FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 DHAKA 000997

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT PASS TO KCC


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CMGT KFRD ASEC CVIS CPAS BG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA

REF: (A) CHENNAI 173(B) 05 DHAKA 779
(C)05 DHAKA 2242(D) 05 STATE 205073



1. SUMMARY. Dhaka is a high fraud post with a full-time FPM and
a busy FPU. Fraud, especially in IV and DV cases, is a daily
occurrence for adjudicators, and is most often found in ages of
children, marital status, and qualification for the DV program.
Most Bangladeshi documents are unreliable, necessitating frequent
field investigations. Bangladeshi officials, at times, issue
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certificates or other documents containing fraudulent information
to visa applicants as a favor. Post continues to expand our
contacts with local police and immigration services, and our new
A/RSO-I is making important progress in this area. END SUMMARY


2. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Bangladesh is a developing country of
more than 150 million people living in an area roughly the size
of Wisconsin. More than a third of the population lives below
the poverty line, and the current per capita income is about
$390. More than 60% of the population is involved in agriculture
which accounts for about 25% of GDP. The national growth rate of
about five percent for the past decade has not been sufficient to
reduce poverty for the majority of Bangladeshis. The cost of
living (rent and food) for the poor and middle class is roughly
double that of Kolkata in the state of West Bengal in neighboring
India, and there is general economic insecurity at all levels of
society. Infrastructure, especially road infrastructure, is poor
outside of main cities and towns. This, combined with terrain
and climate considerations, makes the conduct of field
investigations a difficult task.

The vast majority of Bangladeshis are Bengalis though small
minorities of non-Bengalis, the tribal groups, also live in
Bangladesh. 90% of the population is Muslim, 7% are Hindu, and
the remaining 3% are a mix of Christians, Buddhists, and other
religions. Although a Muslim country, personal status laws are
based on ones religion. However, some civil laws are in
contradiction to traditional Islamic sharia, which presents some
interesting challenges in evaluating marriages, divorces, and
adoptions.

Bangladesh is a multi-party democracy, though the political scene
is dominated by the two main parties, the Awami League (AL) and
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). A BNP-led coalition of
three Islamic parties is currently in power, but the country will
hold elections later this year. The past several years have been
turbulent as the opposition and the government have fought tooth-
and-nail over just about every issue. The AL-led opposition
actually walked out of the Parliament more than a year ago and
opposition lawmakers have only recently returned. The
confrontational nature of politics between the two major parties
and an unsettled law-and-order situation leave many Bangladeshis
uncertain about the long-term prospects for the country.
Politics are rough-and-tumble, and over the past year, there have
been several sensational assassinations of Awami League leaders
and several as yet unsolved grenade attacks on senior AL leaders.
However, in general, all political parties, even minor ones, are
relatively free to organize and operate, and the press has a
great deal of freedom to publish.

Bangladesh has a long history of large-scale labor export, both
legal and illegal, with millions of men and women working abroad,
principally in the Persian Gulf (over a million in Saudi Arabia
alone, according to the Saudi Embassy) and in South/Southeast
Asia. The government actively promotes international manpower
export and has an official government ministry (Ministry of
Expatriate Welfare) tasked to support the export of labor and the
remittance of wages. Remittances are an important element of the
Bangladeshi economy, and we feel this leads the government to
look with little enthusiasm on proposals to repair systemic
weaknesses in the issuance of documents and entry/exit controls.
We believe that this national interest on working abroad is one
of the main reasons that we receive little or no cooperation from
local police on the arrest and prosecution of document vendors
and forgers.

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The government has little effective control over the issuance of
official documents, such as birth certificates and marriage and
divorce certificates, making such documents easy targets for
abuse and fraud. Regulatory controls over these documents are so
lax that true counterfeits are rare since it is quite easy to
obtain a genuinely-issued document containing any information
desired by the visa applicant. Except for some birth documents
issued by the larger city corporations and municipalities,
official documents are not printed on security paper and do not
incorporate even the most basic security features. Controls over
passport issuances are equally weak, and the government has no
centralized control over or records of passport issuances. Post
has uncounted examples of Bangladeshis obtaining legitimate
travel documents in fraudulent names or with fraudulent dates of
birth or listing fraudulent parents. We also have many cases
where Bangladeshis have obtained multiple passports in multiple
identities. The record currently stands with one enterprising
chap who is known to have 17 different passports in five
different identities. Although Post has been working with the
Home Ministry on a machine-readable passport (MRP) project, it is
unclear when the program will actually commence. Furthermore,
without great institutional controls over issuances, the
situation will only come to mirror India, where hi-tech passports
are easily available in a fraudulent identity. (Ref A)


