EMBASSY DILI VIEWS ON POST-UNOTIL MISSION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DILI 000313

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PACOM FOR POLAD
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
USUN FOR GORDON OLSON AND RICHARD MCCURRY
DEPT FOR IO, EAP/MTS, AND ISN/TRECN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2016
TAGS: KPKO PREL PGOV PHUM AU PO MY TT
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DILI VIEWS ON POST-UNOTIL MISSION

REF: A) 05 DILI 168 B) 05 DILI 82 C) DILI 293

DILI 00000313 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Curtis Ried, Political Officer, US Embassy Dili,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)




1. (U) Summary: This message discusses possible components of a
follow-on United Nations mission in East Timor after the
expiration of the anticipated two-month extension of the United
Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL). Whether or not the
mission is conducted under Chapter VII authority and whether or
not includes UN peacekeepers, among its most important tasks
will to provide effective operational policing, as well as
police training that integrates practical skills with human
rights protection and appropriate levels of force. The timely
establishment of a robust police force will provide the security
necessary for the UN to organize and administer national
elections in co-operation with the appropriate Timorese
institutions. The mission should also include country-wide
human rights monitoring; assistance to the judicial system that
is different from and better than the assistance provided during
UNOTIL; and thoughtful policy and technical guidance to help the
GOET accomplish goals such as disarming the civilian population
and restructuring the military. End Summary.

Peacekeepers/Chapter VII
--------------


2. (U) Whether the next United Nations mission in East
Timor should include "blue helmets" rather than simply extending
a UN blessing to the coalition forces presently on the ground,
and the related question whether the mission should be under
Chapter VII authority, are matters on which the United States
will be consulting closely with Australia and other countries
whose forces are involved in the coalition presently on the
ground in East Timor. While these questions are of the highest
importance, they may make more of a difference to the nations
whose forces are involved than they do to the people of East
Timor. This message addresses the other possible components in
a post-UNOTIL mission: an international police force, election
administration and/or assistance, and other elements designed to
promote human rights, good governance, and the rule of law.

International Police Force and Unified Training Program
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) The Australian-led Joint Task Force (JTF) has acted
quickly to establish regular patrols and is responding far more
quickly to acts of violence in Dili than was the case a week or
two ago. JTF officials have made it clear, however, that while
the troops on the ground are filling the policing function as
best they can, it is important that this function be assumed as
soon as possible by an international police force. The
Australian Federal Police (AFP) (augmented by a small police
contingent from New Zealand) and the Portuguese Republican
National Guard (GNR) have been coordinating effectively at the
operational level to begin providing policing services in their
respective sectors. The pending arrival of up to 250 Malaysian
police officers will double the number of foreign police
officers in Dili. As these units become more familiar with
conditions in Dili, and assuming they continue to co-ordinate
effectively, they should be able to complete the task of
restoring order within the capital.


4. Beyond the initial task of restoring a sense of security
in Dili, international police forces will need to turn to the
task of restructuring and retraining East Timor's national
police service (PNTL). AFP officials have indicated that, after
a thorough vetting process, there are plans to integrate PNTL
officers into AFP patrols and administrative structures.
Pending the establishment of a UN successor mission it is
important that one country, presumably Australia, take the lead

DILI 00000313 002.2 OF 005


in engaging with the PNTL. During a visit today to PNTL
Headquarters, EmbOffs learned that more than half of Dili
District PNTL officers are reporting for work on a daily basis
although they are not permitted to conduct police work or even
to wear their uniforms outside the police compound. Much of the
former command structure appears to remain intact, police
officers in all twelve districts other than Dili are carrying
out their duties more or less normally, and PNTL officers in
Dili are anxious to resume their responsibilities.


5. (SBU) The successor mission to UNOTIL should have two
police components. The first will be the operational force that
should have executive authority over police operations
throughout the country. After years of ineffective policing, it
is important that the units chosen to participate in this
international police force be selected carefully, without the
regional balancing and intra-UN logrolling that appears to have
influenced the composition of previous UN police (UNPOL) forces
in East Timor. Each and every UNPOL contingent must come from
an exemplary police force whose record in the home country is
fully consistent with international standards regarding human
rights protection and appropriate levels of force. This is
important not only to ensure that police operations are
effective, but also to foster a sense of trust among the
Timorese public for the international police force and for the
retrained PNTL that will resume operations after the
international force departs. An emphasis on lightly-armed
community policing should guide the operations of the
international police force. (Note: Although some discussions
of policing under a new UN mission have suggested a "rapid
reaction force" as a separate element in such a mission, it
would be better that rapid-reaction elements be integrated along
with other elements in a single international force under a
single command.)


