Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DOHA868
2006-06-06 12:28:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS JUNE 4 WITH QATAR'S HEIR

Tags:  PREL KNNP KPAL IR IZ IS QA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000868 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL KNNP KPAL IR IZ IS QA
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS JUNE 4 WITH QATAR'S HEIR
APPARENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER


Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000868

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL KNNP KPAL IR IZ IS QA
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS JUNE 4 WITH QATAR'S HEIR
APPARENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER


Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. A/S David Welch met with the Qatari
leadership, including Heir Apparent Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani and later with Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al
Thani (HBJ),June 4 to discuss Iran, Iraq, and
Israel/Palestine. Relaxed and well-prepared, Sheikh Tamim,
who handles defense and intelligience issues, evaluated
bilateral relations as "good" and said he would consider
visiting the U.S. soon. A/S Welch encouraged additional
high-level visits. Tamim and HBJ said Qatar could help more
on Iran if it had details of the U.S.-EU offer to Tehran. HBJ
expressed concern that Iran would seek to dominate the region
in the case of a diplomatic settlement to the nuclear issue.
Neither interlocutor was sanguine about the situation in
Iraq; HBJ said that Iraqi Sunnis needed to be dragged into
the political process if there was any hope. Ambassador
provided Embassy Baghdad's document on how Qatar can help
support stability in Iraq. Sheikh Tamim said that Qatar would
not object if the Arab League directed the $50 million Qatari
donation to the International Mechanism for the Palestinians
-- if the procedure had the approval of Mahmoud Abbas. Both
Tamim and HBJ said that squeezing Hamas was counterproductive
and
that it should be given a chance at governance. End Summary.

Iran
--------------


2. (S) A/S Welch briefed the Heir Apparent on the U.S. effort
to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis diplomatically by
strengthening the European negotiating package, provided Iran
suspends enrichment. If Iran rejects the offer, he said, the
U.S. will consider its options under a Chapter VII UN
Security Council resolution.


3. (S) Sheikh Tamim noted Qatar's historically good relations
with Iran and expressed his government's desire that the
crisis be solved peacefully. He said putting economic or
military sanctions on Iran would be counterproductive because
it would make President Ahmedi-Nejad more popular. We don't
want Iran to come out a "loser," he said, because the
consequences of that could be worse. The outside world could

not be sure of Iran's internal political dynamics. However,
he agreed that Iran should make concessions.


4. (S) Sheikh Tamim expected that Qatar would have further
opportunities to discuss the situation with Iranian officials
in the near future, and he offered to convey the message that
the U.S. proposal is serious. At this point, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed al-Mahmoud pointed out that
any Qatari message would be more effective if the Qataris
knew more details of the U.S./EU incentives package to be
discussed with the Iranians shortly. Otherwise, he said, the
Iranians would have no reason to give weight to the Qataris'
message. Sheikh Tamim agreed; A/S Welch said he understood.


5. (S) In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Hamad bin
Jassim Al Thani reported that he had just returned from
Riyadh where he discussed Iran with his GCC counterparts. He
had also made a tour of the Gulf to determine how GCC members
can unify their positions. He also noted that it was not
helpful that they were uninformed about U.S.-EU discussions.
The Omani-led GCC mission to Iran has been cancelled because
"we don't want them to go without a clear picture," he said.


6. (S) HBJ characterized the nuclear issue was a "dangerous
game" whether it is solved through negotiations or by UN
Security Council actions. "Our concern is how Iran behaves if
it is solved peacefully," he said, because Iran is looking
for a larger role in the Gulf. Qatar talks to Iran as an
equal, he said, and this is important. Gulf states have not
forgotten the days of the Shah, when Iran treated its small
neighbors with little regard.


7. (S) HBJ expressed his hope that Iran will accept the U.S.
offer. After Welch had given him a heads-up, he spoke to Iran
Supreme National Security Council SecGen Ali Larijani on June
2 and urged him to agree to it. Larijani told him that Iran
can't accept anything with conditions. HBJ was not sure if
Iran would accept, but he would "research" it further.

