Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DHAKA820
2006-02-14 10:26:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR CODEL CROWLEY

Tags:  OREP BG BGD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000820 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

H FOR CODEL CROWLEY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP BG BG BGD
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL CROWLEY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000820

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

H FOR CODEL CROWLEY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP BG BG BGD
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL CROWLEY


1. (SBU) Everything and nothing has changed since your last
visit to Bangladesh in January 2004. The economy continues
to grow annually at a robust 5-6 percent, but infrastructure
and other problems prevent real inroads on poverty reduction.
The feared loss of jobs in the garment industry with the end
of MFA quotas failed to materialize; indeed, garment exports
last year rose 27 percent. JMB's stunning campaign of terror
in the second half of 2005 finally forced the Bangladesh
Government to acknowledge that terrorism and extremism exist
in Bangladesh, but domestic politics remain as polarized as
ever. One positive development is the government's
increasingly consistent protection of Ahmadiyyas from
Islamist bigots. The general election expected in January
2007 remains crucial to Bangladesh's future.

Extremism
--------------


2. (SBU) The Jamaat ul-Mujahideen (JMB) came close to
traumatizing the country in early December. While its
violence claimed only 32 lives over a span of several months
in a country of 144 million people, the randomness and
nationwide scope of the attacks scared many normally
complacent Bangladeshis into wondering if they might be next.
The ruling BNP and its coalition partner Jamaat Islami (JI)
showed signs of strain as even some, mostly dissident, BNP
MPs criticized the government's handling of the crisis and
questioned the rationale of the BNP-JI coalition.
Predictably, as they do after any incident of high-profile
violence, BNP and AL leaders blamed each other. But by the
time the Id holidays arrived in January, the mood had
shifted, thanks to the halt in violence following major
arrests and weapons recoveries in December. Unless and until
the violence resumes, the BNP will continue to claim it has
largely "broken the back" of JMB.


3. (SBU) BNP leaders say:

-- The total rejection of JMB violence by civil society,
including Muslim clerics and Islamic scholars, underscores
that Bangladesh is still a tolerant, moderate country with no
stomach for extremism.

-- Islam is a religion of peace, so no Muslim could accept
JMB's actions.

-- Since terrorism and Islam are by definition mutually
exclusive, we should look at who benefited from JMB's
violence. The answer is those (read India and the Awami
League) who seek to defame and destabilize the country.


4. (SBU) Awami League president Sheikh Hasina, on the other

hand, asserts that BNP and JI instigated the violence to
distract people from the government's multiple governance
failures. As proof of their complicity, she cites the four
BNP ministers widely linked to JMB leader Bangla Bhai.

Elections
--------------


5. (SBU) Bangladesh's zero-sum political culture makes any
election a winner-take-all affair, but the 2007 general
election is make or break for the two major parties. For the
BNP, victory shatters the strong anti-incumbency bias of
Bangladesh, and South Asia, that has denied any Bangladeshi
administration a second term in office. It would also
position Tariq to succeed his mother as Prime Minister in the
next five years. For the AL, defeat or boycott implies ten
years out of power, a bitter pill for a party that prides
itself as Bangladesh's rightful ruler. There are divisions
in the Awami League, but its leadership threatens to boycott
the election without major changes to the caretaker
government and electoral systems. The BNP indicates it might
consider some electoral reforms but categorically rejects
caretaker changes.


6. (SBU) With both the AL and BNP attached to the politics of
money and thuggery, there is every reason to think the next
election will be extremely turbulent. The BNP's stacking of
the Election Commission in January is the latest example that
it can act clumsily to advance its perceived political
interest.


7. (SBU) Polls suggest that support for AL and BNP is neck
and neck, with a large undecided bloc. However, there is
strong popular confidence in the integrity of the electoral
system, which suggests the AL could have a hard time
justifying a boycott. Whether the issue was attacks on the
AL leadership, terrorism, rising commodity prices, or acute
energy and power shortages, the AL has repeatedly failed to
generate serious political pressure on the government to hold
early elections.


8. (SBU) The AL's recent return to Parliament is probably a
temporary tactical expedience to avoid losing its seats to
non-attendance. However, the return was widely welcomed, and
the first several days of parliamentary debate have been
reasonably civil and free of procedural controversy.


9. (SBU) The BNP says:

-- It is committed to a free and fair electoral process
because, as the stronger party, it wants the will of the
people accurately reflected.

-- The re-election of the AL mayor in Chittagong last year,
and the upset win of an independent Hindu in a JI safe seat
in December, underscores the current system's impartiality.
-- The real problem is the AL does not practice what it
preaches on democracy. It boycotts parliament and spurns
offers of inter-party dialogue in favor of confrontation on
the streets. The USG should urge it to change course.


10. (SBU) The Awami League says:

-- BNP/JI alliance moves to fix the election leave it with no
alternative to boycotts and hartals absent early elections
and major changes to the caretaker and electoral systems.

-- The BNP/JI alliance is out to eliminate the AL as a viable
party.

-- The USG should recognize and do more to counter the
imminent threat posed by Taliban-like Islamists to
Bangladeshi society.

-- Assertions by two recently sentenced JMB leaders, Sunny
and Awal, that they had a relationship with the AL's
religious affairs secretary, and Sheikh Hasina confidant, are
a torture-induced lie.

Religious Minorities
--------------


10. (SBU) The ban on Ahmadiyya publications remains hung up
in the courts and essentially unimplemented. After some
slippage in April 2005, the Bangladesh Government has acted
effectively to protect Ahmadiyya mosques from seizure by
Islamist bigots. In December, as many as 70 demonstrators
were hospitalized after clashing with police as they tried to
march towards the Ahmadiyya central mosque in Dhaka.


11. (SBU) Hindus have previously reported problems at
elections because of their presumed support for the AL. We
are increasing our monitoring of this potentially vulnerable
group to detect any negative trends well in advance of actual
polling.
CHAMMAS