Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DUBAI1319
2006-03-08 16:12:00
SECRET
Consulate Dubai
Cable title:  

IRAN'S HOJJATIYEH SOCIETY (C-NES-01487)

Tags:  IR PGOV PHUM PINR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T DUBAI 001319 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/8/2016
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM PINR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S HOJJATIYEH SOCIETY (C-NES-01487)

CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
S E C R E T DUBAI 001319

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/8/2016
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM PINR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S HOJJATIYEH SOCIETY (C-NES-01487)

CLASSIFIED BY: Jason L. Davis, Consul General, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1.(C) Summary: Iran's Hojjatiyeh Society is a secretive,
anti-Baha'i religious-economic group, reportedly centered in
Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tehran. Sheikh Mahmud Halabi founded the
group in 1953 and remains its leader, but it is unclear if
members view him as a marja-e taqlid (source of emulation). The
secrecy surrounding the group makes it very difficult to
identify possible members and a precise agenda. There are
differing views on whether President Ahmadinejad is an adherent,
and on who his "source of emulation" is. End summary.

Who They Are
--------------

2.(C) According to a Dubai-based Iranian businessman who claims
to have relatives who are members of the group, Iran's
Hojjatiyeh Society is a formally organized group with an
economic, religious, and political agenda. Society members are
very secretive and have no outward symbols, such as rings or
medallions, that would publicly identify them as Hojjatiyeh
members. The businessman had no additional information on how
the group is organized or where or how often it meets. However,
he indicated that the key centers for the group are Shiraz
(where his family lives),Mashhad, and Tehran.

3.(C) Regarding details of their agenda, the businessman could
only speak to their economic goals. He said they share the
general desire of bazaaris to open up the economy and reduce the
state's role. The businessman estimates -- without indicating
the basis of the estimate -- that about ten percent of bazaaris
in Iran are members of the Hojjatiyeh Society. He stated that
these merchants provide monetary support to the group. He
asserted that several years ago he personally witnessed a
receipt from a bazaar merchant paying "zakat" (the amount that
every Muslim must pay to support the poor) to the group.

4.(C) According to reporting by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL),the Hojjatiyeh religious agenda is messianic in
nature, maintaining that a "true Islamic government" must await
the return of the hidden 12th Imam or Mahdi. Until that time,
the group favors collective leadership of the religious
community and opposes religious involvement in political
affairs. It is widely believed that the group believes that only

through chaos will the Twelfth Imam return to the world, and it
is willing to contribute to manufacturing that chaos to
precipitate his return.

5.(S) The historic anti-Baha'i leanings of the Hojjatiyeh
Society are well-documented. An Iranian Baha'i FSN at ConGen
Dubai recently told Conoff that the Hojjatiyeh Society retains
these anti-Baha'i tendencies. It is not known, however, what
role, if any, the group is playing in recent arrests of numerous
Baha'is in Iran. According to information provided to post by an
American Baha'i group, Iranian government harassment of Baha'is
has recently increased, accompanied by a fatwa by clerics in Qom
(nfi) that the killing of Baha'is is "a meritorious act" as they
are considered apostate and are preventing the return of the
12th Imam. It is unknown if any of these clerics have ties to
the group. (Note: According to Encyclopedia Iranica, Hojjatiyeh
leaders are committed to a non-violent, persuasive strategy in
dealing with Baha'is. The group's founder, Sheikh Halabi, was
allegedly distraught by violence against Baha'is and repeatedly
warned his followers that violence was not "their" way. End
note.)

6.(S) A Jewish leader from Esfahan told PolEconChief that the
Hojjatiyeh do not have an anti-Jewish agenda. He also said that
he has Baha'i friends in Iran, and that in his view, the overall
situation for Baha'is has improved over time. (He did not
comment on whether their situation might have worsened in recent
weeks or months.)

7.(C) Reports of renewed Hojjatiyeh Society activism began
appearing in the Iranian press in 2002. The majority of these
reports were anti-Hojjatiyeh. According to an RFE/RL report,
Friday prayer leaders throughout Iran warned their congregations
in early July 2004 of renewed Hojjatiyeh activities. According
to Iranian press reports, an ayatollah in Shahrud in Khorasan
province stated that Hojjatiyeh members were recruiting new
members in the city's mosques. It is unclear what was new at the
time - renewed activities by the group or publicity about the
group. Since its resurgence, the Society's anti-Baha'i
orientation has reportedly widened to encompass anti-Sunni
activities as well, mainly as a means of fomenting chaos in
order to bring about the return of the Mahdi. In two
commentaries in Iranian newspapers in 2004, Rasul Montajabnia, a
prominent member of the Militant Clerics Society - a key
reformist clerical group - claimed that Hojjatiyeh members have
actually stopped their fight against the Baha'i faith and turned
their attention to creating divisions between Shi'a and Sunni
Muslims.

