MULTIPLE DIALOGUE INITIATIVES ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS TIMOR

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SUBJECT: MULTIPLE DIALOGUE INITIATIVES ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS TIMOR
CRISIS


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1. (SBU) Summary: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of dialogue
and reconciliation efforts among East Timorese institutions and
leaders. These have included series of meetings between the
armed forces (F-FDTL) and the national police (PNTL),
initiatives by youth group and gang leaders, and a high level
dialogue last week involving all major political actors except
perhaps the most important one, former Prime Minister Mari
Alkatiri. The Church leadership also failed to show. All of
these efforts have been organized with overarching coordination
from the President's National Dialogue initiative, with the high
level dialogue event receiving significant support from the
Madrid Club with funding from the European Union. There is
broad consensus on the necessity and value of such initiatives,
but also some concerns. There are fears that the security
institution dialogue is simultaneously serving as a mechanism
for prematurely reactivating the F-FDTL, and bypassing
accountability. The youth group dialogue is vital to reduce
violent incidents in Dili, but not all key groups are
participating in the initiative. The high level dialogue ended
without much clarity as to next steps or any clear
accomplishments. Whether it has further dividends will most
likely rest on if it results in dialogue between Alkatiri and
President Xanana Gusmao. End Summary.

Reconciliation between the armed forces and police
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2. (SBU) The first significant move in series of reconciliation
initiatives over recent weeks was a one-on-one meeting between
President Gusmao and Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak in the
first week of November, the first meeting of its kind since the
beginning of the crisis. According to Prime Minister Jose
Ramos-Horta, the two had been willing to meet for some time, but
neither was willing to take the initiative. Ramos-Horta reports
that he therefore made the arrangements, even going so far as to
go and pick up Ruak to convey him to the meeting. No one else
was in the room to report on the conversation, but both men
reported being very happy with the discussion and agreed to move
ahead with a reconciliation process between the F-FDTL and the
PNTL.


3. (SBU) Gusmao then hosted at his home a series of gatherings
over a three-day period, with nearly 80 members of the F-FDTL
including all top leadership on November 8, a similar number of
PNTL also including top leadership on the 9th, and finally with
both groups together on the 10th. This was followed by a joint
parade on November 15 involving about 300 of each in front of
the Government Palace and presided over by the President, Prime
Minister and President of Parliament. The initial very public
F-FDTL-PNTL reconciliation was then followed by a number of
further meetings involving the security institutions' leadership
as well as political parties and youth groups. The main
discussion at these meetings was on how the security
institutions could work together with the various youth groups
to define and implement confidence building measures within
communities and internally displaced person (IDP) camps.
However, to date it is unclear whether any specific steps have
been agreed upon. Proposals that the F-FDTL and PNTL should
conduct joint visits to communities and camps to demonstrate
their new-found commitment to peace, were rejected by the youth
leaders as premature and possibly inflammatory.


4. (SBU) There has been wide acknowledgement of this
institutional reconciliation as a positive and necessary step in
principle. However, a number of concerns have been raised
regarding the way the process is proceeding and possible
pitfalls. Primary concerns focus on the F-FDTL, as it is the
institution that seems to be gaining immediately from the
reconciliation, while the PNTL remains largely (although not
entirely) contained by UNPOL and its vetting and reintegration
process. It is apparent that the Ramos-Horta government and
Ruak used the reconciliation events as a spring board to
reassert the F-FDTL, which has now been granted rights to move
about freely, and armed, in Dili for routine business (they are
not to be involved in any law enforcement). Ramos-Horta has

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repeatedly emphasized his support of "normalization" for the
F-FDTL, declaring that they should have same privileges as
foreign off-duty troops to carry weapons in city.


5. (SBU) Another concern, primarily voiced by the PNTL, is that
throughout the various meetings between the two institutions,
F-FDTL officers have been allowed to carry weapons while all
PNTL officers remain unarmed under current UNPOL arrangements.
Self-suspended National Police Commander Paulo Martins expressed
particular dismay at this and at one point refused to continue
to participate in the meetings. This was again the case at the
November 28 independence day event at the main stadium (reported
septel) , which featured about 100 armed F-FDTL flanked by a
lesser number of unarmed PNTL. A number of PNTL officers have
noted that this creates a fundamentally unequal dynamic between
the two institutions. An additional concern, expressed both by
many PNTL members and others, is that reconciliation and
"normalization" of the F-FDTL will be used to bypass judicial
accountability, in particular for the top leadership who were
all recommended for prosecution for illegal weapons distribution
in the UN Commission of Inquiry report. This worry has been
underscored by recent statements from Ramos-Horta who has
described the report as exonerating the F-FDTL (by concluding
that there was no F-FDTL massacre on April 28),and seems to be
willfully ignoring the report's other findings on the F-FDTL.

