A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000127

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016
TAGS: PREL IR SU SY QA UNSC
SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH QATARI FOREIGN
MINISTER


Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. A/S Silverberg met with FM Hamad bin Jassim
Al Thani (HBJ) January 21 to discuss UN Security Council
issues related to the Darfur conflict in Sudan and Syria's
adherence to UNSC 1559. The Foreign Minister said Qatar is
keen to cooperate with the United States. But he said he
hoped the U.S. would "take into consideration" that Qatar is
located in a difficult region. HBJ added that he visited Iran
and met with President Ahmedi-Nejad on January 16 and that he
is planning a trip to Syria soon. Qatar is concerned about
Iran, but HBJ is not optimistic that Iran will stop its
nuclear program. End Summary.


2. (U) A/S Silverberg, accompanied by Ambassador Untermeyer
and P/E Chief, met with Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al
Thani January 21. Assistant Minister for Follow-Up Affairs,
Mohamed al-Rumaihi, who leads a small committee handling the
UN portfolio; Sheikh Jabor, HBJ's office director; and Acting
American and European Affairs Director Abdullah Jabor were
also present.

--------------
Qatar's Seat on the UNSC
--------------


3. (C) A/S Silverberg congratulated Qatar on assuming its
position on the UNSC and said that it was a good opportunity
to strengthen bilateral ties by cooperating on UN Security
Council issues. HBJ called it "not a good time" to join the
Council, which faces a long list of Middle East problems
including the Iranian nuclear issue. We're keen to cooperate,
he said, while hoping the U.S. will take into consideration
that Qatar is in a difficult region. Qatar values consensus
within the Council, he said. Qatar welcomes timely
information from the U.S. and does not want to be "surprised"
to find out the two countries hold different positions on a
given topic late in the game. A/S Silverberg replied that
while the U.S. respects Qatar's regional role, every member
of the Council should act to protect the strength and
credibility of the Council above regional interests. A/S
Silverberg noted that U.S.-Qatari relations were off to a
rough start on the Council due to disagreements over Syria
and Sudan.


4. (C) Syria. HBJ said the Syrian president had visited Qatar
at the beginning of the week. They had "frank" discussions.
The Qataris emphasized that cooperation with the
international community "is a must." We're not for changing
regimes, he said: We fear chaos. If President Assad is not in
power, the Syrian border with Israel will become unstable,
and the Muslim Brotherhood will take over. This will put the
region in great difficulty. This doesn't mean the Hariri
murderer should get off, HBJ said. He reported that President
Assad said he's ready to cooperate but fears he's being
targeted directly. "Our view is to work with Syria for
gradual change," HBJ concluded.


5. (C) Secretary Rice has said that we are looking for change
in behavior, noted Silverberg. Key actions are controlling
the border with Iraq, allowing for political opening
domestically, ending support for Palestinian rejectionist
groups, and fully implementing UNSCR 1559. Central to 1559 is
the need to disarm and disband.


6. (C) HBJ said that Qatar wants two things: to get to the
truth about the Hariri assassination and to normalize
relations between Syria and Lebanon. He said that issues such
as disarming militias were difficult, can't be done
immediately, and that Syria cannot be responsible for
disarming the militias. A/S Silverberg said that the latest
Larsen report was clear that Lebanon had taken steps to
control the border while Syria had not, and that the PRST
should "call on" Syria to take these steps. HBJ compromised
on the matter of trafficking arms across the Lebanese border,
saying it is something they can work on and that it is "no
problem" to name Syria specifically. He asked, Can we do
something to get the two countries to talk? He might go to
Syria to discuss matters within 10 days. (He confirmed to the
Ambassador that the Amir did not visit Damascus over the
weekend and currently has no plans to travel there.) A/S
Silverberg answered that UNSCR 1559 calls for "normalization"
of diplomatic relations but that a
predicate was mutual respect for national sovereignty. She
advised HBJ to carry the message that Syria should "fully
comply" with its UN Security Council obligations.


7. (C) Sudan. A/S Silverberg said that the U.S. does not
support modifying an independent report by a Panel of Experts
before it is submitted to the Security Council. Accepting
modifications to a report will lead others to do so in the
future, harming the objectivity of such reports. She added
that there would be intensive discussions before any
sanctions or other action is taken after the submission of
the report. HBJ agreed that "we have to maintain pressure on
the Sudanese" but that necessary checks must be made first.
He promised to talk to the Qatari permrep about the issue.


8. (C) HBJ mentioned that he will visit Iran January 23. We
are very concerned, he said. The Iranians are committed to
their nuclear weapons program, in his opinion. The Bushehr
nuclear plant is close and, weapons activity aside, an
accident would impact Qatar more than Iran itself. Also, Iran
shares Qatar's natural gas field. He said he will tell the
Iranians that they must work out the nuclear impasse with the
EU and the international community. He committed to tell them
not to rely on Qatar in the Security Council; we won't be the
member "singing alone." But I'm not hopeful, he said.


9. (C) HBJ said he has not trusted Iranians since the time of
Khomeini. In the late 1990s, he had a dispute with President
Khatami over Iranian accusations that Qatar was too close
militarily to Israel and the U.S. HBJ said Ahmedi-Nejad is
"more serious" and "doesn't lie."
UNTERMEYER