DRL DAS BARKS-RUGGLES' IRAN MEETINGS IN DUBAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUBAI 001859

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SOCI
SUBJECT: DRL DAS BARKS-RUGGLES' IRAN MEETINGS IN DUBAI

REF: A. DUBAI 1728, B. DUBAI 1319

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(C) Summary: During DRL DAS Erica Barks-Ruggles' March 16-19
trip to UAE, she met with a diverse strata of the Iranian
population here, including students, teachers, professionals,
and Baha'is. She also discussed Iran issues with two local
think tanks. Common themes included a concern that the USG's
publicized efforts to help political activists in Iran will put
them in jeopardy, both in Iran -- where the government will use
this as an excuse to clamp down -- and in the UAE, where the UAE
government will feel pressure to clamp down on open political
activity by Iranians. She also heard praise for many U.S. goals
regarding Iran, mixed with criticism of the tone of some U.S.
commentary. Iranians made various suggestions for VOA
programming and people-to-people projects. Many pressed for
more student visas, scholarships and exchange opportunities as
the single most beneficial thing the U.S. could do to positively
influence Iran. A Baha'i couple talked about repression at the
hands of the Iranian government. End summary

UAE Realities
--------------

2.(C) The majority of interlocutors with whom DRL DAS
Barks-Ruggles discussed Iran issues in the UAE March 16-19
indicated that the UAE would not welcome open political activism
by Iranians here, and that Iranians here are vulnerable to
pressure from both the GOI and the UAEG. (DAS Barks-Ruggles'
conversation on Iran with a UAE official is reported septel.)
Iranians in UAE have greater relative freedom than people living
in Iran, but there are limits to that freedom -- placed in part
by the UAE government, in part by the Iranian government, and in
part by their own society. Iranians choose to live in the UAE
for various reasons, including better economic opportunities and
social freedoms. Many young people come here to go to
university due to the scarcity of seats available in Iran.
Several young men indicated that they would stay after their
studies to avoid military service. Because of their desire to
remain in UAE, Iranians are vulnerable to pressure from the UAE
authorities not to rock the boat with political activism while
they are here. Iranian university students said they had to
sign a commitment not to conduct political activities before
being allowed to open a Persian club at their university. Riad
Kahwaji, CEO of the Dubai-based think tank Institute for Near
East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) (who is not Iranian)
also stressed that the UAE does not want to anger Iran by
allowing political activities here. He also noted that to date,
there has been very little interaction between UAE and Iranian
academics, such as conferences in Dubai.

3.(C) Iran itself also has the motivation and the means to
discourage political activism in the Iranian diaspora in the
UAE, either indirectly by pressuring UAE or directly, via the
strong intelligence presence that is suspected here. One of the
university students with whom Barks-Ruggles met said that in
many ways he feels like Dubai is just an extension of Iran.
(Note: The Iranian government promotes this sense by providing
for Iranians' needs here, including Farsi-language,
Iran-accredited schools; a hospital; a social club; and a
newspaper.) A significant reason why that student wanted to
live in Dubai was continued contact with Iran. However,
Iranians fear repercussions for political activity when they
travel back to Iran, as most of them do regularly. Dr. Mustafa
Alani (who is not Iranian) at the Gulf Research Center cautioned
that Iranian intelligence in the UAE is more pervasive than one
might assume. He was pessimistic that many people would risk
participating in USG projects here, since their families or
businesses retain links in one form or another to Iran and/or
the Iranian government. In light of this, he was a proponent of
greater use of more indirect means, like television as a
communication medium, (though he was very critical of al-Hurra).
Kahwaji said he had noted fewer Iranians at a recent Track 2
event he attended in Greece, adding that he believes the Iranian
government is clamping down on participation in such activities.


4.(C) Finally, the university students also indicated that in
general - whether in Dubai or Iran - their parents discourage
them from becoming politically active (since, like most parents,
they do not want to see harm come to their children). The
students said there had been a generational change since their
parents' era, when people were more politically active.
Students listed their primary concerns as 1) finding employment,
2) finding a partner, and 3) being well paid enough to live the
lifestyle they want -- preferably one that allowed them to shift
in and out of Iran. Reza Samadipour, from the Iranian Business
Council, cautioned that Iran and the UAE both have a vested
interest in continued business relations, and that the U.S.

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would likely get pushback from the local Iranian community --
and possibly the UAEG -- if a perception were to develop that it
was our policy to interrupt this.

People-to-People Exchanges
--------------

5.(C) Despite these reservations, the Iranian university
students strongly supported the concept of rebuilding bridges
between the Iranian and the American peoples. They suggested
that perhaps someone could establish an Iranian-American
Friendship Society. They liked the idea of conferences or
speakers at their university in Dubai, but favored multiple
international sponsors, to minimize the footprint of the U.S.
In light of the statement they had been compelled to sign (that
their university Persian club would not get involved in
political activities),they suggested a greater focus on
business topics and cultural exchanges. Kahwaji echoed recent
comments (reftel A) that there was more space for university-to
university exchanges, where the USG seemed less visible.

