Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI381
2006-07-25 11:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

CONTINUED TENSIONS OVER NATIONAL POLICE REINTEGRATION

Tags:  KPKO PREL PGOV KJUS UN AU TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 251105Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2826
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0627
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0700
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0618
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0456
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0481
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0557
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0351
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2154
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000381 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PACOM FOR POLAD
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
USUN FOR GORDON OLSON AND RICHARD MCCURRY
DEPT FOR IO, EAP/MTS
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV KJUS UN AU TT
SUBJECT: CONTINUED TENSIONS OVER NATIONAL POLICE REINTEGRATION

REF: DILI 352

DILI 00000381 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy
Dili, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000381

SIPDIS

NOFORN

PACOM FOR POLAD
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
USUN FOR GORDON OLSON AND RICHARD MCCURRY
DEPT FOR IO, EAP/MTS
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV KJUS UN AU TT
SUBJECT: CONTINUED TENSIONS OVER NATIONAL POLICE REINTEGRATION

REF: DILI 352

DILI 00000381 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy
Dili, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C/NF) Summary: Tensions have continued in recent weeks
between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Minister of
Interior, Alcino Barris, regarding how to handle the
reintegration of East Timor's national police (the PNTL). Each
have presented proposals with competing approaches and
priorities, with the AFP arguing for a thorough vetting of all
police officers to precede reintegration, and the Minister
pushing for an expedited process to get police back on the job
quickly. There are several underlying reasons for this
continued tension, including fundamentally differing views on
the state of the PNTL, different immediate priorities, and
cultural differences undermining effective communication between
the two. There have been some recent indications that a
compromise approach may yet emerge, possibly to involve very
limited PNTL operations in advance of complete vetting. How
this issue is handled in the coming weeks and months will have
potentially serious implications both for short and long-term
stability in East Timor. End summary.

Competing proposals for police reintegration
--------------

2. (C/NF) There has been a continuing stalemate between the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Minister of Interior,
Alcino Barris, (see reftel) over recent weeks in regard to the
question of when and how to bring the National Police (PNTL)
back to work in Dili. In early July, the AFP presented a plan
for PNTL reintegration, which involved extensive vetting of all
members of the PNTL before they could start working again in
Dili. Barris reportedly objected both to the manner in which
the AFP presented their plan, reportedly framing it as a
directive rather than consulting with the Minister in advance,

and to what he deemed to be excessive requirements before any
police could return to work in the capital. He presented his
own counter proposal emphasizing much faster vetting to be
conducted by a Ministry-led commission. An impasse ensued as
Barris made moves to constitute his commission while AFP
Commander Steve Lancaster relayed to Emboff that if PNTL began
working without a process of which he approved, the AFP would
disarm them and remove them from operations.


3. (C/NF) Last week there appeared to be some moves towards
compromise as the AFP presented a revised proposal that
Commander Lancaster said incorporated elements of Barris'
proposal. However, according to one of Barris' advisors, the
presentation of the new proposal was accompanied by significant
pressure on Barris to sign off immediately. Barris refused
pending additional changes, and the plan is to be reviewed again
this week. (Note: While international policing is being
conducted by police from all four contributing international
forces, the AFP has taken the lead regarding the reintegration
issues. The other international police forces reportedly are
remaining neutral on the issue. End note.)

The view from AFP
--------------

4. (C/NF) In conversations Emboffs have had with representatives
on both sides of the issue, it is clear that the two
institutions have very different assessments of the state of the
PNTL. The AFP views the PNTL as essentially have disintegrated
during the recent unrest, beginning with their ineffective
response to the April 28 riots and culminating in their
disappearance from law enforcement duties during the violence of
May 23-25. Perhaps more importantly, the AFP believe the PNTL
not only failed in carrying out their duties, but also
participated in the recent violence. They point to the many
allegations of various police elements being involved in the
late May fighting as well as participating in the mob violence

DILI 00000381 002.2 OF 003


that overtook Dili thereafter. The AFP therefore believes that
only a thorough vetting of all PNTL members, will address both
the issue of professional capacity as well as allegations of
wrong doing. They see the Minister's push for a faster process
as reflecting an inclination to avoid genuine accountability and
reinstitute the same failed institution.


5. (C/NF) Meanwhile, the AFP's present priority is not on the
PNTL at all, but rather on the successful establishment of
international police operations in Dili. As of July 17,
international police have taken over full responsibility for
city security from military forces for 15 hours a day and are
working towards 24-hour coverage. From this perspective, the
AFP regards the issue of PNTL integration as potentially
diverting resources and energy from their primary mission. AFP
Commander Lancaster has stated that they are in no hurry to
begin working with PNTL officers they regard as discredited and
inexperienced. Moreover, he describes Minister Barris' emphasis
on bringing the PNTL on board quickly as complicating, and in
some cases obstructing, operational needs. One example he notes
is Barris' resistance to allowing the AFP to take over the PNTL
headquarters. In addition, he said that Barris has attempted to
circumvent coordination with international police to force a
rapid return of the PNTL to Dili, in one instance by declaring
that PNTL would immediately begin co-patrolling with the
Malaysian police. Lancaster expressed his resentment on these
issues, stating they distract from immediate policing needs.