History of the Hojjatiyeh Society
--------------


8.(U) Sheikh Mahmoud Tavallai, popularly known as Sheikh Mahmoud
Halabi, founded the Hojjatiyeh Mahdavieh Society in 1953 to rid
Iran of the Baha'i faith, according to RFE/RL. According to
Encyclopedia Iranica, the group was established in order to
defend Shi'a Islam against the "theological challenge" of the
Baha'i faith. Sheikh Halabi was a preacher from Mashhad who
supported Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. After the coup
against Mossadeq later that same year, Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi allowed the group to continue its anti-Baha'i activities
in exchange for the clerical community's support for his
continued rule. The group's anti-Baha'i activities allegedly
were non-violent in nature and included the creation of a number
of different "teams of operations," including: 1) a "guidance"
team which was to debate Baha'i missionaries, persuade Baha'is
to return to Islam, and neutralize the effects of Baha'i
missionary activity; 2) "instructional" and "authorship" teams
which worked together to standardize instructional materials; 3)
a "public speaking" team which organized weekly gatherings where
they discussed Shia theology; and 4) an "intelligence" team
which reportedly operated as a "fifth column" within the Baha'i
faith and successfully penetrated the Baha'i leadership - with
some "agents" even advancing to the rank of prominent Baha'i
missionaries.

9.(U) Hojjatiyeh philosophy opposes the velayat-e faqih, or
Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult, as the group opposes
mixing religion with politics prior to the return of the Imam.
Nonetheless, the group flourished immediately following the
Islamic revolution of 1979 because Sheikh Halabi, fearing a
communist takeover, urged his followers to vote in favor of the
concept of velayat-e faqih in the December 1979 referendum on
Iran's new form of government. Some cabinet members and other
prominent clerics during this time allegedly had links to the
Hojjatiyeh Society, including Ahmad Azari Qomi, Ali Akbar
Parvaresh, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Abolqasem Khazali, and
former Majles speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri.

10.(C) Within a few years of the revolution, the Iranian
leadership grew increasingly concerned about the group's
secretiveness and its members' success (presumably political),

SIPDIS
according to a report by RFE/RL. During a speech in July 1983,
Ayatollah Khomeini attacked the group and its conviction that
chaos must be created in order to hurry the return of the Mahdi.
He called upon the Iranian people to "get rid of this
factionalism," and the group announced its dissolution the same
day. Both press and contacts report that Khomeini actually
banned the group. The group's dissolution, however, did not mean
an end to its role in politics, and members reportedly continued
to serve in key political positions according to Iranian press.
According to the Dubai-based businessman, society members also
moved into the Basij and, to some extent, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

Hojjatiyeh Divides into Three Groups
--------------

11.(S) Bijan Khajehpour (please protect),an Iranian political
and economic analyst, told PolEconchief that after the
Hojjatiyeh Society was dissolved, it broke into three separate
groups. One group of non-clerics entered the Islamic Coalition
Society (Jami'at-e Motalefeh-e Eslami) -- a traditional
conservative group linked to the bazaar -- to focus mainly on
economic issues. Another group formed the more politically
oriented Mahdaviat group and set up camp in Mashhad. (Note:
According to Iranian press reports, 30 Mahdaviat members were
found guilty of an assassination attempt in 1999 against the
chief of Tehran's justice department and plotting against then
President Mohammad Khatami, Expediency Council Chairman Ali
Akbar Rafsanjani, and Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi.
At least two of these men were sentenced to death, including
Hassan Milani, the grandson of Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Hadi
Miliani. End note.)

12.(S) The third group, comprised of clerics, realigned
themselves around the Haqqani theological seminary in Qom. The
Haqqani seminary was founded in 1963 by four clerics with close
ties to Ayatollah Khomeini, including Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who currently heads the Council of
Guardians. (Note: The Haqqani seminary was reportedly originally
founded to modernize seminary training to equip clerics to deal
with present day issues. Khajehpour's theory of the division of
the group aside, Iranians still refer to Hojjatiyeh as an entity
in Iranian society. For the purpose of our research, we use the
term Hojjatiyeh in the sense of one entity.)