6.(C) The students also advocated approving direct flights from
Iran to the U.S. as a message of solidarity with the Iranian
people. In addition they asked for greater and easier access to
more visas for students. They claimed it cost more to go to
university in the UAE than in the U.S., while the quality of
education was lower. In addition, they advocated for student
exchanges and access to increased skills training through
American schools and universities. They also thought it could
be useful, either via Internet or on TV, to provide English
language teaching material for classrooms in Iran.

Media Habits
--------------

7.(C) The Iranian university students discussed their media
consumption habits and recommendations for programming into
Iran. One student said the three sites he finds credible for
news on Iran are: Baztab.com (founded by former presidential
candidate Mohsen Rezai),VOA's website, and London-based
oppositionist Ali Reza Nourizadeh's website, nourizadeh.com. He
said he checks them daily and does not consume any press from
inside Iran. Others noted that VOA's Farsi website is very
credible, but that it is blocked inside of Iran. Most of our
Iranian interlocutors, especially the students, agreed they did
not like the private Farsi-language broadcasting out of "L.A."
as the stations had lost credibility by exaggerating events and
constantly predicting the downfall of the Iranian government.

8.(C) The Iranian students said they believe the Iranian
government's claims to read messages sent by SMS. They thought
the government monitored SMS even more than phone calls and
emails. They said few Iranians in Iran have i-Pods and that
most people in rural areas have limited access to the Internet -
except through work (which is monitored) or Internet cafes.

USG Sponsored Media
--------------

9.(C) In the view of the university students, television
programming is more effective than radio, in part because it is
harder to jam satellite TV than short-wave radio. They
recommended more debates on VOA-TV on issues, including between
various external political factions. They liked the al-Jazeera
show formatted on "Point-Counterpoint" as it is a lively debate
of issues that are often taboo. They suggested including more
content from political activists who have left Iran recently.
They disagreed amongst themselves over how much access the
poorer strata of society had to satellite television, with one
student one saying "a lot," and the other saying "not much," --
while adding that passing around videotapes in Iran helped
amplify the impact of programming. Both said Radio Farda's
signal and website are effectively blocked in many places in
Iran and asked why the U.S. did not set up FM transmitters along
the border in Iraq and Afghanistan to combat jamming.

10.(C) Another contact, Reza Samadipour with the Iranian
Business Council said he considers USG broadcasting a credible
news source and uses its information as a reality check against
other news about Iran. He recommended that broadcast management
take a much more pedagogical approach towards its programming,
formulating long-term "lesson plans." For instance, instead of
random public opinion polls on Radio Farda on news of the day, a
series of questions over several weeks could be posed to explore
in depth and shape public attitudes to a specific subject, such
as human rights. He also recommended that VOA develop
children's television programming -- perhaps incorporating civic
education into English language learning programs.

11.(C) Dr. Alani suggested that given the limits that the

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Iranian government will try to put on USG outreach to the
Iranian people, the U.S. should focus primarily on UAE-based
Iranians, with the expectation that they will operate as a
bridge to Iranians back in Iran. He also suggested distributing
in Dubai a free Farsi-language newspaper -- with some news, some
advertising and a columnist or two -- which he said could reach
both a resident population as well as Iranians traveling back
and forth.

U.S. Rhetoric and Policies
--------------

12.(C) Even those who seem generally supportive of shared goals
with the U.S. (i.e. for greater freedom in Iran) were at times
critical of certain aspects of U.S. policy and rhetoric. One
particularly eloquent and westernized Iranian university student
said that he had been initially opposed to President Ahmadinejad
but now he supports him out of nationalistic pride over the
nuclear issue. He said Iranians get angry when they hear the
U.S. say Iran does not "need" nuclear energy because of its oil
and gas reserves because 1) it is not the business of another
country to make these decisions; and 2) it sounds hypocritical
in light of the fact that the U.S. helped start those programs
in the 1970s. He said he supports Iran's right to nuclear
technology, despite the fact that he knows perfectly well that
the regime wants a bomb and he himself is against Iran building
a bomb.

13.(C) The university students also said that another perceived
contradiction in U.S. policy was that we say we stand with the
Iranian people, but at the same time we make the Iranian people
fly in unsafe planes. Barks-Ruggles explained that we had
offered to consider licensing the sale of planes by the EU in
support of the EU-3 negotiation effort with Iran, but the GOI's
rejection of the EU-3's efforts had led to a dead end. She also
noted that we have, on occasion, licensed export of spare parts
for safety reasons. However, the students indicated that in
the view of the Iranian population, the U.S. does not care about
their personal safety.

14.(C) Riad Kahwaji cautioned the U.S. not to make empty
threats, and said that the drawn-out conflict in Iraq had
reduced Iran's fear of the U.S. He stressed that Iran's weak
point was its inability to deliver economically. He echoed a
view held by many that the vote for Ahmadinejad was not so much
for Ahmadinejad but against the corruption that Rafsanjani
represented. The U.S. should exploit this weak point by
focusing more on internal corruption issues in its rhetoric.

