Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI372
2006-07-19 00:15:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

PRIME MINISTER RAMOS HORTA'S LATEST VIEWS

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KPKO UN PO AU TT 
pdf how-to read a cable
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000372 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO UN PO AU TT
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER RAMOS HORTA'S LATEST VIEWS

REF: DILI 368

DILI 00000372 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000372

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO UN PO AU TT
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER RAMOS HORTA'S LATEST VIEWS

REF: DILI 368

DILI 00000372 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: In several conversations with Ambassador and
Emboffs following his swearing in as East Timor's new Prime
Minister, Jose Ramos Horta shared his views on some issues
facing his government. Among the subjects addressed were: his
delicate working relationship with the Fretilin party; his plan
to establish a civil society council and a strategic planning
group to advise his government; his intention to withdraw the
criminal defamation portion of the penal code and to provide
support to media development; his thoughts on the election law
currently under review; and his recommendations regarding the
the operational security and police training components of the
next UN mission. Although Ramos-Horta has a clear vision of what
needs to be done to turn around the fragile political situation,
it remains to be seen to what extent this legendary
international negotiator will prevail in moving hard-line
Fretilin members to a more practical and inclusive approach to
governance. End summary.

Working with Fretilin
--------------

2. (SBU) One of the key challenges facing Ramos Horta in the
coming weeks and months will be working with the ruling Fretilin
party whose representatives have clearly indicated that they
consider this a Fretilin government bound to implement the
party's policies. In a conversation with Ambassador Rees
immediately following his swearing in, Ramos Horta noted that he
would have liked to have made many more changes to the
composition of the cabinet but that the party "remains in
control of cabinet appointments~it's only fair, they still have
the majority in Parliament." (See reftel for discussion of
cabinet appointments.) However, in the same conversation he
noted adamantly that "my judgment is final" on policy decisions,
although he will be in regular discussions with Fretilin's
Political Committee.

Plans for civil society council and strategic planning group
-------------- --------------

3. (SBU) Ramos Horta relayed to us his plans to establish two
bodies to assist in advising and the government and shaping

future policy development. First, he wants to establish a civil
society council, comprising representatives of the Catholic
Church, non-governmental organizations, the media, and other
civil society organizations. The role of the council would be to
review and advise on all major government decisions, with
particular emphasis on decisions with wide social impact. In
describing this concept, Ramos Horta remarked that civil society
has felt shut out of government deliberations and the council
would begin to remedy this complaint. A second body that he
plans to establish is a strategic planning group. His
explanation of the precise function of this group remains
somewhat general at this time, but the overall idea is to hire a
group of consultants who could provide policy and public
outreach direction, particularly on economic development issues.

Criminal defamation to be withdrawn from penal code;
government support of media development
-------------- --------------

4. (SBU) In several conversations Ramos Horta has stated his
unambiguous intent to resubmit the penal code with the sections
criminalizing defamation withdrawn. He noted that he might
support criminalizing defamation if East Timor, and especially
its media sector, were significantly more developed. However, he
noted that criminal defamation is particularly inappropriate for
the current stage of media development. In this vein, Ramos
Horta spoke of his intent to provide greater material support to
media organizations if possible within the budget. Examples of
the kinds of support that might be included were salary
subsidies and support to provide for free distribution of
newspapers around the country. He also wants to start a monthly
government "lift-out" section in papers to educate the public
about government policies while providing additional support to
the papers. Finally, he stated that there should be a new law
stipulating that the government cannot financially punish

DILI 00000372 002.2 OF 002


papers, for example by withdrawing advertising, because of
differences in opinion.

Election law
--------------

5. (SBU) On the subject of the election law, a draft of which
was produced by the Alkatiri government and is currently under
review by Parliament, Ramos Horta stated that he will insist on
broad consultations. While he expressed equanimity regarding the
resubmission of the Alkatiri government's version by the
Fretilin bench in Parliament, he noted that he has some specific
disagreements with the contents that "must be worked out." In
particular, he noted the current draft law's provisions for
providing funding support to parties based on the proportion of
seats they have in Parliament. He stated that while there could
be some proportionality in this support, it should not be so
directly proportional as this would clearly unfairly benefit the
majority Fretilin party. His suggested alternative is to either
give an equal amount to each party, or to have a proportional
system with a set minimum and maximum to reduce the discrepancy
between parties.

The next UN mission
--------------

6. (SBU) In discussing his current views of the next UN mission,
Ramos Horta emphasized that he still wants at least one
battalion of Peace Keepers in addition to the policing
operation. While noting that Peace Keepers were not strictly
necessary for day-to-day security needs, he believes that the
symbolism would be very important and that they would provide a
potentially vital rapid reaction back up capability. On the
policing operation, he still believes that it will be necessary
to have around 1,000 on the ground. He emphasized that he wants
the Portuguese National Republican Guard (GNR) to play as big a
role as possible in this operation. He said that the population
like and respect the GNR and believe they are the most effective
international police operating here. He also believes there is a
role for the GNR in police training, noting that the Australian
training program has been good but that the GNR have also been
working on training plans and could make a valuable contribution.


7. (SBU) Separately, Ramos Horta expressed to the Ambassador
that he hopes that Ian Martin will be the next SRSG, remarking
that the current SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa "has experience in
development but not in politics."


8. (SBU) Comment: Under the Constitution the Prime Minister
merely "proposes" cabinet members and the President has
discretion about whether to "appoint." It seems unlikely that
the Fretilin inner circle would have agreed to the appointment
of Fretilin reformer Jose Luis Guterres as Foreign Minister if
they had as much control as Ramos-Horta has suggested. However,
other changes and retentions in the Cabinet, such as the
decision not to abolish the five regional Secretary of State
positions suggest that Ramos-Horta deferred to the Fretilin
leadership except when he had a particularly strong opinion.
Ramos-Horta's belief that he, not the Fretilin committee, has
ultimate authority over matters of policy is notable. His
decision to reintroduce the penal code without the controversial
criminal defamation provision, a pet project of former Prime
Minister Alkatiri, suggests that he really means this. An even
more important test of Ramos-Horta's asserted authority over
policy will be whether he succeeds in changing the election law
to meet his own specifications, which conform closely to those
of United Nations experts, opposition parties, and civil
society, but not very closely to the views of Fretilin
leadership. Never so much as now has East Timor's ability to
move forward as a truly participatory democracy depended on
Ramos-Horta's legendary negotiating skills.
DICKEY