Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI228
2006-05-11 19:24:00
SECRET
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

EAST TIMOR UPDATE: WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT THINKING?

Tags:  PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000228 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT THINKING?

REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220

DILI 00000228 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000228

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE: WHAT IS THE PRESIDENT THINKING?

REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220

DILI 00000228 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dili, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) Summary: Despite the widespread popular belief in East
Timor that the ongoing political and security crisis can only be
resolved if the President invokes the constitutional provision
permitting the dismissal of the Prime Minister, President Gusmao
and his close associates have made clear to Emboffs and other
interlocutors that he would not consider such an action unless
the situation were to become far worse than it is now. His
reluctance is motivated by several overlapping practical and
legal concerns. First, although the President reportedly agrees
with an analysis by his legal advisors that he has the
constitutional power to dismiss the Prime Minister when it is
"necessary to ensure the regular functioning of the democratic
institutions," it is not clear that this point has been reached.
Second, the President believes that no matter how strong the
legal and factual case for dismissal might become, it is not out
of the question that elements of the armed forces (FDTL) and
possibly of the police (PNTL) loyal to him might defy any such
action by the President, leading to further bloodshed. Finally,
the President believes there is an excellent chance Alkatiri
will be defeated in the upcoming Fretilin Party Congress, which
would greatly enhance the prospects for an immediate and
peaceful change of government. President Gusmao is deeply
disappointed in Alkatiri, believes there are credible reports of
many more killings during the weekend of April 28-30 than have
been officially reported, and is worried --- despite his view
that the majority of FDTL and PNTL would be loyal to the
President in a crisis --- about the possitibility of illegal

violence by elements in FDTL led by Colonel Lere. End Summary.


2. (S) In two recent meetings with President Xanana Gusmao and
numerous discussions with his close political associates and
others who have spoken with the President, Emboffs have learned
that President Gusmao has no intention of yielding to what
appears to be the widespread popular demand (see Reftels) that
he dismiss Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and oversee the
formation of a new government. Gusmao has generally avoided
direct answers to questions about what actions he might consider
taking in various circumstances, instead urging Ambassador and
other interlocutors to do everything possible to calm the
situation in order to avoid the need to consider difficult
options. However, he told a senior United Nations Office in
Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) official yesterday (May 10) that dismissal
of the Prime Minister is not an action he would consider under
anything like the present circumstances. The President
indicated that it would be particularly inappropriate to
consider such an option so soon before the Fretilin Party
Congress scheduled for May 17-20, which he suggested might
resolve or at least clarify the situation.


3. (S) Despite his present unwillingness to consider dismissing
the Prime Minister, the President reportedly believes he has the
constitutional authority to do so if the situation were to
degenerate to the point where governmental institutions could
not function effectively. The President's Chief of Staff, Agio
Pereira, told Ambassador Rees that the President's legal
advisors have prepared an analysis of the President's powers
under the Constitution to deal with a crisis of this sort.
Although Pereira declined to share the analysis with Ambassador,
he referred to article 112 of the Constitution, which provides
in pertinent part that the President may "dismiss the Prime
Minister . . . when it is necessary to ensure the normal
functioning of the democratic institutions, after consultation
with the Council of State." The Council of State is a

DILI 00000228 002.2 OF 003


constitutionally mandated institution composed of prominent
individuals appointed by the President, the Parliament, and the
Government. The majority of the members of the Council,
including several of those appointed by the Government, are
generally regarded as thoughtful and independent. Article 112
dos not require that the Council support the President's
decision, only that he consult with the Council. (Note: The
legal advisors who prepared the analysis for the President are
believed to be two Portuguese law professors who were formerly
provided as advisors to the President by UNOTIL. Although they
have returned to Portugal, they have continued to advise the
President on issues such as the criminal defamation provisions
of the proposed Penal Code.)

4) (C) Although Article 112 also contains other language that
could be construed as further limiting the President's power of
dismissal to a list of specified situations --- e.g., the
beginning of a new legislature, the rejection of the
Government's program for the second time by Parliament, and the
approval of a motion of censure --- the most straightforward
reading of the provision is that these circumstances are cases
that automatically "entail" (implicam) the Prime Minister's
dismissal, whereas the broader "necessary to ensure the normal
functioning of democratic institutions" clause is an additional
grant of discretion to the President. All the relevant actors
appear to agree with the President's interpretation on this
point, although the Prime Minister grudgingly refers to this
grant of power as a "constitutional coup d'etat." See Ref D.

5) (C) Pereira told Ambassador the President has no present
plans to invoke article 112, and does not believe that the
current crisis will degenerate to the point where replacing the
Prime Minister would be necessary to preserve democratic
institutions. Rather, the chief of staff says the analysis the
President requested from his legal advisors was just to make
sure he understood the constitutional situation in anticipation
of a wide range of possible scenarios. This is consistent with
what the President himself has told Ambassador and others in
recent conversations, in which he has repeatedly urged a united
message that the situation is getting better and life is
returning to normal.