6. (SBU) The second policing component in the next UN mission
should be a robust and unified training program. Retraining the
PNTL will be one of the most important responsibilities of the
successor mission and one that will need to be scrutinized
closely by the diplomatic community. In previous UN missions,
the PNTL was trained by foreign police units from an array of
countries with different standards of ethics and varying modes
of operation and structures. Moreover, some of these units had
less-than-exemplary human rights records in their home
countries. See Refs A and B. The new training program should
be conducted by either by one country's police force or by a
very small number of like-minded foreign police units to ensure
continuity and in training. As with the operational police
contingents, it is vital that the international trainers come
from police units whose doctrines and practices fully
incorporate human rights protection and the use of no more than
appropriate levels of force in all situations --- units who can
deliver the training appropriate for a reconstituted East
Timorese police force that would be lightly armed and engage
primarily in community policing. Past tendencies to promote the
establishment of heavily armed specialized units must be
actively resisted. Although recent events do show that East
Timor needs a highly-trained riot control unit and an effective
and well-equipped border protection force, it is particularly
important that these units be trained by international units
with good records of not using excessive force. See Refs A and

B.


7. (S/NF) There have already been overtures from the GNR to
begin training the Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR). The UIR,
formerly known as the Special Police Unit (SPU),has been
plagued by an institutional culture of machismo and related bad
habits that some international and Timorese observers attribute
in part to training the SPU received from GNR during previous UN
missions. See Ref A

Election Administration and/or Assistance
--------------

DILI 00000313 003.2 OF 005




8. (SBU) Last year's local elections administered by the GOET
with the assistance of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and bilateral donors were successful on the technical
level, but there were credible accusations that GOET resources
were used to assist candidates of the ruling Fretilin party and
that GOET leaders may also have engaged in intimidation of
non-Fretilin candidates and voters. Barring a dramatic change
in the political situation between now and early 2007, the
national parliamentary and presidential elections will take
place in an atmosphere of tension, of distrust, and quite
possibly of fear. Recent credible allegations of involvement by
the Prime Minister in illegal activities to ensure his
government and party remain in power, together with the
Government's insistence that all election functions should be
administered directly by the executive branch with a minimal
role for the constitutionally mandated independent election
commission, cast doubt on the current Government's willingness
and ability to administer free and fair elections.


9. (SBU) Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta's recent message to
the UNSC addressed this problem by requesting that the national
elections be not only "organized" but also "administered"
directly by the UN mission. Although there have been
indications that Prime Minister Alkatiri does not concur with
this position, it has the status of an official request to the
UNSC by GOET. The United States should move quickly to build
UNSC consensus to comply with this request, which would greatly
enhance the prospects for a free and fair election that has the
confidence of the Timorese people. International administration
of the election should be carried out in close cooperation with
the Timorese authorities --- and particularly with the
independent election commission --- and should be done in a way
that builds on the training received by national election
officials during the local elections. Special attention should
be given to ensure that East Timor is left with capable and
ethical electoral institutions, including the technical
secretariat that handles the logistical aspects of elections as

SIPDIS
well as the independent election commission.

Political Affairs, Human Rights, and Rule of Law
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) UNOTIL has had difficulties in quickly accessing
information about developments in the far-flung areas of the
country, particularly alleged violations of human rights. In a
country where the news media often provides inaccurate
information and telecommunications are unreliable, it is often
difficult to debunk rumors without making time-consuming
reconnaissance trips to remote areas. In light of the upcoming
elections and planned nationwide presence of UN election
officials, Embassy would recommend that several political
affairs and/or human rights unit offices be opened in strategic
towns across the country. Under the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the United Nations
Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) mandates, similar
offices provided a critical information resource for the UN, the
diplomatic community, and GOET.