Iraq
--------------


8. (C) Sheikh Tamim expressed a negative view of conditions
in Iraq. The new government is the "only good side" whereas
security remains poor. He was not optimistic.


9. (C) Tamim said "the intention is there" to attend the Arab
League conference planned for Baghdad in late June. However,
he expressed concern about the role of the meeting now that
an Iraqi government has been formed. He agreed "totally" with
A/S Welch that Arab states need to visit Iraq in order to
provide support and establish intra-Arab ties.


10. (C) In his meeting, HBJ described Iraq as "like civil
war." The problem, he said, is that now the Shia have the
"upper hand;" Kurds have made some achievements; and the
Sunnis "feel lost in the middle" with no power and no oil. It
would be difficult to improve the situation. HBJ also
supported "building Iraq as part of the Arab world.... But if
we go there, it shows were accepting the situation" that is
harmful to Iraqi Sunnis. He said Qatar has indicated that it
will welcome a visit from PM Nour al-Maliki.


11. (C) "My fear," HBJ said, is that Iraq will be a training
ground for terrorists as Afghanistan was for the Taliban. It
could create people like bin Laden. "It's the right place to
hide, train and kill," HBJ said.


12. (S) Tamim said that Qatar has good relations with a
number of Sunni tribal leaders and had offered its good
offices previously. "They still can help," he said. On the
same subject, HBJ said that the U.S. and allies have to "drag
the Sunnis to dialogue"; Iraq will not see quiet without this
happening. Ambassador Untermeyer passed the minister a letter
from Ambassador Khalilzad outlining ways Qatar can help
support and strengthen Iraq.

Israel/Palestine
--------------


13. (S) A/S Welch outlined a way forward on the peace process
in which the Israelis make credible, sustained efforts to
negotiate with the Palestinians. The U.S. would like to see
Hamas change its policy, he said, but meanwhile something
needed to break the logjam on the Palestinian side. While
short of U.S. conditions, one way to do that would be for
Hamas to accept the Palestinian prisoners' document which
includes accepting Israel and honoring agreements. He
outlined a funding mechanism that will allow humanitarian
assistance to reach the Palestinians.


14. (S) Sheikh Tamim agreed with A/S Welch on the need for
Hamas to change but pointed out that the Palestinians are
facing serious internal divisions now. He advised giving
Hamas a "chance" because it's a government now, not a
"group," and the only way to peace is through them. Hamas
must work with Fatah -- at least in public. The
Israeli/Palestinian issue is the biggest problem in the
Middle East; Tamim offered his services in any capacity to
help solve it. But "both sides should sacrifice," he said.


15. (C) Sheikh Tamim said that Qatar would have no objection
if the Arab League decided to use its $50 million donation
through the proposed International Mechanism. Tamim advised
to let the Palestinians agree on the mechanism first. "If the
Palestinians agree, no other country will have an objection,"
he said.


16. (C) HBJ pointed out that in the current Arab social
landscape, "If you are against the U.S., you are a hero." For
this reason, he advised, "don't besiege Hamas." Instead, let
them rule, and they will fail. He reminded his audience that
he is personally no friend of Hamas or its ideology.

Bilateral Relations
--------------


17. (C) A/S Welch asked Sheikh Tamim to consider a visit to
the U.S. to get to know American officials and help
strengthen bilateral ties. We need a more regular pattern of
high-level visits, he said. Tamim replied that he will
consider the offer. He said that he believes relations are
"very good," though there are some occasional disagreements
between the two countries, which is "normal."


18. (C) HBJ said that he wants time to carefully prepare
before any official visit by the Amir to the U.S. so that it
will be successful. There is a lot to discuss, he said. He
will determine whether an Amiri visit is possible in the
second half of July, as suggested by the NSC, and let
Ambassador Untermeyer know. A/S Welch said that other
high-level visits would be welcome.


19. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Welch.
UNTERMEYER