The view from the Minister of Interior and PNTL
-------------- --

6. (C/NF) While Minister Barris acknowledges the need to screen
police before returning them to full duties in Dili, he does not
see the PNTL as the failed institution described by the AFP.
Rather, he notes that a small number of police officers were
involved in the recent unrest, but that these officers are
already well known both within the police and in the community
at large. Moreover, he points out that several hundred of the
Dili-based police force, probably more than half, have
registered at PNTL headquarters and are waiting for the
opportunity to return to work. He therefore believes that with
some basic screening procedures, the majority of the Dili PNTL
could be back to work quickly. Also, in recent conversations he
has stated his belief that the internally displaced people
(IDPs) need to see the PNTL back on streets to feel safe before
returning to their neighborhoods.


7. (C/NF) The Minister, as well as his two international
advisors who are both long-term reliable contacts of the
Embassy, also complained that the AFP's approach to working with
the PNTL has been overly directive, with relatively little
genuine consultation in advance of decisions. One of his
advisors stated to Emboff that the current AFP plan for PNTL
reintegration is in fact very good, but that it will fail if
implemented because it does not address or account for cultural
issues and will be resented and undermineQver the long term as
a result.


8. (C/NF) Sources within both the ministry and the police have
described to Emboffs what they view as arrogance and disrespect
on the part of the AFP. They note that the police remaining at
the headquarters are not acknowledged as colleagues and are
instead treated by the AFP as incompetent. An American UN
police advisor worried that the police are being progressively
demoralized by not being allowed to operate in Dili, having all
their equipment confiscated, and prohibited from appearing in
public in uniform. One example that particularly rankled some
police was the AFP refusal to permit officers to wear their
uniforms to the funeral of a colleague killed during the May 25
police massacre.


8. (SBU) Views regarding the process needed before PNTL can
return to work also vary significantly among the police

DILI 00000381 003.2 OF 003


themselves. Some, such as Ismael Babo, the Deputy Commissioner
for Operations who was closely aligned with discredited former
Minister of Interior Lobato, conveyed to Emboffs that the blame
for the recent crisis lay entirely with the F-FDTL. He strongly
implied that no specific PNTL vetting or review process was
necessary and that the police could return to work in Dili
immediately. Others, including those at the headquarters who
are predominately from the West as well as the higher-ranking
eastern police who remain outside of Dili, argue strongly that a
thorough vetting and reconciliation process should precede a
return to normal policing.

Room for compromise?
--------------

9. (SBU) UN police have also been discussing possible approaches
to the vetting and reintegration issue. One UN police
representative recently relayed to us that a "win-win" solution
that addresses the concerns of both international police and the
Ministry is in the works. This would involve a fast track
process to get PNTL back to work in the short term, but with
limited powers, followed by a thorough vetting process that will
most likely be conducted by the police component of the next UN
mission. In the short term, the most likely solution would be
for PNTL to operate unarmed and conduct joint patrols with
international police.


10. (SBU) Since his swearing in on July 10, Prime Minister Jose
Ramos-Horta has become more involved in the police issue,
meeting with both AFP Commander Lancaster and Minister Barris on
a regular basis. The involvement of the Prime Minister's office
is viewed as a positive development by both and should continue
to help the move the negotiations forward. In recent
conversations with Ramos-Horta, he stated that he is not getting
involved in the details, but trying to sQthe overall
direction. He emphasized, however, that his approach is
generally to defer to the AFP and to encourage the MOI to
cooperate with them.


11. (C/NF) Comment: The issue of how to handle the PNTL in Dili
has potentially serious implications both for short and
long-term stability. Too much delay in the reintegration
process will likely lead to an increasingly unhappy and restless
PNTL, and alienation between PNTL officers and their Australian
counterparts would negatively impact their future working
relationship. On the other hand, bringing the PNTL back into
action precipitously would leave grave doubts about PNTL
involvement in the May-June violence that wracked Dili and
compromise public confidence in police impartiality in
protecting Dili's communities as displaced persons return home.
Given these concerns, the idea of a two-stage reintegration
beginning with co-patrolling with international police may be
the only way to give the PNTL some visibility and credibility as
an active force in Dili, without compromising the longer term
need for a full review and vetting process. End comment.
WHITMAN