Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI487
2006-10-03 07:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

PREVIEW OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS

Tags:  PHUM PGOV KJUS KPKO ASEC UN TT 
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PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0487/01 2760747
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030747Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3004
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0693
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0763
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0677
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0515
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0541
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0615
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0409
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2335
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000487 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS KPKO ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS


DILI 00000487 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000487

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KJUS KPKO ASEC UN TT
SUBJECT: PREVIEW OF UN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT ON TIMOR CRISIS


DILI 00000487 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Dili,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

1. (C) Summary. According to one of its principal authors, the
UN Special Commission of Inquiry report pulls no punches in
naming the direct perpetrators and assessing responsibilities
for the April-May crisis. The report recommends prosecution of
former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato and elements of the
F-FDTL leadership (including General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel
Lere Anan and Major Maubuti) for illegal actions, as well as for
more direct perpetrators of the violence, including Oan Kiak,
Captain Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita, and Railos. It does
not recommend prosecution of former Prime Minister Alkatiri,
however, only recommending 'further investigation', and alludes
to the 'irresponsible' March 23 speech of President Gusmao. The
report finds no evidence of rumored mass killings by F-FDTL on
April 28-29, and also dismisses conspiracy theories that
Fretilin had a coordinated plan to destroy the political
opposition. There is serious concern regarding the potential
for violent reactions once the report becomes public. Prime
Minister Ramos Horta would like the release to be delayed from
the scheduled October 7 date until upcoming rotations of the
Portuguese and Malaysian rapid reaction forces are completed and
it now looks likely that the need to translate the document into
Tetun will push the release off until late in the month. End
summary.


2. (C) CDA met on October 1 with a UN official who is one of the
primary authors of the UN Special Commission of Inquiry report
on the April-May events. He said the completed draft had been
sent to Geneva for clearance, but did not anticipate that Geneva
would make any major changes or "water down" the findings in any
way. He was adamant that the report pulled no punches in
describing in some detail the various clashes and, to the

maximum extent permitted by the evidence, "named the names" of
those directly involved. The major actors in this regard
include dissident commander of the F-FDTL Military Police Major
Alfredo Reinado, Abilio Mesquita of the National Police (PNTL),
former Falintil fighter Oan Kiak, and Rai Los, the leader of the
Liquica-based group allegedly armed by former Minister of
Interior Lobato. Thereport recommends that all be prosecuted.
The report also fingers the F-FDTL leadership, including
Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, Colonel Lere, and Major
Maubuti, for illegal acts and recommends prosecutions. As
expected, illegal acts of former Interior Minister Rogerio
Lobato feature prominently in the report, which recommends that
he be prosecuted.


3. (C) According to this source, the Commission encountered many
claims that then Prime Minister Alkatiri may have been aware of
if not behind certain illegal acts, but it seemed that Alkatiri
had been quite adept at insuring that he was one step removed.
There was nevertheless enough evidence for the report to
recommend "further investigation" of the ex-Prime Minister. The
report also censures President Gusmao for his "irresponsible"
speech of March 23. The report attempts to put to rest widely
circulating reports that F-FDTL carried out mass killings of
dozens of people on April 28-29 , concluding that there is no
evidence to support this. The report also dismisses conspiracy
theories regarding purported coordinated plans by Fretilin to
destroy the political opposition.


4. (C) The UN official indicated that the report allocates much
of the blame to Timorese institutions as a whole. The UN mission
also does not come off unscathed, with one mention of "faulty
management" by former SRSG Hasegawa during the height of the
crisis.


5. (C) There is serious concern among UN and senior GOET
officials regarding potentially violent reactions once the
report becomes public. In a September 27 meeting with us Prime
Minister Ramos Horta predicted that if the report exonerates
Alkatiri while recommending prosecution of Lobato, "a strong
negative reaction," including demonstrations and waves of arson,
could be expected. Embassy sources have also reported that
significant numbers of people from the eastern districts are
leaving Dili for their home districts in anticipation of a

DILI 00000487 002.2 OF 002


violent response by western opposition groups. In light of the
scheduled October 7 release date for the report, the Prime
Minister expressed concern that both the Portuguese GNR and the
Malaysian rapid reaction force are slated for rotation around
October 6, with the replacement personnel not arriving for
several more days. He therefore urged that the report's release
be delayed by two weeks or so. Acting SRSG Finn Reske-Neilson
indicated to us that such a delay is likely, due both to the
concern regarding the security forces and the need to translate
the report into Tetun.


6. (C) Comment. It is encouraging that, unlike previous UN
investigations here, the Commission's report will apparently
pull no punches (with the possible exception of the ex-Prime
Minister's role). A slight delay in the release to ensure that
adequate security forces are on hand seems justified, but it is
essential that the report be made public soon to move the
process along. We are not yet convinced that the GOET, UNMIT,
and the JTF are fully prepared for the possible consequences of
the report's release, and will be strongly encouraging them to
be ready for all contingencies. RSO and visiting DS analyst
discussed these issues in meetings with local counterparts last
week, who did not yet seem to have a good handle on where
violent reactions may break out. The Embassy will also be
closely assessing the situation in regard to our own security
concerns. End comment.
GRAY