Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI427
2006-08-22 09:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

RAMOS-HORTA WILL REINFORCE SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE DRAFT

Tags:  PREL UNSC KPKO TT PO AS CH JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2902
INFO RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2233
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0653
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000427

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO TT PO AS CH JA
SUBJECT: RAMOS-HORTA WILL REINFORCE SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE DRAFT
RESOLUTION

REF: A. (A) STATE 00135746;


B. (B) STATE 000137410

DILI 00000427 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



(1) (C/NF) Summary: Ambassador met with Prime Minister Jose
Ramos-Horta to discuss the status of negotiations in the UN
Security Council over a resolution for a new UN mission in East
Timor. Ramos-Horta agreed to reinforce his message, included in
an August 15 letter, that the Japanese draft resolution is
acceptable to the Government of East Timor. He said the
Japanese resolution was a good compromise because it allowed for
a review of the situation in or around October, when it would be
more clear whether East Timor needed peacekeeping forces and
whether the current arrangement should be changed. He added
that the Australian armed forces in East Timor had been both
responsive and effective, probably moreso than a UN force would
be. Ramos-Horta added, however, that he had already expressed
this view earlier in the day to the Portuguese and Brazilian
Ambassadors, but that these diplomats had expressed
disappointment that East Timor was taking this position. He
said the Chinese delegation to the UN had been even more
forceful, complaining to an East Timorese diplomat that China
felt "betrayed" by East Timor's change of position. He
speculated that China was reluctant to see Japan taking the lead
on this matter, and that some (but not all) Portuguese
internationals in Dili are obsessed with what they see as
Australia's efforts to exert undue influence in East Timor.
Ramos-Horta said, however, that he had convinced the entire
Timorese leadership including President Xanana Gusmao that the
Japanese resolution was a good basis for a compromise to get the
new mission started as soon as possible. In addition to speaking

again with East Timor's UN mission, he said he would try to make
a statement to the press reiterating the advantages of the
Japanese compromise. End Summary.

(2) (U) Ambassador met with Prime Minister Ramos-Horta on August
21 to urge that East Timorese diplomats be as strong as possible
in support of the Japanese draft of a Security Council
resolution for a new mission to succeed the United Nations
Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). Ambassador thanked the Prime
Minister for the letter he sent on August 18, but noted that
some parties who favored a "blue helmeted" peacekeeping force
were interpreting the letter to mean that East Timor still
favored the blue helmets and would accept the Japanese
compromise only grudgingly. Ambassador also reminded
Ramos-Horta that the language calling for review of the
continuing need for international military presence within two
or three months had been inserted after Ramos-Horta himself
suggested it to Ambassador and others last week. Ambassador
added that the Japanese draft, which would continue the
650-strong Australian military presence pending a review of East
Timor's needs within a few months, would almost certainly be
more protective of East Timor's security than an immediate
switch to a smaller blue-helmeted force.

(3) (C) Ramos-Horta responded that he agreed with the points
made by Ambassador. He said he would be happy to call Foreign
Minister Jose Luis Guterres in New York, with whom he has been
in frequent contact on this matter, to stress that East Timor's
diplomats should emphasize the part of his letter that says the
Japanese draft is a good basis for a compromise, not the part
that says Timor would have preferred a United Nations
peacekeeping force. He praised the Australian military forces
in East Timor, saying that they had been responsive and
effective whenever he called on them to address a particular
threat or crime, citing a case in which he asked Australian
Brigadier General Mick Slater to take action against dissident
Timorese soldiers who had gone to the Oecussi enclave with
automatic weapons and "the Australians had Blackhawk helicopters
in Oecussi that same afternoon to pick them up and bring them
back here." In contrast, he said that a multilateral UN force
"would have talked to someone in New York and probably said they
could not do it."


DILI 00000427 002.2 OF 002


(4) (C) Ramos-Horta added that the review provision in the
Japanese draft was better than an immediate switch to blue
helmets, because "by October the situation might have calmed
down, national dialogue and reconciliation might have worked,
and we might not need peacekeepers at all. Or we might need a
bigger force, or a different one. We'll know more by then. And
even if the Security Council voted today for a multilateral
force, they might not arrive for a couple of months."

(5) (C/NF) The Prime Minister added, however, that he as well as
East Timor's UN mission had already made their position clear to
governments that have not supported the Japanese draft, and that
so far the only effect had been to irritate representatives of
these governments. For instance, he said he had told the
Portuguese and Brazilian Ambassadors earlier in the day
(apparently in response to a joint demarche on the subject by
the two Ambassadors) that it would be better to go forward with
the Japanese draft, and that they had both expressed
disappointment. He said a representative of the Chinese mission
to the UN had been even more blunt, stating to a Timorese
diplomat that "China feels betrayed by East Timor's change of
position on this issue." Ramos-Horta speculated that the
Chinese government might be irritated at the leading role played
by Japan on this matter, and that the Lusophone ambassadors
might be motivated in part by a fear he said was shared by some,
but not all, Portuguese nationals in Dili, that Australia might
seek to exert undue influence in East Timor. He concluded that
"sometimes I don't know what gets into our friends."

(6) (C) Despite this foreign disappointment to East Timor's
newly nuanced position on international peacekeeping forces,
Ramos-Horta said he had convinced the entire Timorese
leadership, including President Gusmao, that the Japanese draft
afforded a good basis for a quick compromise that would get the
new mission established as soon as possible. He added that
"even Alkatiri" had been convinced --- an apparent reference to
the close alliance that continues to exist between the former
Prime Minister and the official and unofficial Portuguese
expatriate community in Dili.

(7) (SBU) Ramos-Horta said that in addition to communicating
again with East Timor's mission to the UN, he would try to make
a statement soon in response to press inquiries reiterating the
desirability of the Japanese compromise.
REES