Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DOHA461
2006-03-27 09:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

COUNSELOR ZELIKOW'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN

Tags:  PREL MARR KPAL XF IR IZ QA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000461 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR KPAL XF IR IZ QA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR ZELIKOW'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN
MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMED FORCES

REF: DOHA 445

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000461

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR KPAL XF IR IZ QA
SUBJECT: COUNSELOR ZELIKOW'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN
MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMED FORCES

REF: DOHA 445

Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. Department Counselor Dr. Philip Zelikow met
with the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs March 20 to begin a strategic dialogue
between the two countries, consult on Iran, and enlist
support for decisive strategic investment in Iraq. The
foreign minister, Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ),agreed
with Zelikow's analysis of Iran's objectives in the region
and methods Iran is using to implement them. He said that
Qatar is working with GCC states to develop a policy to
address these difficult issues and will provide USG a
proposal in the next couple of weeks, which will include a
meeting for GCC ministers in the near future followed by a
GCC-U.S. meeting. HBJ also outlined Qatar's idea to create a
$5 billion development bank for Iraq; he will send a study on
the subject to the Counselor in Washington. Qatar is also
considering a $200 million micro-credit institution for the
Palestinians.


2. Summary Continued. The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed
Forces characterized bilateral relations as excellent in the
military area but not as robust as they should be
politically. The Counselor said the U.S. is ready to
concentrate on the challenges the U.S. and Qatar must work on
together. Two meetings with the Minister of Finance will be
reported septel; reftel reports the meeting with Qatari
Amir's consort, Sheikha Mozah. End Summary.


3. (U) Dr. Philip Zelikow met March 20 with Qatari First
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to discuss
regional security. Accompanying Dr. Zelikow were Ambassador
Untermeyer, Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, NEA DAS Gordon Gray,
EB Financial Economist Alexei Monsarrat, C Staff David
Aidekman, and P/E Chief.

--------------
Iran
--------------


4. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that Secretary Rice had asked him to
visit the region to advance a strategic dialogue on regional
security as a follow-up to her recent meetings with GCC

foreign ministers. The U.S. is now developing a comprehensive
strategy toward Iran and needs to consult allies in the
region. The Counselor explained that Iran's nuclear program
is just one of many U.S. concerns with Iran which stem from
the revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime and its
violent, extremist agenda. Iran's primary objective is to
push the U.S. out of the Gulf in order to pressure and
intimidate regional governments. The U.S. seeks to counter
the impression that the Iranian tide is surging while the
American tide is ebbing. The U.S. hopes to work with Gulf
states to utilize diplomatic, security, and economic
strategies to counter the Iranian threat. A U.S.-GCC
strategic dialogue should also focus on supporting moderation
in Iraq through an international strategic investment compact
outlining clear commitments for the new Iraqi government. It
could discuss ways to reassure international energy markets
about the possibility of any Iran-related supply disruption
by examining options for stockpiling oil, increasing
production levels, and protecting shipping. The U.S. and Gulf
States also could engage in quiet, low-key discussions on
security cooperation and planning. He said that countries of
the region, which are facing some turmoil, have a choice to
choose progress and reform or to seek revolutionary and
violent change. Qatar has chosen the former path; terrorist
groups and Iran have chosen the latter. However, the Iranian
people primarily care about their domestic situation and for
the most part do not share the Iranian government's desire to
export revolution to the region. In Iraq specifically, the
U.S. wants a country that is prosperous, independent, and
secure, and which could be a strong partner in regional
security. Iran prefers to have a weak, divided, and dependent
Iraq as its neighbor.


5. (C) HBJ agreed strongly with Dr. Zelikow's analysis of
Iran's motivations and goals, noting Iran's active support
for subversive elements in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and
eastern Saudi Arabia. HBJ added that while the Iranian public
does not support the regime's foreign policy goals writ
large, the U.S. should not underestimate the degree of
domestic support for the nuclear program based on a
nationalistic agenda. Zelikow said he would like the GCC to
take steps that will show Iran that it is not intimidated. He
understood that Qatar might prefer to use the GCC forum to
advance its security needs so as not to risk harming its
sensitive relationship with Iran by acting unilaterally.


6. (S) HBJ said the GCC was ready to come forward and
coordinate on regional security. Qatar is working with
neighbors and meetings are happening that are not reported
publicly. He believes that five GCC countries can get
together at the ministerial level, including military
representatives. Because Saudi Arabia has been problematic in
the GCC, he doubts they would participate but believes the
meeting can continue without them. Oman would be the right
state to urge Saudi attendance. (NOTE: When Dr. Zelikow
observed that the Omanis appeared to be acting friendly
toward the Iranians, HBJ urged the Counselor not to make too
much of this, noting that Oman is very worried about Iran.
END NOTE) Following these initial internal discussions, the
group would meet with a U.S. representative, possibly at
HBJ's London residence, and possibly within the next month.


7. (C) HBJ had just returned from France, where he met with
French PM Dominique de Villepin, whom he advised to maintain
solidarity with the other permanent members of the UN
Security Council. HBJ reported that he told the French that
their diplomacy with Iran was not going well and it would be
the wrong signal for the Iranians to find a gap in the
Security Council.


8. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that in fact U.S. relations with
France are in "harmony" on most issues. The British, French,
and Americans have been aligned on the UNSC for a year. All
three agree on the need for a serious policy toward Iran.


9. (C) HBJ said that the Iranian foreign minister was to come
to Doha Wednesday, March 22. (NOTE. The foreign minister met
with the Amir. END NOTE) "I still have hope that if they are
pushed to the edge, they will do something" to end the crisis
over nuclear enrichment, HBJ said. The Iranians don't want to
destroy themselves or their long-term strategy for influence
in the region. He said Qatar fears a military response, which
"if not done cleanly," could result in retaliation against
the nearest U.S. forces, i.e., those in Qatar. "I hope we
don't reach this stage, and I don't recommend it," he said.
President Ahmedi-Nejad told HBJ in January that the Iranians
"could make big trouble for the Americans"; HBJ said he
advised Ahmedi-Nejad against such a course of action.

--------------
Guatemala and UNSC
--------------


10. (C) Dr. Zelikow said he believed that Qatar would support
Guatemala's UNSC candidacy over Venezuela. He said the U.S.
appreciates the position as a great example of international
harmony. HBJ confirmed Qatar's position, and other MFA
officials told Embassy Officers that Qatar will support
Guatemala, rather than fellow oil-producer Venezuela, because
Guatemala had supported Qatar in its own UNSC bid. Zelikow
mentioned some additional concerns about Venezuela's
behavior. HBJ said he too had a skeptical view of President
Hugo Chavez.

--------------
Concern About America's Image
--------------


11. (C) HBJ suggested that some U.S. foreign policies have
damaged America's image. He noted that the climate in Europe
was against the U.S. "A lot can be said or done differently,"
he said, so as not to aggravate allies while achieving the
same results. Dr. Zelikow thanked him for this advice "from a
friend" and noted that the U.S. was pursuing such a strategy
on the Iran issue.

--------------
Need to Restart Regular, High-Level Dialogue
--------------


12. (C) According to HBJ, Qatar used to host an informal
discussion with U.S. officials every six months in London,
but the practice was discontinued. At Dr. Zelikow's request,
HBJ said he would get in touch with A/S Welch and Zelikow in
several weeks to discuss plans to re-start the dialogue.
(NOTE: It was not clear whether this discontinued dialogue
had involved all GCC States or just Qatar. END NOTE)

--------------
Iraq
--------------


13. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that we are facing a difficult time
in Iraq but that we could get past it. It is important to
form an inclusive government. There are qualified, dedicated
people, and if a good government is formed, we will need to
take quick, decisive action to ensure that it has a good
start. He observed that the idea of an "International
Compact," such as Afghanistan's, was attractive; it would be
a contract between the responsible Iraqi government and the
international community that would assure donors of progress.
Iraq will need financial assistance for the Compact, and he
urged Qatar and other friends in the region to be ready to
move decisively.


14. (C) HBJ said Qatar had evaluated creating a $5 billion
bank to invest in - rather than grant money to - Iraq's
industries, such as oil, gas, and agriculture. The GOQ had
commissioned a study with the Bahrainis and Citibank, which
HBJ promised to send to Dr. Zelikow. The Iraqi financial
expert who has charge of the proposal, Nemir Kidar of
Investcorp, will be in New York shortly and HBJ will ask him
to travel to Washington to brief U.S. officials on the idea.

--------------
Let Hamas Make its Choice
--------------


15. (C) Hamas came to power by elections, HBJ said. They will
come around slowly. Either they will fail or they will
deliver, which would require engaging Israel. "We advised
them to let Abu Mazen deal with the Israelis," he said.
Although the GOQ supported Hamas's legitimacy, Qatar will not
transfer cash. Qatar is committed to paying $3 million
monthly to the Palestinian Authority for salaries; beyond
that, there will be no cash transfers, the minister repeated.
Qatar is discussing with former PA Finance Minister and now
PLC member Salaam Fayyad the creation of a $200 million micro
credit facility. The Palestinians are clever, HBJ said; they
will succeed in helping their economy and will have a low
default rate. Qatar is also considering building hospitals or
schools in lieu of providing cash.

--------------
Assistance to Lebanon
--------------


16. (C) For Lebanon, Qatar has donated 100 military vehicles
and $25 million for a new library. Qatar is also studying a
real estate project that would relocate people from a
blighted and dangerous area near the Beirut airport to a new
location with prospects for growing a tourism industry. The
project would cost about $3 billion, but it would be to "make
money and help people at the same time," the minister said.

--------------
Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces
--------------


17. (C) Dr. Zelikow and delegation met with Maj Gen Hamad bin
Ali al-Attiyah, Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces.
Al-Attiyah expressed a warm welcome and evaluated the
relations between the two countries as good, especially on
the military side. The Military Consultative Committee
meetings in January went well, and liaison with the Embassy
is excellent. The General was less positive about political
relations, however. They started out well, at the start of
the Iraq war, but then stagnated. Political ties are not as
strong as the military ties.


18. (C) Dr. Zelikow said that there have been problems, but
the U.S. has decided to concentrate on the strategic issues
facing the two countries. His visit and that of U/S Hughes
the previous month are evidence of this. He said he was not
visiting to raise the subject of Al Jazeera. Instead, he
wanted to initiate a serious strategic dialogue and obtain
the views of senior level Qatari officials. "This is an
important country, and we want to treat it that way," he said.


19. (S) We need this relationship, al-Attiyah said. We do not
have such a defense agreement with any other country. We can
play a big role in the region, in the war on terror, in
helping to educate our people.


20. (S) Dr. Zelikow said that three issues are of great
importance and indicate progress in our relationship. First
is Qatar's attitude toward the terrorist threat. For example,
there were concerns ten years ago about Qatar's relations
with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, and this shaped Qatar's image in
Washington. People wondered if Qatar really cared about the
threat. Second is national security. Qatar's hosting of U.S.
forces counts for a lot with the President, and he doesn't
take friends for granted. Third is reform. Qatar is taking
decisions that will define the future of the country. Its
decisions lead it down the path of reform and progress.

--------------
Qatar's Security Strategy
--------------


21. (S) Al-Attiyah outlined Qatar's security posture. Most
important is the defense agreement with the U.S. For internal
security, a joint Defense-Interior force of 2,000 men has
been set up and trained. For external security, Qatar is
trying to establish a "security shield" consisting of radar
and other technology to detect infiltration. He discussed the
"GCC belt" with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that
is a link of radar and communication systems. But he said
Qatar's small military could not repel an attack from a
powerful country like Iran. He expressed the view that the
GCC was the proper mechanism for improving regional security.


22. (C) Al-Attiyah discussed the GCC Peninsula Shield. Qatar
was not happy with having radar only in Saudi Arabia and
voiced its concerns. Saudi Arabia did not accept the point
that the Shield should also respond to threats such as Iran.
It feels secure. This tension has led to the Shield's
possible disbandment, but until now there has been no
solution.

23. (C) Along lines identical to his meeting with the Foreign
Minister, Dr. Zelikow said that the U.S. is working on a
comprehensive policy toward Iran, not just on the nuclear
issue. He discussed Iran's revolutionary foreign policy and
its tools of subversion and terrorism. We want to help the
GCC to be effective, he said.


24. (C) Al-Attiyah said Qatar was helping the effort on Iraq.
Qatar will train 40 military officers and soldiers in diving
and security techniques and has invited the Iraqis to the
Eagle Resolve domestic security exercise. But it is difficult
for the Iraqis to send people outside the country for such
training.

--------------
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
--------------


26. (C) At a lunch he hosted for the delegation, Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Ahmad bin Abdullah al-Mahmoud
expressed Qatar's concern about Iran's nuclear program and
said the GCC was not prepared to face it (echoing statements
by HBJ). The minister spoke in some detail about relations
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. He noted that the Kingdom has
supported plotters of a coup against the Amir in 1996. (NOTE:
The attempt was a counter-coup to restore the rule of Khalifa
bin Hamad Al Thani.) More recently, Saudi Arabia blocked a
gas pipeline deal with Kuwait and a causeway to the United
Arab Emirates; in the case of the pipeline deal, Prince Saud
bin Faisal's denial that the Kingdom had received a request
to transit Saudi waters particularly infuriated the Qataris.
"There is no trust," al-Mahmoud said with apparent agitation.
He also noted that Saudi Arabia had failed in its promise to
provide "good offices" in the now-settled territorial dispute
with Bahrain, which, due to a lack of other options, was
reviewed by the International Court of Justice; the ruling
was in Bahrain's favor.
UNTERMEYER