3. NIV FRAUD: Although Dhaka is a high-fraud Post, window fraud
on the NIV line is generally unsophisticated and obvious. Given
that most documents are considered unreliable, officers rely more
on effective lines of questioning during interviews. Dhaka sees
the usual array of fake bank and employment letters and
invitations, but we believe that our effective new officer
orientation and proactive FPU give the officers the needed tools
to recognize and deal with such cases. Our FPU has good
relations with most major banks and this is invaluable in
detecting or confirming fraudulent bank documents. In 2005, we
encountered only 1 washed NIV, but we are aware of 2 incidents of
counterfeit NIVs. We worked closely with our A/RSO-I to open an
investigation of the counterfeiter, and our A/RSO-I continues to
work with local police on these cases. On several instances, the
NIV unit has reported receiving inquiries from individuals who
wanted to verify that their visas are genuine. Suspecting the
worst, we always tell such callers that they have to bring their
visas in to the Embassy for us to verify the documents.
Unsurprisingly, no one has yet appeared to verify their visa.

Though Dhaka is a low-volume H1B and L visa country, most of our
serious NIV fraud is found in the H1B/H4 category. We have some
trouble with H1B renewals for smaller, less well-known companies
where questions may exist regarding the H1B applicants work
history or the basic legitimacy of the petitioner. However, most
of our fraud occurs in cases of first-time applicants from
Bangladesh. We regularly see applicants who present either fake
ke
university degrees from Bangladeshi or Indian schools or vastly
overstated work experience coupled with suspect certificates from
various IT training institutes. We also have difficulties with
H4 applicants. Since Bangladesh is country with a long tradition
of settled, i.e. arranged, marriages, it is not uncommon to
have a wife apply for an H4 who literally met her husband on
their wedding day. Then after spending a brief honeymoon with
him, she waved goodbye as he flew back to the US. It is
difficult to differentiate between legitimate settled marriages
and marriages strictly for immigration purposes. This problem is
also common with IV and DV cases and is discussed more fully in
the IV section.

R1s are also a problematic visa category as every year we see
many questionable R1 applicants seeking to go to the US to lead
Ramadan prayers. Most of these applicants have the most nebulous
of qualifications and employment histories, and FPU checks most
ost
often reveal that their qualifications are, at best, generously
overstated. We find in some cases that the real sponsor is often
a relative who sits on the management committee of the mosque
offering the invitation.

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Finally, Post also sees a number of Bhutanese NIV applicants who
are trying their luck in Dhaka instead of in New Delhi or
Kolkata. It is difficult to identify fraudulent B1/B2 applicants
because of a lack of knowledge about Bhutan and the lack of a
common language, so most applicants are merely 214b. We have
experienced some problems with fraudulent R1 applications. For
example, one group of 10 applied last year under the leadership
of two monks, one who had led another such group to the US and
the other with extensive travel in Europe. The group was
supposed to teach traditional Buddhist religious dance, song, and
prayers at a Buddhist center in Maryland. However, we found that
two of the religious workers had previously applied in New
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Delhi for B1/B2 visas. We also found that, when asked to
demonstrate their prayers and religious songs and dances, half of
the group were just lip-synching or were too sick to dance.
Finally, we found that the monk who had traveled to the US had
forgotten to bring his three traveling companions back to Bhutan
when he left the US. As an added note, IDENT hits revealed that
two of these characters later applied for visas to attend a dairy
conference in Wisconsin, using different employment histories and
slightly different DOBs.


4. IV FRAUD: IV fraud occupies the majority of the FPUs
effort. We see all types of fraud in all visa categories. In
particular, we see a large amount of age fraud among applicants
claiming to be less than 21 years of age, marriage fraud, and
employment visa fraud. With the relative lack of security of
most Bangladeshi documents, official or not, it is very easy for
applicants to obtain fake or fraudulent documents to support
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their claims. FPU investigations uncover many instances where
responsible officials were aware that the documents they were
issuing contained fraudulent information, but they did it to
help [the applicants] travel to the US.

