Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI229
2006-05-12 15:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

RAMOS-HORTA: WOULD ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER POSITION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT 
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VZCZCXRO2918
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0229/01 1321512
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121512Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2524
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0405
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0467
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0394
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0248
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0262
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0333
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0134
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1845
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000229 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: RAMOS-HORTA: WOULD ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER POSITION

REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220; (F)
DILI 226; (G) STATE 75819

DILI 00000229 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



Classified by Ambassador Grover Joseph Rees for reasons 1(b) &
(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: RAMOS-HORTA: WOULD ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER POSITION

REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220; (F)
DILI 226; (G) STATE 75819

DILI 00000229 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



Classified by Ambassador Grover Joseph Rees for reasons 1(b) &
(d).


1. (S) Summary: In a conversation with Ambassador Rees, Foreign
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta said he believes Prime Minister Mari
Alkatiri will probably be defeated in next week's Fretilin Party
Congress. He believes Alkatiri has brought the defeat upon
himself by his arrogant and sometimes abusive behavior, and he
expects that the likely new Fretilin Secretary General, Jose
Luis Guterres, would ask Ramos Horta himself to replace Alkatiri
as Prime Minister. Ramos-Horta said he would accept the Prime
Minister position in order to lead a transitional government
through the 2007 elections. The transitional government would
not include Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato or deputy armed
forces commander Colonel Lere, and it might include members of
opposition parties as well as of Fretilin. Ramos-Horta does not
believe there will be violence or civil disorder in the days
leading up to the Fretilin convention, and he is confident that
if Alkatiri were defeated neither he nor his supporters would
attempt to retain power by force. Ramos-Horta also says he
would reluctantly agree to lead a new Government in what he
regards as the unlikely event of a constitutional/security
crisis requiring the President to dismiss the Prime Minister.
He predicts that in the aftermath of any such crisis, the
President would have the support of the country's two Catholic
Bishops and that these three public figures, together with
Ramos-Horta himself, would be able to unify the country.
Despite clearly having given serious thought to all these
scenarios, Ramos-Horta told Ambassador he will spend most of his
time in the next week trying to calm the population and to get

leaders of various factions to talk to one another. Ambassador
also delivered the demarche in Ref G and Ramos-Horta agreed with
the points set forth therein. End summary.


2. (U) In a May 11 evening meeting with Ambassador, Ramos-Horta
began with what sounded like the Alkatiri Government's party
line: he has been traveling around the districts trying to
listen to people's fears and to calm them; although the people
are still afraid of recurring violence, there are in fact no
armed groups preparing to attack Dili; he believes the Fretilin
Congress will be held on schedule May 17-19; and, all things
considered, the institutions of government are functioning
reasonably well. He added that he is still unconvinced that
there was a massacre in Dili and/or Tasitolu on April 28-30, but
he believes the current Government of East Timor (GOET)
investigation might not be regarded as credible and should be
supplemented by a separate international investigation,
preferably under United Nations auspices.


3. (S) When asked to predict the outcome of the Fretilin
Congress, Ramos-Horta said "Alkatiri thinks he will win because
he and his people chose the delegates. But he is overconfident.
It's a secret ballot, and he has alienated too many people with
his arrogant and abusive behavior." Ramos-Horta cited a recent
public statement by Alkatiri that the many thousands of people
fleeing Dili were going for a "picnic". He said the Prime
Minister was "lucky there was so much going on that nobody
focused on that remark. Can you imagine?" He also said
Alkatiri has become inextricably associated with the extremely
unpopular recent actions of elements of the armed forces (FDTL),
and that even Fretilin party regulars who do not dislike him
will vote against him because they believe Alkatiri's leadership
could result in a Fretilin loss in the 2007 election. Asked
about reports that key Alkatiri supporters were buying delegate
votes, the Foreign Minister responded, "Yes, there is that. But
I reminded Alkatiri that this is exactly what the Indonesian
military thought, that they would win by money and pressure.

DILI 00000229 002.2 OF 003


When it came to the secret ballot, our people knew how to vote
the way they wanted." (Note: Fretilin party rules require a
secret ballot at the Congress for the election of the Secretary

SIPDIS
General.) Ramos-Horta said he regarded Alkatiri as an old and
close friend and that "I really care about him. I wish things
had turned out better for him. But he has done this to himself."



4. (S) Discussing Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres, Alkatiri's only
announced opponent in the Secretary General election,
Ramos-Horta said "Jose Luis is exactly the kind of person the
country needs. He's smart and he's an idealist. He really
believes in democracy. Everybody likes him. He would get along
with opposition parties and with the Church, and his goal would
be to unify the country." He said, however, that Ambassador
Guterres has had little or no administrative experience, which
is why he believes Guterres would prefer someone else to become
Prime Minister while he concentrates on the 2007 campaign. He
alluded to the possibility that Guterres could become President
of Parliament, or perhaps run for President in 2007. Asked
about the argument that some of Guterres' supporters were almost
as unsavory as some of Alkatiri's supporters, Ramos-Horta
responded to the effect that opportunists are beginning to
support Guterres because they sense he is going to win.