11. (S/NF) Both GOET and the leadership of UNOTIL believe it is
important that a successor mission include assistance to the
judicial system, including international judges, prosecutors,
public defenders, and other judicial system personnel. As with
police training, it is important that international assistance
to the judicial system be different from and better than the
assistance that has been provided under UNOTIL and previous
missions. While it is true that East Timor's court system is
fragile and inefficient, the UNOTIL- and UNDP-financed program
designed to cure these problems has in fact made them far worse.
The centerpiece of this plan was mandatory classroom training
for the Timorese judges and other judicial officers ---
administered exclusively in the Portuguese language which at the
time few of them understood --- followed by a written

DILI 00000313 004.2 OF 005


examination. In December 2004 the results of the examination
were announced: all 21 judges, including several who were by
all accounts doing an excellent job, had failed. These judges,
along with almost all the Timorese prosecutors and public
defenders, were then required to vacate their jobs and complete
another 18 months of training. About half of the judges have
completed the training and will now be able to return to the
bench as "probationary" judges. During the absence of the
Timorese judges from the bench, the caseload formerly handled by
21 Timorese judges has been assigned to a much smaller number
(ranging at various times from 2 to 5) of international judges,
all from Portugal and other Lusophone countries. Although Judge
Ximenes (himself a Portuguese judge of Timorese extraction),
Prime Minister Alkatiri, and some UN advisors have taken the
position that the international judges have improved the quality
and quantity of judicial decision making, the public perception
is that the judicial system has slowed to a crawl and that most
of the international judges have made no effort to understand
the people whose cases they are deciding. The recent return of
the Timorese judges and other judicial officers, even as
"probationers," see Ref C (Dili 293),should increase public
confidence in the legal system. International assistance to the
judicial system should concentrate on helping the Timorese
judges and other officers to do their jobs, not on convincing
them that they lack the capacity to do so, and advisors to the
judicial system under the new mission should not/not be limited
to judges and other officials from Lusophone countries.


12. (SBU) The relationship between the new mission and the
international "commission of inquiry" into violence committed in
East Timor since April 28, 2006, and the relationship of both
these entities to possible follow-up mechanisms for truth and
accountability for serious crimes committed in 1999, will be
discussed in septel.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program
-------------- --------------


13. (SBU) In light of the proliferation of weapons and increased
recalcitrance of the various armed groups, including "civilians"
(many of whom are ex-independence fighters who have been aligned
with the armed forces (FDTL) during the recent conflict) or
dissident members of the security forces, it appears
increasingly unlikely that GOET will be able to manage the
necessary disarmament program alone. Although the international
forces currently on the ground have recovered a number of
weapons possessed by police officers and "civilians," these
efforts have been confined primarily to Dili, and many weapons
are believed to remain hidden in Dili and elsewhere. The
complete disarming of dissident and pro-government groups will
be a long process. A program to accomplish this should include
not only disarmament but also mechanisms to ensure the members
of these groups are effectively demobilized and reintegrated
into civilian life.


14. (C) During a meeting with EmbOffs today, Foreign/Defense
Minister Ramos-Horta agreed that a disarmament, demobilization,
and reinsertion (DDR) program would be a useful component of a
follow-on mission. He discussed the possibility of conducting
exchanges whereby weapons could be traded for livestock, food,
agricultural tools, etc. The Foreign Minister indicated that a
disarmament program was long overdue in East Timor as the
population had never been effectively disarmed of old Falintil
guerrilla weapons. The Minister also highlighted the important
point that, in order for the armed groups and individuals to be
confident enough in their physical security to hand over their
weapons, the international forces on the ground must be visibly
present throughout the country and must work to establish a
sense of community security.

Military/Defense Advisors
--------------


DILI 00000313 005.2 OF 005



15. (C) There have been productive discussions between the
President, Foreign/Defense Ministe Ramos-Horta, and FDTL
commander General Taur Matan Ruak regarding a possible
restructuring of FDTL. During a meeting with EmbOffs, Defense
Minister Ramos-Horta stated that he felt the size of the
military should be reduced. The Government has made important
steps in this regard by recently adding line items to the budget
that would provide housing and pensions for veterans. As many
FDTL soldiers are former guerrilla fighters who will soon reach
retirement age, it is likely that a significant portion of the
FDTL can be effectively demobilized through such programs.
Although no decisions have been made, Ramos-Horta discussed a
previous initiative that would enhance FDTL's capacity to serve
as a maritime security force, perhaps give it some function with
respect to land border security, and divide the remaining forces
into two specially trained battalions, namely a peacekeeping
battalion and an army corps of engineers. Such an initiative
would transform the current conventional infantry into
specialized units that would perform productive work throughout
the country and provide noncombatant assistance during crises
such as natural disasters. In light of these positive
initiatives, Embassy would recommend the follow-on mission
include a small unit of military/defense advisors. As with the
officers providing police training, particular care should be
taken to select military/defense advisors with high ethical
standards, commitment to human rights and to civilian control of
the military, and experience in defense policy development.
REES