Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DOHA1603
2006-11-02 15:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS;

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHDO #1603/01 3061507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021507Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5782
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0006
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0003
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1285
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001603 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS;
U.S. DEL DISASSOCIATES FROM DECLARATION

REF: DOHA 1583

Classified By: DCM Michael Ratney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 001603

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KPAL IS QA
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACIES CONFERENCE DOES NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS;
U.S. DEL DISASSOCIATES FROM DECLARATION

REF: DOHA 1583

Classified By: DCM Michael Ratney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. The International Conference of New or
Restored Democracies did not meet the Qatari hosts' greater
expectations and a range of participants felt that
international representation was at a low level. The Israeli
FM's plans to attend and then cancellation left the
conference organizers open to criticism. The Qatari
government worked hard for the creation of a follow-on
secretariat, but these plans were scaled back amidst

SIPDIS
criticism from the U.S. and European delegations. The final
document contained unfortunate political language critical of
Israel; Ambassador exited the conference hall prior to
adoption of the document. End Summary.


2. (U) The Sixth International Conference of New or Restored
Democracies (ICNRD-6) ended November 1 in Doha with a
declaration that creates an eight-person non-resident
"Advisory Board" and a five-person "nucleus" secretariat to
advise the Conference's Presidency (Qatar, for the next three
years). The secretariat's effectiveness will be reviewed
after three years. Qatar will fund the secretariat and will
staff four of the five positions locally. The fifth position
will be an advisor knowledgeable about the workings of
international institutions. This outcome reflected a vastly
scaled-down version of the secretariat, which, according to
the Qatari government, would have drafted reports,
facilitated communication, planned seminars, and engaged in
ongoing substantive work would would have required a large
staff and budget.


3. (SBU) Only a few ministers attended the ICNRD-6. Arab
states in particular were represented at low levels, in part
because of bilateral friction with Qatar in some cases but
also in reaction to the expectation that the Israeli foreign
minister would attend. (She cancelled at the last minute and
sent a delegation headed by by Yacov Hadas-Handelsman, Deputy
Director General of the Israeli MFA's Middle East and Peace
Process Division.) Only Morocco, Oman, and Algeria from the
Arab region sent ministers. There was no official Saudi or
Syrian representation. Venezuela did not send a delegation
from Caracas, ostensibly over the Israeli issue, although it
was rumored to be seeking the next ICNRD presidency.


4. (SBU) Press commentary highlighted European and American
opposition to the creation of a permanent secretariat for
ideological and financial reasons. Commentary also addressed
the issue of the Israeli delegation, accusing all sides,
including the Palestinians, of "hypocracy" for taking
half-measures to show displeasure while attending the same
conference but not talking.


5. (SBU) Poloff participated in the drafting of the "Doha
Declaration" and was successful in de-linking the ICNRD and
the UN Democracy Fund in the document. Poloff worked with EU
colleagues to limit the size and scope of the secretariat.
The Qataris were seriously determined on this point; they
ajourned and overnight re-drafted the much more modest
proposal. Poloff suceeded in toning down language critical of
Israel, which included the term "collective punishment," but
did not have sufficient leverage to entirely eliminate
language that condemns unspecified foreign occupation,
abduction, and destruction of infrastructure because it was
not clear that the U.S. would endorse the final document in
any case.


6. (SBU) Ambassador briefly attended the final session of the
conference but exited the hall well before adoption of the
"Doha Declaration." Post also issued a press statement
disassociating the USG from the conference outcome over
concerns regarding the membership of non-democratic regimes
and over the politicalization of the issue of
democracy-building. These actions built on previous
statements to the local and regional press highlighting U.S.
concerns over the secretariat.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The conference did not contribute to Qatar's
objective, which is to build Doha's "brand" as a world
capital and conference destination. Big names did not attend,
and there was grumbling by other delegates on aspects of the
event's logistics. The conference scaled back the
"secretariat," which was aimed at keeping international
visitors Doha-bound for the next three years. Finally, there
was a certain irony, not lost on many observers here, of a

DOHA 00001603 002 OF 002


hereditary monarchy like Qatar staking out a role as an
international center for democracy.
UNTERMEYER