Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DILI203
2006-05-03 11:06:00
SECRET
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

DAS JOHN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GUSMAO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR PREL KJUS KCRM KAWC ID TT 
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VZCZCXRO2141
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0203/01 1231106
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031106Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2469
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0368
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0430
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0357
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0214
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0228
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0299
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0100
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1790
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000203 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/3/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR PREL KJUS KCRM KAWC ID TT
SUBJECT: DAS JOHN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GUSMAO

REF: A) DILI 194 B) DILI 135

DILI 00000203 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, Embassy Dili,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000203

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/3/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR PREL KJUS KCRM KAWC ID TT
SUBJECT: DAS JOHN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GUSMAO

REF: A) DILI 194 B) DILI 135

DILI 00000203 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, Embassy Dili,
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John, along
with Ambassador Rees and Emboffs, met with President Xanana
Gusmao May 2 to discuss U.S. priorities and concerns in East
Timor. The major focus of the discussion was the riots on
Friday, April 28 and the subsequent intervention of the armed
forces (F-FDTL) to quell the violence. DAS John expressed the
great importance the U.S. places on the development of stable
democracy in East Timor. He emphasized the connection between
encouraging respect for law and order and addressing
accountability for the serious crimes committed in Timor in

1999. President Gusmao expressed great concern regarding Prime
Minister Mari Alkatiri's decision to call in the F-FDTL to quell
the disturbances, the actions of F-FDTL during these operations,
and the potential long-term implications. He also reiterated
his overarching criticism of the Government's handling of the
original complaints of the ex-soldiers whose demonstrations last
week led up to the riot. The President appeared extremely sad,
apparently in large part because of his disappointment in his
former comrades-in-arms who now make up F-FDTL. On the issue of
accountability for the crimes against humanity committed in East
Timor in 1999, the President again highlighted the need for good
relations with Indonesia and expressed his understanding for the
fragile political environment in Jakarta. He assured DAS John
that he is watching the work of the bilateral Truth and
Friendship Commission closely and will not accept an outcome
that does not lead to a genuine disclosure of the truth. The
President did not object to reinstatement of the investigative

component of the UN Serious Crimes Unit to complete the
unfinished investigations into 1999 atrocities. End summary.


2. (C) During a May 2 meeting with DAS John and Ambassador Rees,
President Gusmao talked at some length regarding his
disappointment with recent developments and how they have been
handled. He stated that he "never expected" the violent turn of
events, and that it demonstrates that Government and military
leaders were either unwilling or unable to solve the problems
when they were small and then took the wrong approach when they
became large. He said that "we didn't take care of our people,
we didn't listen to their voices, we just added to the
problems." He expressed particular surprise and disappointment
at the attitude of F-FDTL leadership, citing statements on the
part of some military leaders to the effect that the dismissed
soldiers were their "enemies". When asked about the accord that
had seemed on the verge of being finalized when the riots broke
out, see Ref A, President Gusmao acknowledged that the situation
had appeared near resolution at that point, but that this
progress had come too late. Reporting on his meeting on Friday,
April 28 --- a couple of hours before the riot broke out ---
with Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the petitioners, he said
Salsinha had been ready to move forward with the accord but had
told the President he could no longer control the "youths"
(i.e., non-petitioners) who had joined the demonstrations and
were increasingly agitating for greater confrontation.


3. (S) President Gusmao was extremely critical of the decision
to call in the F-FDTL on Friday afternoon. His described his
discussion with Prime Minister Alkatiri, which directly preceded
the meeting with DAS John. He reported that Alkatiri had said
Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato, who exercises ultimate
control over the PNTL, did not take the necessary actions to
keep order. Moreover, the President (please strictly protect)
said Alkatiri believes that Lobato may have allowed the
situation to get out of control on purpose, and perhaps that
Lobato may even have instigated the riot in order to create
chaos that would justify an authoritarian response. In the
President's view, Alkatiri is using Lobato and PNTL Commissioner
Paulo Martins as scapegoats to justify his decision to call on
the F-FDTL, noting that the relationship between Alkatiri and
Lobato is now extremely negative, although he did not specify
whether the Alkatiri-Lobato split preceded or was caused by
Friday's events. Moreover, he believes this is part of a trend
toward the army being more closely identified with the ruling
Fretilin party. (Comment: It is interesting that the President
focused all his criticism regarding the handling of the riots on
the Prime Minister and his decision to call in the F-FDTL, and