5. (S) Asked whether Alkatiri or anyone close to him would
attempt to retain power by force in the event they lost control
of Fretilin and the party then moved to form a new Government,
Ramos-Horta said he was confident this would not happen.
Alkatiri would know when he was defeated --- and has repeatedly
announced that he will immediately resign as Prime Minister if
he should be defeated for re-election as Secretary General.
Others, such as Colonel Lere and Minister Lobato, have no
particular affection for Alkatiri and would attempt to survive
within the new order.


6. (S) Ambassador asked Ramos-Horta whether, if Ambassador
Guterres won the Fretilin contest and asked Ramos-Horta to
become Prime Minister, he would accept. Ramos-Horta responded
immediately, "Yes, I would. I would lead a transitional
government lasting until the election. People might think this
means I am an ambitious person, but in fact this is much more
important than any chance I might have to become Secretary
General of the United Nations. I would have the obligation to
try to unify my country." Ramos-Horta said he would strongly
consider including talented members of opposition parties in his
new government. He also insisted that any government of which
he (Ramos-Horta) was a part would have no place for Lobato. "He
should have been fired years ago." He suggested that Colonel
Lere --- assuming the investigations of the April 28-30 events
do not implicate him in criminal behavior --- should be helped
to find a life in the private sector.


7. (S) (Please strictly protect the information in this
paragraph.) Finally, Ambassador asked Ramos-Horta what he would
do if he were offered the Prime Ministership under more
difficult circumstances. Suppose there were a recurrence of
violence and disorder, perhaps with the involvement of elements
of the police and military, and the President invoked his
constitutional authority to dismiss the Prime Minister "when
necessary to ensure the functioning of the democratic
institutions". (See Ref F). This time Ramos-Horta paused for a
moment, then responded, "I would have to accept." He reiterated
that he thought this scenario extremely unlikely, but he
indicated that he believed the President would only invoke this
constitutional provision if things had really fallen apart. In
this case, he presumed the President's action would also have
the support of East Timor's two Catholic bishops, who
Ramos-Horta believes represent the most important source of
moral authority in the country. "It would be my responsibility
to stand with the President and the Bishops and to work with
them to unite the country."


8. (U) Ambassador also delivered the demarche set forth in Ref

DILI 00000229 003.2 OF 003



G. Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta responded that the points in
the demarche closely reflected his own thinking and that he was
confident the Prime Minister and the President would also abide
by these principles.


9. (S) Today, May 12, Ambassador called Ramos-Horta for an
update on various matters, and Ramos-Horta volunteered that "I
had a good meeting with the President about the matters you and
I discussed last night," presumably a reference to the
possibility of a Ramos-Horta Prime Ministership in the event of
Jose Luis Guterres were to prevail at the Fretilin Congress. He
added that "we talked about these things for a long time" and
that "the President has also had good discussions with Jose Luis
about this."


10. (S) In the May 11 meeting and the May 12 telephone
conversation, Ramos-Horta also discussed his visit earlier in
the day on May 11 with Major Alfredo Reinado, the leader of
dissident FDTL and police officers who are encamped in Aileu.
See Ref D. Ramos-Horta said that tomorrow (May 13) he will
drive to Aileu to pick up Major Reinado and drive him to
President Gusmao's house in Balibar (in the mountains above Dili
on the road to Aileu) where the three will have a conversation
about the circumstances under which Reinado's group might agree
to return to Dili. Ramos-Horta will accompany Reinado back and
forth to Aileu as a guarantee of safe conduct.


11. (S) Comment: Although Ramos-Horta has always privately
acknowledged that Prime Minister Alkatiri has weaknesses as well
as strengths, his negative assessement in yesterday's
conversation was stronger by orders of magnitude than any
previous criticism he has offered. Like President Gusmao,
Ramos-Horta appears to be pursuing a two-part strategy: do
everything possible to avoid violence or unrest before and
during the Fretilin Congress, and prepare for a smooth
constitutional transition to a new Government if, as they
expect, the Congress replaces Alkatiri with the more popular and
conciliatory Guterres. This is a best-case scenario, not only
because it would likely result in a speedy return to normal life
in East Timor, but also because a government led by President
Gusmao, Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, and Ambassador Guterres
would be far more committed than the Alkatiri government to
human rights, genuinely participatory democracy, and other
values and interests the people of East Timor share with the
people of the United States. End Comment.
REES