Concurrent youth group initiatives
--------------


6. (U) Concurrent with the development of the F-FDTL - PNTL
dialogue, an "independent" reconciliation initiative sprung up
among a number of youth groups (a term that in Dili encompasses
a range from church groups to neighborhood gangs to large
martial arts organizations). This initiative was at least
partially organized by the President's Youth Commission for
Dialogue. Prominent in this initiative were several
neighborhood gang leaders who have played alternately
destructive and constructive roles, including Joao Becora,
Jacinto Kulao and Alito Rambo. A number of youth involved in
this initiative participated in the November 15 F-FDTL - PNTL
parade, distributing flowers at the end of the ceremony. They
also organized a series of peace marches during the weekend of
November 12, "National Youth Day" and the anniversary of the
Santa Cruz massacre. Beyond these mostly symbolic activities,
these youth leaders have become increasingly involved in
community dialogue processes to encourage the return of IDPs.
However, there has concurrently been increased combative
rhetoric among some of these groups indicating the potential
fragility of their peace efforts and the likelihood of
additional violent clashes between them.

High-level dialogue
--------------


7. (U) The Madrid Club, with funding by the European Union, has
been for several months, in coordination with the President's
National Dialogue initiative, pushing to bring about a series of
dialogues involving mid- and high-level political and societal
leaders. The initial series of mid-level meetings had only
token participation by the ruling Fretilin party, and was
ultimately overshadowed by the simultaneous F-FDTL-PNTL
initiative described above. The high-level dialogue held last
week was comparatively more successful, involving as it did all
important political actors currently in country, including key
members of Fretilin's top leadership. However, Fretilin
Secretary General and former Prime Minister Alkatiri's absence,

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reportedly for medical treatment in Portugal, was a major gap.

Don't count on the Church
--------------


8. (SBU) Lutheran Bishop Gunnar Stalsett of Oslo and Former
Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs attempted to set the tone
during their opening speeches. Stalsett, a member of the Nobel
Prize Committee who is playing an active role here in the

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dialogue process, is supporting though not directly involved in
the Madrid Club effort. He relayed a tough message regarding
the emptiness of "reconciliation" without truth or justice.
Birkavs, who is leading the Madrid Club effort, made a robust
presentation about looking to the future not the past, the
meaning of leadership, and the need to work together with
political enemies. However, they essentially stepped back and
let the meeting run itself from there, with the President's
Chief of Staff officially mediating. With no clear agenda or
structure for the meeting, nor any preparatory work before
bringing together such a large group, much of the event devolved
into a series of familiar speeches and political posturing by
the participants. At a November 23 briefing hosted by the
Embassy for the diplomatic community and UNMIT officials,
Birkavs said that it is not clear to the Madrid Club where to go
from here. He noted, however, that many of the participants had
expressed desire for continued dialogue with an emphasis on the
need to arrange smaller meetings to allow freer conversation.


9. (SBU) The Catholic Church leadership also was notably absent
from the high-level dialogue, the bishops having pulled out at
the last moment and only mid-level Church leadership in
attendance, which the organizers regarded as a major setback.
It was not clear why the Church backed out, but recently the
local bishops seem to be increasingly shying away from any
activities even remotely related to politics. This is not true
of the former Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo, who reportedly will
return here for a Nobel Prize commemoration on December 10.
According to Bishop Stalsett, Belo was disappointed by the
results of his visit here last month, when he failed to make any
inroads with rebel leader Alfredo Reinado and was severely taken
aback when a group of youths stopped his car in Dili and treated
him disrespectfully, something he had never experienced here
before.

The missing piece: Gusmao and Alkatiri
--------------


10. (SBU) There is a widespread sense, at all levels of society,
that until Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri can reach a workable
modus vivendi, other reconciliation efforts, while important,
remain built on weak foundations. However, getting the two to
talk has remained an elusive goal. In a conversation with a
Madrid Club official in late October, Alkatiri stated that he
regarded the UN Commission of Inquiry report as invalidating
dialogue because it was biased against him and his allies, but
then stated that he would be willing to meet with Gusmao once
the Prosecutor General had completed the investigation into
allegations of his involvement in illegal arms distribution, and
if they met first informally and as equals. Meanwhile, although
Gusmao has been overtly supportive of dialogue, he has likewise
demonstrated reluctance to engage directly with Alkatiri.


11. (SBU) Thus, perhaps the most significant outcome of last
week's high-level dialogue was an explicit commitment made for
dialogue between the two men. State Administration Minister Ana
Pessoa, who spoke early in the day, regretted the absence of
Alkatiri and remarked on the need to have a dialogue between
Alkatiri and Gusmao. (Pessoa is very close to Alkatiri and her
statement in this context can be assumed to represent Alkatiri.)
In his speech toward the end of the day, Gusmao noted his
agreement with Pessoa that the high-level dialogue ideally
should have included Alkatiri. He then stated that he would
make every effort to bring about a meeting with Alkatiri on the
latter's return. Whether or not such a meeting can begin to
narrow their differences remains to be seen, especially in light
of the ongoing public rhetoric coming from both of them. Many
observers regard the two to be in a struggle to the political
death. Alkatiri is regarded as determined to hold onto power at
all costs and Gusmao's intent to possibly form a new party
appears to be based on his calculation that this may be the only
way to ensure a Fretilin defeat in next year's national
elections. In this context finding common ground for productive
dialogue will be difficult.
GRAY