DILI 00000203 002.2 OF 004


had no direct criticism of police handling of the rioting or of
Lobato's role in the events. Many Timorese and international
observers, even if they disapprove of the decision to call in
the army, agree with the Prime Minister's view that the PNTL
were at best inept in their response and at worst purposefully
negligent of their duties. End Comment.)


4. (C) Gusmao's main concern regarding accountability for the
weekend's events is focused on the F-FDTL and the need to fully
investigate their actions in the areas they controlled Friday
evening through much of Saturday. Regarding the rumors of 60
unreported deaths at the hands of soldiers in the Tasitolu area
of Dili, the President noted that these cannot simply be
dismissed. He expressed his fear that the rumors might be true
and that the soldiers who took over security operations may have
been motivated by revenge. He emphasized the importance of a
thorough accounting for army actions, noting that the F-FDTL
would lose all credibility if it is seen as perpetrating a cover
up.


5. (C) In discussing the situation as of yesterday, President
Gusmao stated that he does not think there will be further
violence in the coming days. However, the key challenge, he
noted, will be to quiet the many rumors circulating in Dili
about potential attacks or clashes. Regarding the petitioners,
many of whose locations are still unknown, he expressed
satisfaction that Alkatiri has publicly recognized that the
petitioners were not the main culprits in the rioting and that
most had not taken part. He also reported that Alkatiri had
promised him that petitioners are not to be arrested, but rather
sent back to their homes so that they can participate in
interviews with the commission being formed to investigate their
complaints. The President added that the Prime Minister had
asked him to give a speech on television later that afternoon to
try to calm the situation and encourage people to return to
their homes, and that he had agreed to do so. (Comment: The
speech, delivered yesterday evening and rebroadcast today, was
short and does not seem to have instilled much more confidence.
The President appeared to be tired and sad and rather than being
directly reassuring made statements to the effect of "the Prime
Minister tells me that the situation is calm." End comment.)


6. (SBU) The President also said that he would try to call
Lieutenant Salsinha, the leader of the petitioners, to enlist
his help to calm the situation. We have no further information
today on whether he was able to have this conversation. (Note:
in interviews with media outlets in the last few days, Salsinha
was more confrontational than in previous statements. He said
he only trusted the President, not the Government or the F-FDTL,
because "they have lied and they have killed." Salsinha said he
believed the rumors that FDTL had killed an additional 60 people
in Tasitolu and hidden the bodies. End note.)


7. (SBU) DAS John shifted the conversation away from recent
events to accountability by asserting that the issue remains one
of the US Government's top priorities in our bilateral relations
with both Indonesia and East Timor. He cited the reformist
efforts of Indonesia's current Government, especially in regard
to corruption, as the grounds for reestablishing military to
military relations with Indonesia. DAS John stated that true
reform in Indonesia requires the TNI be held accountable for its
action in East Timor, but made clear that accountability does
not necessarily require punishment. Rather, a measure of
accountability can be achieved by revealing the whole truth
about the 1999 crimes, including the names of the perpetrators.
He stated that the Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) is the
best vehicle to achieve this, and it should include
international participation. DAS John added that its term
should be extended for an additional year. (Note: The TFC's
original mandate of one year will expire in August.)