A Bleak Future for Iranian Youth
--------------

16.(C) DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles met a group of Iranian students
March 18 who are studying in a Dubai TOEFL program. Out of the
roughly 15 students present, only one had been accepted into an
Iranian university and planned to return to Iran. The rest
indicated they planned to study in the UAE or elsewhere. They
said the vast majority of students who take the university
entrance exam fail to secure a place. However, they disagreed
amongst themselves how many times a student was allowed to take
the test (some saying three, others saying it was unlimited).
Most indicated they would likely try to stay in the UAE to work
because there simply was not much opportunity in Iran. Almost
all wanted to study hard sciences -- medicine, engineering, and
architecture -- while only one person mentioned business and
another psychology. A number of the students -- all males but
one -- made it clear they were also outside the country in order
to avoid military service. They said Iranian males who worked
for two years after university outside of Iran were allowed to
buy out their military service, which would allow them to travel
back and forth. All the students pressed for more visas to
study in the U.S.

Baha'i Concerns
--------------

17.(C) An Iranian Baha'i couple resident in UAE outlined to
Barks-Ruggles March 17 the situation for Baha'is in Iran, as
well as some of the problems they face in the UAE. The wife
left Iran five years ago, after being denied a passport for 13
years. She continues to travel back and forth and to date has
had no problems. Her husband has lived outside Iran for much
longer.

18.(C) The couple believed that in the past few months, the
nuclear issue has distracted the Iranian government, and
pressure has eased somewhat on the Baha'i community. That said,
the couple believed that should Iran get a nuclear weapon, the
world could experience terrorism far worse than 9/11. Because
the Baha'i religion is non-political, Baha'is do not fight back

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in any organized way against the repression they face.

19.(C) Asked about Hojjatiyeh (reftel B),the couple said they
believe Hojjatiyeh members in various branches of the security
forces use their position to advance their own agenda and
persecute Baha'is. This is likely done without explicit orders
from the government, but the government takes no steps to rein
them in. The couple had no other knowledge of the Hojjatiyeh
agenda, other than being familiar with its anti-Baha'i stance.

20.(C) The couple said that about six years ago, Iranian
authorities began recognizing Baha'i marriage attestations, but
they said only some registries will issue certificates. Baha'is
are issued an affidavit saying that they have attested they are
married; the affidavit makes no mention of religion. The couple
thought that a combination of thousands of letters that Baha'is
sent to complain about their lack of marriage registration, plus
former President Khatami's influence, led to the policy change.
In addition, they said that Western condemnation of Iran for
persecution of Baha'is has had an overall positive effect.

21.(C) Because Baha'is are not allowed to study in Iranian
universities, they have developed their own underground
university system. The Iranian government, however, does not
recognize their degrees. The couple complained that no U.S.
universities, other than one school in Indiana, recognize these
degrees, unlike in Canada, where they are recognized. They
thought it would be an interesting idea to try to partner with a
distance-learning program.

22.(C) The couple described the situation of about 1000 Baha'i
living in UAE, from Iran and numerous other countries, as
relatively good, compared to the situation in other Arab
countries, but said Baha'is do experience some problems with
civil matters. For instance, they cannot formally register a
Baha'i marriage. There are, however, a few sympathetic
officials who will register them informally.

WMD-Free Gulf
--------------

23.(C) The Gulf Research Center briefed on its ongoing sessions
with representatives from GCC countries, Iran, Iraq and Yemen
for a declaration of principles supporting a WMD-Free Zone
(WMDFZ) in the Gulf, with the ultimate goal of a treaty. Dr.
Mustafa Alani and Dr. Christian Koch said their next meeting
will be in South Africa in May, sponsored by the South African
MFA. They believe they have a commitment from Qatar, Bahrain,
UAE, and Oman, but that the Saudis are still trying to gauge
Iranian behavior. They also believe that the Iranian
representatives at the previous meetings are close to the
government and that Iran is close to a positive decision to
support a WMD-free Gulf. They said they would remain skeptical
of Iranian pledges, but thought it was best to control Iran
regionally. In their view, Iran originally thought it could
bypass the region and negotiate with the European Union, but
that after the failure of the EU-3 talks, it was now turning to
the region. The GRC saw a WMDFZ pledge as a cornerstone for
ultimately developing a regional security system. Alani and
Koch called on the U.S. to affirm its support for Gulf WMDFZ
activities and praised Secretary Rice's joint statement with the
GCC along these lines.

Comment
--------------

24.(C) The most actionable items that came out of these meetings
were recommendations to increase VOA programming, up the
involvement of political activists who have recently left Iran,
and to develop children's programming. It was also an
intriguing idea to put more thought into a long-term syllabus
for VOA for what the US wants the programming to accomplish, and
how to do this. The concerns about UAE-based activities are
real, but are also a function of all the recent publicity given
to our decision to expand operations here. While it is
important to push the envelope of what we try to do here, it is
also true that the less said about it, the better. End comment.

25.(U) This message has been cleared by DRL DAS Barks-Ruggles.
DAVIS