Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI394
2006-08-01 09:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

EAST TIMOR UPDATE JULY 24-31, 2006

Tags:  PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR UN TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6667
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0394/01 2130905
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010905Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2852
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0636
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0709
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0627
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0465
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0490
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0566
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0360
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2180
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000394 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE JULY 24-31, 2006

REF: A) DILI 387 B) DILI 275

DILI 00000394 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy
Dili, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000394

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE JULY 24-31, 2006

REF: A) DILI 387 B) DILI 275

DILI 00000394 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy
Dili, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (U) Summary:
Continued repercussions of Reinado arrest
Prime Minister presents his Government Program to Parliament
Council of State extends the "State of Crisis" through August 20
International Commission of Inquiry: Briefing by the Executive
Director
End summary.

Continued repercussions of Reinado arrest
--------------

2. (U) Although the pro-Reinado demonstrations dissipated on
Friday and have yet to resume, participants appear to have made
good on their promise to disperse throughout the city and create
disturbances (Ref A). Their numbers appear to be quite small,
in the range of a dozen to several dozens, but their effect is
being felt more widely, with many residents reporting sharply
increased security worries. A dozen or more houses were burned
since Friday, and a small number of house burnings or
destruction continues each night.


3. (SBU) Members of one of the groups involved relayed to
Embassy staff that this renewed violence was a direct response
to the Reinado arrest and that their goals is to destroy all the
remaining Lorosae (eastern) houses and belongings in Dili. In
reality, the disturbances seem to be limited to a number of
major neighborhoods affected by the recent crisis where some
"Lorosae" empty houses had remained standing but nearly or
entirely emptied of their "Lorosae" population. The group
members went on to explain that they have adjusted their
activities to account for the international police, but by
targeting a small number of houses each night and staying in
regular contact through newly-acquired cell phones, they are
effectively evading arrest.


4. (SBU) The National Front for Justice and Peace (FNJP) also
remains seized with the Reinado arrest issue and continues to
plan demonstrations. One of the group's leaders, Vital dos

Santos, relayed to Emboff that they are meeting this week to
prepare demonstrations for next week to demand the dissolution
of Parliament and a "fair judicial process" for all involved in
recent events. Dos Santos described the youth group that
organized last week's demonstrations as "separate" but sharing
the same goals. When organizing the anti-Alkatiri
demonstrations in June, the FNJP remained non-violent and
disassociated themselves from Loromonu-Lorosae dynamics. It
remains to be seen whether their sympathy with the pro-Reinado
demonstrators indicates that they are now ready to dispense with
such niceties.


5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Reinado who last week was assigned to 30
days preventative detention while his case is investigated, was
moved over the weekend from the Joint Task Force (JTF) detention
facility to Becora prison in Dili, where he is reportedly in
solitary confinement. According to one of his lawyers, the
prison director is trying to have Reinado moved to a prison
outside of Dili because of his confrontational behavior since
arrival. The Australian-led JTF refused his initial suggestion
of Gleno prison (in the western district of Ermera),so he is
now proposing Baucau prison (in the East). JTF sources
confirmed that they had refused the request to move Reinado to
Gleno due to concerns that the population would attempt to
forcibly free him. However, they did not indicate whether the
Baucau request would be refused as well. A move to Baucau would
be as problematic for different reasons. As one observer put
it, if Reinado is moved to Baucau "he will be lynched."
Moreover, a move to the East would inflame Reinado's western
supporters. (Note: There is no "high security" prison in East
Timor for problem inmates, and if anything the district prisons
are less secure, so the justification for such a move is
unclear.)


DILI 00000394 002.2 OF 003


Prime Minister presents Government Program to Parliament
-------------- --------------

6. (U) Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta on July 31 presented his
Government program to the National Parliament, noting in the
presentation that his government was essentially adopting the
same program and budget as its predecessor the Alkatiri
government for two main reasons. First, it is a program based
on the National Development Plan and thus consistent with the
nation's long-term needs. Second, the circumstances under which
he became Prime Minister did not allow him to implement radical
changes. The program and budget under discussion cover only the
period of this government's mandate through May 20, 2007, rather
than the full fiscal year through June 30.


7. (C) Discussion of the program continued today (August 1) and
will possibly last for another day or more. An advisor to the
President of Parliament relayed to Emboff that the number and
nature of the questions coming from the MPs indicates that
Parliament could vote to reject the program. However, a
reliable Embassy source confirmed that he observed a meeting
between former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, apparently in his
continued role as Secretary General of the ruling Fretilin
party, and the Fretilin MPs on July 30. Ramos-Horta and his two
Deputy Prime Ministers were also in attendance. Our source
noted that this meeting indicated there is "no doubt that this
budget and program will be passed."

Council of State extends the "State of Crisis" through August 20
-------------- --------------

8. (U) The Council of State on July 31 agreed to another
extension of the "State of Crisis" originally declared by
President Xanana Gusmao on May 30 (DILI 275). Under the State
of Crisis, which falls short of a formal State of Emergency, the
President assumed responsibility for defense and national
security, including the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the
military, and the national police. The current extension is
intended to last through the deployment of a new UN mission,
expected August 21. In a Presidential Statement issued
following the decision, Gusmao stated that, "Significant
progress has been made~ However, the humanitarian situation
continues to be very serious ~ [and] the situation is still very
precarious, particularly in Dili."

UN Commission of Inquiry: Briefing by the Executive Director
-------------- --------------

9. (U) The Executive Director of the UN Independent Special
Commission of Inquiry, Luc Cote, last week briefed Charge and
Emboffs on its composition and mandate. The Commission was
established in response to the June 8 request from then Foreign
and Defense Minister Ramos-Horta and commenced its three-month
mandate on July 7. Cote provided an overview of the
Commission's composition, noting that the three Commissioners
--- Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil, Zelda Holtzman of South
Africa and Ralph Zacklin of the United Kingdom --- were chosen
partially because they had no prior experience in East Timor and
would therefore conduct their work with no preconceptions. The
Commission's secretariat, however, includes several experts with
extensive bQkground in East Timor. It comprises six
investigators, two legal advisors and a political advisor.
Members of the secretariat will remain in East Timor throughout
the Commission's mandate. The three commissioners will come to
East Timor twice, first from August 4-12 and again for two weeks
in September.


10. (SBU) Cote emphasized that the Commission's mandate is
focused on the events of April 28-29 and May 23-25 only.
However, it is possible -- in fact likely -- that a complete
understanding of these events will necessitate examination of
developments preceding and following these dates. In
investigating these events, the Commission will incorporate the
work already done by international police, the UN Human Rights
Unit, the Provedor (Ombudsman),non-governmental organizations,
and the office of the Prosecutor General. He does not believe
the basic investigation of what occurred will be difficult, as
much of the work has already been done. What will be more
difficult is developing conclusions regarding responsibility for

DILI 00000394 003.2 OF 003


the events, especially at the institutional and command level.


11. (SBU) The Commission will present its report to the
Secretary General and East Timor's National Parliament by

SIPDIS
October 7. The Commission's terms of reference do not specify
what will be included in the report and Cote stated that they
are already struggling with the question of naming names. In
addition to its accounting of the events of April 28-29 and May
23-25, the report will include recommendations for both East
Timor officials and the international community. Cote noted
that they have endeavored to convey that the Commission is not a
judicial organ, and as such can only make recommendations
regarding the appropriate judicial and accountability measures.
WHITMAN