8. (C) President Gusmao provided his assessment of the political
environment within which the bilateral Truth and Friendship
Commission (TFC) is operating. Describing Indonesian President
Yudhoyono as a "good friend", Gusmao expressed his appreciation
for the significant transformation taking place in Indonesian
politics and also noted that the crimes committed in East Timor
by Indonesians were the acts of a previous regime. The
President stated that pushing Indonesia too far in seeking
punishment of those involved in the 1999 atrocities could be

DILI 00000203 003.2 OF 004


detrimental to bilateral relations. He did note a positive
progression in President Yuhoyono's thinking on the issue of
accountability. When the TFC was first proposed in early 2005,
President Gusmao said it was clear that the Commission was
largely intended by the Indonesian side to be a quick exercise
aimed at improving Indonesia's image with the international
community. Since that time, the Indonesian President has become
more committed to the bilateral project and agrees with
President Gusmao that an assessment of the current process and a
one-year extension of the TFC's mandate should be approved by
both governments. While admittedly sympathetic to the
challenges President Yudhoyono faces, President Gusmao stated
that East Timor will not continue participating in the TFC if
the Commission's work is diverted from genuine truth-seeking
activities.


9. (C) Referring to a bilateral summit between the two
Presidents that took place in January, President Gusmao
mentioned a discussion with then-TNI Chief of Staff Sutarto in
which the General stated that he recognizes the TNI's actions in
East Timor were wrong, but reminded the President that the TNI
was then operating under the Soeharto-era doctrine of
maintaining national integrity at any cost. The General
continued by stating that the TNI needs to develop a new
doctrine in line with the current needs of the country, but has
not yet done so. President Gusmao reported that he informed
Sutarto that the "TNI needs to say these lessons [learned in
East Timor] were bad." Gusmao later asserted that the entire
government of Indonesia must recognize what took place in East
Timor.


10. (S) The President played down the importance of the TFC's
ability to recommend amnesty by stating that outsiders need to
understand the entire TFC process in context rather than
focusing on any one aspect. Gusmao said it had been necessary
to include the possibility of recommending amnesty in order to
secure Indonesia's commitment to the Commission. He noted,
however, that the Timorese parliament would have to approve any
such recommendation for amnesty, a step that is highly unlikely
given the fact that an amnesty bill for minor crimes was
rejected in 2002. President Gusmao said he recently expressed
this view to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise
Arbor, in hopes of securing some form of UN assistance for the
TFC. The President posed no objection to DAS John's suggestion
that the investigative component of the Serious Crimes Unit
(SCU) should be revived in order to complete unfinished
investigations into the murders and other grave crimes committed
into 1999, in part so that the TFC would have a complete
evidentiary record from which to draw its conclusions.


11. (C) President Gusmao concluded the portion of the meeting on
accountability by stating that the recent events in Dili have
highlighted the necessity that the Timorese people must also
learn from the various accountability processes that the lessons
learned during the 24 year occupation were wrong and cannot not
be repeated among Timorese. The recent CAVR report revealed a
significant amount of Timorese-on-Timorese violent acts
committed during the Indonesian era. In order for democracy to
mature in East Timor, President Gusmao stated that such internal
violence must be prevented.


12. (S) Comment: During the meeting President Gusmao appeared
to be doing his best to be his usual self: calm, thoughtful, and
candid, with a tendency to find the humorous or ironic side of
serious matters. Yet his mood throughout the discussion was one
of deep sadness. Once or twice during the meeting he paused to
wipe away tears. At one point, having discussed what he
regarded as the misbehavior of F-FDTL and his own failure to
convince them to take a forgiving attitude toward their
ex-colleagues who had led the demonstration, he said slowly and
quietly, "I have lost my guerrillas."


12. (S) Comment continued: What remains of F-FDTL is indeed now
far more closely aligned with the Prime Minister, who backed up
the military leadership's decision to dismiss the 595
petitioners, than with the President, who opposed the decision.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that the
President has now lost his authority within Timorese society.
This authority was never based on the probability that men with
guns would follow his orders. Rather, his immense popularity

DILI 00000203 004.2 OF 004


and moral authority is based on his personal qualities and on
his long history as the undisputed leader of the independence
movement. Recent events have almost certainly solidified the
President's standing with the people of East Timor and further
weakened the popularity of the Alkatiri government. It is worth
noting that Prime Minister Alkatiri --- an effective public
speaker with a healthy self-regard who in his own way is doing
his best to stabilize the situation --- asked President Gusmao
to give an address to calm the nation rather than giving the
address himself. End comment.


13. (U) DAS John has cleared this message.
REES