We see age fraud both with principal applicants and with
derivatives, though CSPA has reduced the number of age fraud
cases that we pursue. Since birth certificates are generally not
reliable and most births are late registered a few months before
a petition is filed, we generally rely on secondary documents,
such as school certificates, to corroborate the applicants
claimed date of birth. FPU investigations uncovered document
fraud, either in the form of forged certificates or certificates
with fraudulent information that is not supported by the schools
records, in more than 80% of cases involving suspected age fraud.
It is not uncommon to find cases where a school head master
admits that a certificate was issued as a favor to an applicant,
nt,
sometimes with a fake date of birth and other times for
applicants who never actually studied at the school. We also use
a bone-age test (Ref B) as an initial screen for possible age
fraud, though we apply a generous margin of error. Using the
results of the test, we have elicited dozens of confessions from
applicants and petitioners. Usually the fraud is only a few
years, though in extreme cases, we have seen misrepresentations
of 10 or more years in dates of birth. However, equally
important, with a positive result, we have been able to quickly
return many cases to IV where an officer initially had some doubt
about a child applicants age. In all fairness to applicants,
many people do not really know their dates of birth. In the
past, birth registration was never a priority and late
registrations were the norm rather than the exception. Only when
it was necessary, for example at school registration, would a
date of birth be established, hence the popularity of January 1
as a DOB in Bangladesh. The government is taking steps to
require birth registration within a year of birth, but that is
very much a work in progress.

In marriage fraud cases, we see fraudulent marriages, cases where
one spouse did not properly divorce his/her spouse in Bangladesh
before marrying again (usually found in IR2 step-child case),or
cases where an applicant hid an existing marriage during an F2A
or F2B application. Most cases involve AmCits or LPRs who were
born in Bangladesh and are seeking a Bangladeshi spouse. They

DHAKA 00000997 004 OF 008


ask their relatives to find a suitable spouse, and once the
matter is settled, they fly to Bangladesh for a wedding. As
previously mentioned with H4 cases, this tradition of settled
marriages poses difficulties for adjudicators. Since it is not
unusual for a spouse, especially a new wife, to know almost
nothing about their partner, we rely heavily on secondary
evidence to establish the bona fides of the marriage. Marriages
in Bangladesh are major social events, often times with several
sub-events and attended by many guests, sometimes several
hundred. In case of legitimate marriages, there will usually be
a bonanza of secondary evidence, such as photos, videos,
invitations, cards, etc., to back up the marriage. In most of
our cases with fraud, the lack of secondary evidence was one of
the initial red flags. We are also seeing a rise in the number
of cases of marriages where a US spouse, usually a man, met the
Bangladeshi spouse, usually a woman, through the Internet, though
the total number of these cases remains low.

We encounter both counterfeit and fraudulent marriage documents
and insufficient marriage documents, most often in the form of
Marriage Affidavits, which are not sufficient, in any case, to
serve as legal proof of marriage, except for Hindus and
Buddhists. In some cases, applicants present completely
counterfeit marriage documents, but at times, as with education
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documents, we find cases where a marriage registrar issues a
fraudulent marriage certificate as a favor to the applicant.
These cases are generally identifiable as suspect because they
usually lack any secondary evidence. While it is rare to find a
case where an FPU document check uncovers a fake marriage
document but the case presents strong secondary evidence, it is
not uncommon for FPU neighborhood and documents checks to come
back as genuine in cases without strong secondary evidence. We
also routinely see cases involving counterfeit, fraudulent or
insufficient divorce documents. As with marriage documents, some
involve true counterfeits, but some involve fraudulent documents
given as a favor to the applicant. We also see cases where a
claim of divorce is based on an affidavit of divorce without a
corresponding official divorce certificate from a court or an
office authorized to register divorces. A bare divorce affidavit
is not sufficient in Bangladesh for any type of divorce, and the
presence of a bare affidavit is a key fraud indicator. We have a
nearly 100% fraud rate in cases of divorce affidavits, most often
in cases of IR2 step-children.

