covering Tajik events
in Russian. The MFA refused to offer any Russian-language
interpretation, telling journalists to hire their own since it
was not the responsibility of the MFA. The MFA also refused
admittance to a U.S. Embassy staff member who is also an

DUSHANBE 00001435 003 OF 003


accredited journalist.


13. (C) COMMENT: Despite the enormous protocol and press, the
summit appears to have been little more than an opportunity to
feel good about the Persian language world, without holding any
of the three states to real commitments. The Tajiks are still
waiting for delivery of some of the promises made during the
bilateral meetings in January, particularly the construction of
Sangtuda-II hydropower station. This time around, it appears as
if expectations were lower.


14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Tajikistan continues to join
organizations and sign memoranda which keep it in good standing
with its neighbors and allies. Tajikistan needs economic
assistance, trade and investment too much to alienate Iran.
Rahmonov's foreign policy door remains open to other countries
and the Tajiks continue to balance all the competing interests.
Rahmonov does not at all trust Tehran politically and
ideologically, but he wants Iranian investment. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND