IRAQ: QATAR CAN SUPPORT EDUCATION, INFLUENCE SUNNI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS IZ XF QA
SUBJECT: IRAQ: QATAR CAN SUPPORT EDUCATION, INFLUENCE SUNNI
RELIGIOUS LEADERS

REF: STATE 181228

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D


1. (S) SUMMARY. In contrast to its support for our military
in the region, Qatar has not been an important partner on
political issues regarding Iraq. Post believes Qatar can
provide increased support in areas where it can achieve
leadership, such as education and training. Its contacts with
Iraqi Sunni leaders could prove useful. Qatar remains
concerned about and suspicious of the role of Iran in Iraq
but would be unwilling to take a public position on the
matter. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) QATARI VIEWS OF IRAQ. Qatar has not supported the new
Iraqi government for four primary reasons. First, Qatar
rarely faces major international issues head-on. Qatar
recognizes that it does not have the diplomatic weight to
work its way to the diplomatic forefront on this issue, and
it likes to have a certain amount of control over its
diplomatic initiatives. Qatar does not want to be a member of
someone else's team. Second, Qatar has serious reservations
over the Shia-dominated nature of the Iraqi government.
Officials have expressed concerns about the perceived
diminished role for Iraqi Sunnis. They feel that backing the
Iraqi government now would be a form of abandonment of the
Sunni Arabs. Third, Qataris are conscious of a need for
balancing their support for U.S. military missions launched
from Qatar. If they took steps to support Iraq politically,
they would be open for criticism from conservatives. Finally,
the GOQ has told us that lack of security is the primary
reason for not opening a mission in Baghdad.


3. (S) ENCOURAGING QATARI SUPPORT. A Gulf-wide approach may
not work with Qatar because it would require cooperation or
coordination with Gulf neighbors. Qatar would need a role in
which it can stand out. It has touted its support for higher
education in Iraq, and it has trained groups of aviation and
security officials. This theme could be broadened to support
for training in a number of fields. Qatar could become the
go-to country for education and training. We believe that
engagement by high-level U.S. officials will be required for
Qatar to expand its role.


4. (S) CONTRIBUTIONS. Following is a list of possible
contributions Qatar could make to Iraq political and economic
development. This list was produced (and later expanded upon)
by Embassy Baghdad following a request in may 2006 from
Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim to Ambassador
Khalilzad.

Political

-- Foreign Minister could visit Baghdad to demonstrate
support for the Iraqi government publicly (we would provide
logistical support if asked);

-- Invite senior Iraqi officials - such as the Prime
Minister, Iraqi FM and the MFA MinState - to Doha;

-- Establish a special Qatari envoy for Iraq and have him
visit regularly - his role would be to look for ways to build
bilateral cooperation until a Qatari ambassador can take up
residence in Baghdad; or accredit Qatari Ambassador in
neighboring country to Baghdad and instruct the Ambassador to
visit regularly;

-- Press Syria and Iran to cease interference in Iraqi
affairs. Specifically, urge Syria to stop support for
insurgents and Saddam loyalists using Syria as safehaven for
planning violent acts in Iraq. Urge Iran to stop flow of
money, weapons, and training to militias;

-- Invite an Iraqi observer to GCC meeting to start building
ties between Iraq and the Gulf states;

-- Invite Iraqi academics and government advisors to
participate in events hosted in Qatar devoted to developing
common understandings and approaches to regional security and
economic challenges;

-- Recommend to us any figures from the Iraqi resistance not
affiliated with the Al-Qa'ida network or Saddamists whom they
think would be willing to talk to us;

-- Urge Iraqi insurgents with whom the Qatari government has

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contacts to stop fighting the legitimate, unity government
and instead join the political process - these insurgents
could open contacts with us and with the Iraqi government;

-- Urge Sunni Arab tribal and religious figures inside and
outside Iraq to support the government and secure their
pledge to work against those who insist on using violence; and

-- In particular, call upon Muthenna and Harith ad-Dhari to
(a) moderate their public statements; (b) appoint a personal
representative we know who speaks for Dhari. (If such
discussions go well, we can consider a meeting between
Ambassador Khalilzad and Harith ad-Dhari in Iraq or in Doha.)

Economic

-- Forgive the roughly $4 billion in debt that Iraq owes
Qatar;

-- Pursue with other states the idea of establishing a
development bank to assist Iraq's reconstruction (an
initiative within the GCC or the OIC perhaps); and

-- Sponsor scholarships for Iraqis to attend Qatari
universities.


5. (S) SYRIA-IRAQ. Qatar has close ties with Syria and can
meet with President Asad on a moment's notice. Investment
ties to Syria also play a role in the relationship. We do not
have specific information on Qatari views of Syria's
relationship with Iraq, but Qatari security officials have
commented that they believe Syrian efforts to control the
flow of extremists to Iraq are genuine. Qatari policy toward
Syria is anchored in Lebanese and Palestinian issues, rather
than Iraq.


6. (S) IRAN-IRAQ. Qatar is alarmed by reports of Iranian
influence in Iraq, as they are by the Shia-dominated nature
of the government. Efforts to increase or restore Sunni
influence will be welcome. In 2005 the GOQ attempted to
arrange a meeting between the son of Harith al-Dhari, the
President of the Association of Muslim Scholars, and Embassy
Baghdad in Doha. The Qataris claim that they brought Harith's
son to Doha, but no U.S. representative showed up. Though
Embassy Doha was aware of the offer and passed it to Baghdad,
it was never told of Harith's son's visit. Whether or not it
actually happened, the Qataris always raise the incident as
an example of their unrequited willingness to help the U.S.
in Iraq. Qatari officials have offered their connections with
influential Iraqi Sunnis on other occasions. Efforts to get
Qatar to join in a public effort to isolate Iran will be
difficult because Qatar's economic future is tied in part to
Iranian policy toward sharing the vast North Field/South Dome
gas reserve.
UNTERMEYER