FORMER COMMANDER LOOKS BACK ON RAB'S ORIGINS AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 002078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016
TAGS: PTER KISL KCRM PHUM BG
SUBJECT: FORMER COMMANDER LOOKS BACK ON RAB'S ORIGINS AND
MISSION

REF: 05 DHAKA 02603

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS FOR REASONS(s): 1.4 (c)


1. (S/NF) Summary: The former deputy commander of RAB
recounted the origins of the controversial anti-crime unit,
disparaged the skills and integrity of police, and cited the
interrogations of JMB suspects to suggest that the BDG's zeal
in arresting the August 17 bombers ironically triggered as
retaliation JMB's deadly campaign of terror in late 2005.
End summary.


2. (S/NF) On April 5, Brigadier General Chowdhury Fazlul
Bari, now Counter Intelligence Director of the Directorate
General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) but previously the
deputy commander of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB),
discussed on the margins of the 2006 PASOC conference in
Hawaii, attended by poloff, his RAB experiences and his
observation of Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB)
interrogations.

Raising RAB
--------------


3. (S/NF) "I was there at the initial planning," Bari
recalled. The original personnel plan had been to have 44
percent military, 44 percent police, and 12 percent from the
paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR),but the police were
reluctant to fill their slots because they "earned more
money on the outside" from bribes and other illicit
activities. Senior police officers, he claimed, preferred to
sit in their offices. The police, he agreed, operate like a
giant pyramid scheme, where street personnel pass payoffs up
to their bosses. Corruption, he added, was one reason police
failed to capture JMB commander Sheikh Abdur Rahman.


4. (S/NF) Bari noted that RAB now comprises 10 battalions of
600 men each and will soon grow to 12 battalions. He
complained that the police remain unwilling to second able
personnel, often providing instead the old and physically
unfit. Police personnel lack basic skills, such as shooting,
and have no training in special operations. He pleaded for
more training for RAB to enhance its capabilities in CT and
other areas.


5. (S/NF) When RAB was first established, Bari said, they
only had old police weapons and vehicles, but now they have
new weapons from the military, new vehicles, and three
Chinese-made armored personnel vehicles. Asked if there was
one political sponsor of RAB, Bari said no, there were
several. Bari added that the PM herself selected the black
RAB uniforms from six alternate designs, including the
distinctive black RAB "doo-rag."

JMB
---


6. (S/NF) Bari described JMB as a "home grown" military
organization. Abdur Rahman, he said, studied Arabic in South
Asia, visited India and Pakistan twice, and in 1996 started
learning from ISI in Pakistan how to make improvised
explosive devices and use AK-47s. ISI, Bari stated, wanted
to use Rahman in Kashmir, but Rahman chose to return to
Bangladesh instead and form JMB.


7. (S/NF) In 2002, an accidental explosion at a JMB safe
house alerted the BDG to JMB's bomb-making activities, Bari
continued. He described JMB operatives as poor people who
flunked out of madrassahs. Being poor, they could easily
blend in "as rickshaw pullers and hawkers" and go anywhere to
recruit for JMB.


8. (S/NF) In his current capacity at DGFI, Bari was present
at many of Rahman's interrogations. Rahman reportedly stated
that he ordered the August 17 bombings to spread JMB's demand
for sharia Law, that there was no intent to kill anyone, and
that there was "no law against setting off firecrackers."
Furthermore, since there were "no splinters in the bombs, how
can you charge me?" Bari expressed sympathy with that point,
stating that the two fatalities that day stemmed from "shock"
and not the explosions themselves.


9. (S/NF) Taking the August 17 explosions seriously, law

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enforcement personnel, Bari said, quickly arrested 70 persons
involved with the blasts, which angered the JMB rank-and-file
and generated internal pressure on Rahman to retaliate and
demonstrate that JMB remained a viable entity. The result,
Bari claimed, was the onset in October of the deadly attacks
on the judicial system.

Comment
--------------


10. (S/NF) Bari is a forceful advocate for RAB. In a June
2005 conversation with us, he described "cross-fire" killings
as a necessary, short-term expedient, and stated that "due
process is (RAB's) objective." Military disdain for the
police is not new, and police failings are often cited to
justify the military's continuing dominance of RAB--about 80
percent of its total force structure and virtually all of its
senior officers except for the director general himself.


11. (S/NF) It is an interesting twist to suggest, as Bari
did, that the deadly JMB attacks in late 2005 were an
unplanned action triggered by BDG zeal in rounding up August
17 bombers. However, along with downplaying JMB's religious
credentials as failed madrassah students and describing JMB
as home-grown, Bari is toeing the BDG line that JMB
operatives were basically local yokels with little or no
interest in "true" Islam.
BUTENIS