Historically, most of our E3 cases have been fraudulent,
especially for Indian specialty cooks. Over the past several
years, there have been several well-publicized cases of
immigration lawyers who confessed to large-scale abuse of such
visas on behalf of their clients, including many Bangladeshis.
Although the overall number of E3 principals applying for visas
is very low, most E3 cases are referred to the FPU for
investigation. We also process a large number of follow-to-join
cases for E3 derivatives. In these cases, we focus primarily on
age fraud concerns, though with the generous relief offered by
CSPA, most applicants will qualify as children.

Post receives a number of requests each year from DHS
adjudicators in the various service centers or in CIS offices for
document verification, generally for marriage and divorce
documents and work certificates. In 2005, we completed 17
investigations for DHS, and in 12 cases, we determined that the
applicant had submitted fake documents. Half of the bad cases
were marriage or divorce document checks, and the other half were
work certificates.


5. DV FRAUD: Bangladeshis are enthusiastic participants in the
DV program. For the past five years, Bangladeshis have submitted
more entries than anyone else, and Bangladesh perennially ranks
in the top 5 for DV winners. Unfortunately, Bangladeshis are
equally enthusiastic about DV fraud, and our DV unit faces a
daily barrage of fake or altered school documents, fraudulent
work letters, and suspect marriages. DV brokers and visa fixers
are a part of the landscape in Bangladesh (Ref C),and our A/RSO-
I continues to work with local police on several ongoing DV fraud
ring investigations.

DHAKA 00000997 005 OF 008



Occupational qualification fraud is the easiet to detect and
defeat. Using the O-Net standards, adjudicators ask detailed
d
questions about the applicants usual work and can usually
quickly identify those who qualify from those who are inflating
their qualifications. Relatively few cases are referred for
document verification, but in more than 70% of these marginal
cases, an investigation revealed that the applicants either
overstated their qualifications or submitted fraudulent work
letters.

Counterfeit and/or altered school certificates are also
commonplace. Post has extensive exemplar files of genuine and
fake Secondary School Certificates (SSC) and Higher Secondary
Certificates (HSC) from all the regional Boards of Education.
These are available in both hard copy and electronic soft copy,
available to consular staff through our FPU Front Page, a quasi-
website maintained on our consular shared drive with many such
resources and document guides. In the past, FPU teams made
frequent visits to regional Boards to check certificates. We
have cultivated good relations with Board officials, an effort
that pays handsome rewards in allowing us great access to the
Boards. We regularly sit with these officials to brief them on
counterfeits and altered documents that we have uncovered and to
talk about various security features that are slowly being
incorporated into Board certificates. We find that historically,
certificates from the Dhaka, Comilla and Sylhet Boards are the
most common counterfeits presented by applicants. In particular,
we believe there is one counterfeiter who specializes in Comilla
Board certificates, and we have seen many examples of his work,
both in Dhaka and in documents referred from Persian Gulf posts
for verification.

In October 2005, the Ministry of Education took a giant leap into
the 21st century by establishing a website for on-line
verification of certificates, www.educationboard.gov.bd. The
website allows verification of certificates issued after the
computerization of Board records, generally from the mid-1990s.
To access a record, you must enter the Board name, the year of
the test, the type of test, and the students Roll Number, all of
which are found on the certificate. From October 2005 to January
2006, we ran all Board checks in parallel to verify that the
results of the on-line check were consistent with the physical
Board records, and we found that on-line checks had a 100% match
to the physical records check. In many suspect certificates the
biographic information did not match the online check, indicating
that a physical change may have been done at the Board, after the
applicant won the DV in order to match the winning DV entry.
Since the online check is so easy, we have changed our processing
of DV cases, and the DV unit now conducts a check of all possible
education certificates before interview. While we must still
check older certificates at the Boards, we anticipate a 50%
reduction in the number of cases referred to the FPU for
verification. We will also randomly select one week a quarter
when all certificates will be sent for physical check in order to
continue to validate the accuracy of the data base.

Since DV winners automatically become the most eligible of
potential spouses, many of our cases involve winners who married
after winning the DV. As previously discussed, the tradition of
settled marriages makes it extremely difficult to distinguish
between traditional arranged marriages and marriages for
immigration purposes. Again, we rely on the usual array of
secondary evidence to establish that a genuine marriage exists.


6. ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD: We have extremely low incidence of
fraud in these areas. Rarely, we will have a CRBA case where DNA
testing shows that the alleged AmCit father is not actually the
father. This year, we are aware of three instances where
imposters attempted to use a US passport to travel to the US.
One was an imposter case, and the other two are more conventional
cover or photo-sub cases. In 2004, we also had four such cases,
one imposter and three photo- or cover-subs. However, the most
recent case has an unusual twist in that the true bearer of the
cover-subbed passport is a Bangladeshi-American with a history of

DHAKA 00000997 006 OF 008


losing passports. According to PIERS, the holder claimed that
the passport had been during a home invasion in February 1999.
However, while reviewing the case, Post FPM found one of the
other passports in our files that the holder claimed was lost on
a subway in New York City in September 1994. The British
Airline Liaison Officer (ALO) had intercepted the passport in the
possession of an imposter on November 14, 1994 in Dhaka. This
passport had a variety of entry and exit stamps, showing that
someone entered Bangladesh on May 31, 1994, and then stayed until
November 14, 1994. We found it remarkable that the passport was
lost in New York when it never left Bangladesh.


7. ADOPTION FRAUD: Adoptions are a difficult proposition in
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Bangladesh. Bangladesh civil law makes no provision for
adoptions, and Islamic law prohibits all adoptions and Hindu law
prohibits almost all adoptions. The only recourse is for
Bangladeshi adults to apply for an order of guardianship under
the 1890 Guards and Wards Act. Foreigners are not permitted to
become guardians in this manner. In some cases, this order can
form the basis of an IR-4 petition. Most of our fraud involves
direct transfers between family members where a relative in the
US seeks to adopt a cousin or nephew/niece in order to give the
child a better life in the US. The family in Bangladesh
generally tries to fraudulently conceal their standard of living
in order to qualify the child as an eligible orphan.

There is also a tradition of social adoptions in Bangladesh
where families take in orphans of relatives or foundlings and
raise them as their own. The parents never regularize the
childs status, and the child may not even be aware of his or her
er
actual parentage. This causes very sad situations when DNA
testing reveals that one or another child may not be eligible to
receive a visa in preference cases.


8. ASYLUM and other DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Dhaka handles both VISAS
92 follow-to-join cases and requests for investigation in ongoing
political asylum cases. We receive investigation requests both
from DRL/CRA and directly from some DHS FDNS officers. Last
year, we processed more than 100 follow-to-join cases and
conducted 22 investigations. In only 3 of our investigations did
we verify the documents submitted by asylum seekers. Our files
are literally bulging with hundreds of cases where the FPU has
uncovered document fraud in asylum cases.

Officers regularly hear admissions from derivatives that their
parents or spouses asylum case is bogus. When pressed to
describe the persecution that the asylee supposedly suffered,
most cannot name even a single incident, or if they can describe
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some incidents, they claim that no police report was ever filed.
Furthermore, we encounter NIV and IV applicants, generally men,
who have a history of filing a fraudulent asylum claim coupled
with extensive illegal presence and/or a deportation. Generally,
they sheepishly admit that the asylum claim was only a method to
gain permission to stay in the US. We have also heard stories of
immigration lawyers in New York who regularly advised their
clients to file fake asylum claims under false identities as the
best way to gain legal status in the US. All of this leads us to
view asylum follow-to-join cases with some degree of skepticism.
However, as per FAM guidance, we suspend our disbelief regarding
the legitimacy of the basic asylum grant in most VISAS 92 cases
and merely focus on the derivatives. As with many IV cases, we
regularly find cases of probable and suspected age fraud among
child derivatives. However, given the generous nature of CSPA
relief, we rarely investigate these cases. In the very rare
instances where we uncover serious information about the basic
asylum claim, we forward our information to the appropriate DHS
office for review.