6) (S) Notwithstanding this upbeat assessment of the current
situation, the President has told Ambassador that he blames
Alkatiri for the current crisis, both because he ignored
institutional problems within the military (FDTL) that a
commission headed the President himself identified in a report
two years ago, and because he unconstitutionally and
ill-advisedly called in the military without consulting the
President, whom the Constitution designates as Commander in
Chief. He also told Ambassador that "if I had been consulted I
would not have agreed."

7) (S) Although the President does not claim to know for sure
how many people were killed in Dili and Tasitolu over the
weekend of April 28-30, he regards as highly credible the
allegations that there were many more deaths than the 5
officially reported. The President believes this partly because
of his long familiarity with Colonel Lere, the alleged
ringleader of the alleged atrocities, of whom he says, "even
when we were fighting in the jungle he would do this sort of
thing." The President is also deeply suspicious of the motives
of FDTL members who denied him access to Tasitolu at gunpoint on
April 29 when he arrived unannounced to investigate the claims
of mass killings. According to Pereira, the President saw a
dead body on a hillside near FDTL headquarters in Tasitolu
before he was turned away, and a secretary who was traveling
with him also saw the body. The President suggested that "it
might be better for the investigation of Tasitolu to proceed
slowly. People need more time to find courage to say what they
saw. And Matan Ruak needs time to get into full control of
FDTL." The President says Matan Ruak is now more or less back
in charge, but that Lere now has his own relationship with the
Prime Minister and very strong reasons to resist any effort to

DILI 00000228 003.2 OF 003


find the truth. According to the President, Lere is now saying
that "we will take orders only from the Government, not from
Xanana. And if they try to blame us, then we'll see."

8) (S) (Please strictly protect the information in this
paragraph.) Despite his firm intention not to invoke his power
under article 112 to dismiss the Prime Minister, the President
has clearly been conducting a discreet but detailed survey over
the last few days of who in the FDTL and police (PNTL) would
support him in the event circumstances were to change to the
point where he found it necessary to invoke this power, or in
other extreme circumstances such as an attempted coup d'etat by
Colonel Lere or Minister of the Interior Rogerio Lobato. The
President believes the substantial majority in both institutions
would follow his orders, including the "Los Palos Group" of
about 300 FDTL members under Lt. Col. Aluk as well as Police
Commissioner Paulo Martins and the vast majority of PNTL
members. Although the President did not allude to the dissident
military police and other FDTL and PNTL members who are
currently AWOL under the leadership of Major Alfredo Reinado and
Major Marcos Tilman, it is clear that these groups would also
follow his orders. See Ref E. The President told Ambassador
that "they used to say the army belonged to Xanana and the
police belonged to the Government. It was never really true.
But now it is more complicated." He believes Alkatiri rejected
the ex-FDTL petitioners' demands and then activated the FDTL to
quell the April 28 riot partly in order to change this equation
by bringing the whole armed forces over to his own side. Now,
according to the President, Alkatiri has discovered that his
move backfired: the public now associates the Prime Minister
with Colonel Lere and the real or perceived military excesses of
April 28 and the ensuing days, while a majority both FDTL and
PNTL would still follow the President if a constitutional crisis
were to occur. Despite these elaborate scenario planning, the
President reiterated that he has no intention of taking action
against Alkatiri, either constitutional or unconstitutional.
Rather, he wants to know what support he could count on in the
event he needed to assert his authority as Commander in Chief to
stop an illegal action by elements in the military.

9) (S) One reason the loyalties of the military are of great
interest to the President is that he believes that during the
days after April 28 he himself was the object of an "action",
which he says may have been only a surveillance action, by what
he believes to have been a group of FDTL members who conducted
operations behind his house during the night of Wednesday, May

3. The President's military advisor, Lt. Col. Pedro Klamar
Fuik, told Embassy USDR that he has previously received death
threats and threats against his family, and that he is still
under unspecified pressure from FDTL members associated with
Colonel Lere.

10) (C) The President also told Ambassador that if the Fretilin
Party Congress is held on schedule May 17-20 there is an
excellent chance that Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres will defeat
Alkatiri. However, the President fears that "if there is more
violence, they will use it as an excuse to postpone the
Congress. If it is held now, Alkatiri cannot win."

11) (C) Comment: Embassy Dili is confident that President
Gusmao intends to act in strict accordance with the
Constitution. It is also clear that he understands the likely
human costs of an imprudent use of a constitutional grant of
authority that should only be used in the most extreme
circumstances. He does, however, appear to be preparing for a
wide range of possible scenarios, including those in which he
might have to intervene in a constitutional crisis caused by
others. End comment.
REES