Is He or Isn't He?
--------------

13.(S) We have heard differing views on whether President
Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hojjatiyeh Society. An Iranian
Baha'i FSN at ConGen Dubai told Conoff that it is widely
believed among Iranians that Ahmadinejad is a member of the

Hojjatiyeh Society. The Jewish leader from Esfahan echoed this
view. This belief is likely the result of Ahmadinejad's
apparently close ties to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, head of the
Haqqani seminary. Soon after the first round of Iran's
presidential elections in June 2005, an Iranian blogger posted
an Internet link to a website that claimed Ahmadinejad was
Mesbah Yazdi's son-in-law. (Note: The Iranian government has
since blocked this link. End Note.)

14.(S) In contrast, Khajehpour claimed President Ahmadinejad is
not a Hojjatiyeh believer, but instead a genuine populist. He
said Ahmadinejad's driving force is more social than religious
and that the president believes he is on a mission from God to
bring social justice to the world. To achieve this, he wants to
return the revolution to its ideological roots of revolutionary
socialism. His view, Khajehpour said, is at odds with the view
of the Mahdaviat, which is prepared to sacrifice society in
order to create the necessary chaos to bring back the Imam.

15.(S) Khajehpour claims that Supreme Leader Khamenei, not
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, is Ahmadinejad's source of emulation
(marja-e taqlid),and his political model is the populist
Mohammad Ali Rajai, prime minister in 1980, elected president in
1981, then assassinated soon after. The Jewish leader from
Esfahan, however, echoed the probably more widely held view that
Mesbah Yazdi was Ahmadinejad's source of emulation.

16.(S) Khajehpour believes Ahmadinejad aligned with the Haqqani
school during the presidential elections for its support,
promising it more room to maneuver if he won. Under Khatami, the
followers of the Haqqani school were marginalized. For instance,
Khajehpour said the Haqqani school produced the first wave of
intelligence officials in Iran and its students had held onto
the position of intelligence minister until Khatami broke with
tradition and appointed Ali Yunesi, who was not a Haqqani
graduate. Prior to the elections, Mesbah Yazdi reportedly issued
a fatwa calling on basij (Islamic militia) members to vote for
Ahmadinejad, according to an Asia Times report. Once elected,
Ahmadinejad brought in Haqqani students as both intelligence
minister (Hojjatoleslam Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ezhei) and
interior minister (Mostafa Pour Mohammadi). Because of this
link, the Asia Times report alleges these two are possibly
Hojjatiyeh.

17.(C) Ahmadinejad is also suspected of links to the Hojjatiyeh
Society because of decisions he undertook both as mayor of
Tehran and as president. As mayor, Ahmadinejad reportedly
instructed the city council to build a "grand avenue" from Qom
to Tehran to prepare for the Mahdi. Since becoming president, he
has reportedly begun the construction of a direct rail line
between Tehran and Jamkaran - the location of a shrine dedicated
to the Mahdi. His cabinet has also allocated $17 million to
build a new mosque near the shrine. Whether or not Ahmadinejad
is a member of the group, the Iranian government is very touchy
about the subject of Hojjatiyeh Society influence. In late
November 2005, the Iranian government spokesman vehemently
denied any link between the Society and "Ahmadinejad's
government," according to Iranian press. The Ministry of Islamic
Culture and Guidance also denied rumors in October 2005 that the
government had dropped a letter pledging loyalty to the Mahdi
down the well at Jamkaran, according to Western press reports.

Comment
--------------

18.(S) Although it remains unclear whether Ahmadinejad is a
member of the Hojjatiyeh Society, at least some key members of
his administration likely are, given their links to the Haqqani
seminary. The question of their impact on policymaking remains
open. While Iranian contacts with links to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs recently claimed to Conoff that there has been
no distinct shift in Iranian foreign policy since the change of
administration (septel),in numerous ways Iran's policy has
become more ideological and less pragmatic since Ahmadinejad
took office. Perhaps this is a result of increased Hojjatiyeh
influence. It is also possible that the up tick in arrests of
Baha'is in Iran is the result of increased Hojjatiyeh influence
in government.
DAVIS