With investigations, we generally are asked to verify police or
court documents or medical certificates. As with most
Bangladeshi documents, police and court documents are easily
counterfeited. Fortunately, we have always been able to check
such documents at police stations and courts, though we always

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strictly adhere to the standards of confidentiality for such
investigations. Most often we find that the documents are
completely fake, though occasionally in cases where the police
records concern petty crimes, the documents turn out to be
correct. Most medical certificates are nearly unverifiable,
since most clinics and doctors offices keep minimal records.
Last year the FPM and the Deputy Political Officer drafted an
information paper on pertinent political and social issues in
Bangladesh for use by DHS asylum officers. Hopefully, this
information will make it easier for DHS officers to more easily
sort out genuine asylum cases from the vast sea of fraudulent or
spurious cases.


9. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Most
Bangladesh government officials are helpful when approached on an
individual case basis, such as a school certificate or police
station check. However, at present, courts and the police are
still generally uninterested and unmotivated to take steps that
would hinder the ability of Bangladeshis to travel abroad in
search of work. Addressing this lack of interest has been one of
the key goals for our new A/RSO-I over the past six months. Our
active and energetic A/RSO-I has made remarkable steps in
strengthening his contacts and our links with the police,
especially Special Branch which controls officers assigned to
immigration duties, and the Directorate-General of Passports and
Immigration with goal of institutionalizing these relationships.
He has used training opportunities, both post-sponsored and
Department-sponsored, as his entre in these efforts. The
response has been overwhelmingly positive, and we hope to build
this relationship to the point where the police will actively
assist with the arrest and prosecution of offenders in serious
immigration fraud and alien smuggling cases. As an initial
indication of his success in forging cooperative relationships
with the right people in the police, our A/RSO-I recently
obtained a large number of immigration records requested by the
FPU for use in a validation study of F1/F2 applicants, the first
time we have obtained this type of information.


10. AREAS OF CONCERN: Last year, Chittagong, the major southern
port city, was identified as a transit point in the ongoing major
international smuggling of Chinese nationals using Singaporean
passports. Lacking any Western diplomatic missions to provide
de
airport coverage, mala fide travelers come from Bangkok for
further passage on to Dubai. The smuggling ring originally used
the main international airport in Dhaka, but the efforts of the
resident British ALO drove them out, forcing them to use the
smaller airport in Chittagong. We continue to be greatly
concerned with the lack of security with Bangladesh documents,
especially passports, though we have little optimism that the
government will have either the will or the capacity to
adequately address the problem in the near future.

Dhaka boasts an active Anti-Fraud Working Group comprised of more
than 20 members from many diplomatic missions, including all the
Europeans countries, Australia, Canada and the US. The group
regularly exchanges information about mala fide applicants, fake
documents, and fake document vendors. The British ALO is an
essential part of our efforts, providing a constant presence at
the airport to detect and confiscate fraudulent travel documents
of all kinds. Our A/RSO-I is working closely with the British
ALO to provide additional coverage, when needed.


11. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Post has a full-time FPM who also
doubles as the Deputy Consular Chief, a JO back-up, an EFM, and
four, soon to be five, full-time LES. Under post policy, all
fraud investigations are done by a team of one American and one
FSN. We are fortunate that our JO and our EFM are both FSI-
trained Bangla speakers, which helps reduce the possibilities of
malfeasance or fraud during the conduct of investigations. The
FPM and his alternate have taken the FPM course, and three of our
four investigators have attended the FPU FSN workshop at FSI.

FPM: Robert J. Jachim (EOD: JUN 2006)
Alternate FPM: Brian R. Peterson (EOD: SEP 2006)
EFM: Mark L. Stillwell

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FSN Supervisor: Syed A. Reza
FSN Investigators: John B. DCosta, Maske Jannat, and Khan J.
Ali

The FPM provides detailed training to all newly-arrived officers
and FSNs on current fraud trends, fraud history, and fraud
indicators. The FPU offers a monthly briefing on topics of
interest and the FPM provides a quarterly briefing/training,
usually covering the latest fraudulent documents or trends. The
FPU also maintains a local quasi-website on our consular shared
drive with scanned images of genuine and fake school certificates
and other personal documents, such as marriage and divorce
certificates. This information is available from the desktop of
all computers at the interview window.


12. Dhakas FPU is always ready to offer assistance to other
posts and agencies with questions regarding Bangladeshi documents
or applicants. We can be contacted through individual email or
through DhakaFPM@state.gov.


CHAMMAS