RWANDA PREPARED TO SEVER TIES WITH ICTR

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 001573

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

S/WCI FOR KMCGEENEY; USUN FOR EBRUNO; AF/E FOR BYODER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PREL KCRM PHUM RW TZ
SUBJECT: RWANDA PREPARED TO SEVER TIES WITH ICTR

REF: A. KIGALI 00883

B. KIGALI 00891

Classified By: CDA D. Purnell Delly for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Government of Rwanda (GOR) is pursuing
the issue of suspected genocidaires working at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by pressing
the ICTR to respond on the issue and by encouraging the
Tanzanian authorities to work with the GOR. The GOR is
prepared to end cooperation with the ICTR should its response
be unsatisfactory, and requested USG support to successfully
resolve the problem. Ambassador Retzer will visit the ICTR
with other Chiefs of Mission when the Friends of the ICTR
travel to Arusha on September 25. END SUMMARY

Genocide suspects employed at ICTR
--------------

2. (C) Alloys Mutabingwa, Rwanda's Special Representative
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),and
Zeno Mutimura, Rwanda's Ambassador to Tanzania, met with
Ambassador Retzer on September 15. Mutabingwa said relations
between the GOR and the ICTR generally have been good, but
noted there have been "hiccups here and there" and proceeded
to discuss one issue of particular concern. Mutabingwa said
the Government of Rwanda (GOR) is pressing the ICTR on the
"difficult" issue of genocide suspects being employed at the
Tribunal. Mutabingwa said the GOR has been communicating
with the ICTR on this issue consistently since 2000,
presenting lists and summaries concerning suspected
genocidaires employed at the ICTR and requesting meetings
with court officials, but that the ICTR had not taken action
or responded formally. In 2005, the GOR provided the ICTR
with a short list of 13 suspected genocidaires employed at
the ICTR, announced the GOR's intention to put interpol on
notice and requested the ICTR's urgent attention. Mutabingwa
demonstrated the GOR's resolve regarding this issue by saying
that the GOR will pursue it "even if there was just one week
left in the court's mandate."

Gakwaya arrest and release
--------------

3. (C) Having received no response, the GOR has decided to
pursue the issue of suspected genocidaires employed at the
ICTR in concrete terms by identifying specific cases for an
ICTR response, Mutabingwa said. In March 2006, the GOR
submitted to the ICTR an arrest warrant for Callixte Gakwaya
who worked at the ICTR in different capacities since 2001 and
was being considered for the position of Lead Counsel.
Subsequently, the ICTR employed Gakwaya as Lead Counsel and
informed the GOR of his new position. Feeling that the ICTR
disregarded the information the GOR had provided, and
insulted that a suspected genocidaire was employed at a
senior, high-profile position, the GOR worked with
authorities in Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia to
track Gakwaya and located him in an Arusha hotel near the
ICTR.


4. (C) The Tanzanian police arrested Gakwaya on September 1
based on documents provided by GOR officials and on September
4 the GOR submitted to the Government of Tanzania a request
for extradition of Gakwaya. Instead, Tanzanian authorities
released Gakwaya on September 5. Mutabingwa attributed
Gakwaya's release to the ICTR's "serious protest letter" and
characterized the ICTR's response as "interfering with due
process." ICTR press releases of September 5 and 6 state the
ICTR took "appropriate measures" to secure the welfare of
Gakwaya and that ICTR officers visited and spoke with Gakwaya
at the police station, but that he "was only released after
undertakings were made by private persons to the Tanzanian
police." Mutabingwa said that ICTR officials escorted
Gakwaya to the Mozambique border after his release but, as
far as Mutabingwa knew, authorities there were not tracking
Gakwaya.

GOR pushes for ICTR response
--------------

4. (C) Upon learning of Gakwaya's release, the GOR called
for the ICTR to terminate his employment. Rwanda's State
Minister for Cooperation, Rosemary Museminali, was quoted in
the New Times on September 12 as having said "we are waiting
for a week to elapse . . . we shall then take a serious
measure. Among the alternative decisions is stopping our
cooperation with them (the ICTR)." The lack of any action or
response by the ICTR prompted the GOR to send a note verbale
to the ICTR on September 13, the date of its weekly cabinet
meeting. The note communicates the GOR's "decision" that the
ICTR's Registrar arrange to meet with GOR judicial
authorities to find a solution to the problem of Gakwaya and
the 13 other fugitives employed at the ICTR, and reserves the
GOR's right to take further appropriate measures. Mutabingwa
said if there was no response from the ICTR the week of
September 18, the GOR would consider "the strongest measure"
and, when pressed, said "we won't say it, but we'll end
cooperation with the court."

Registrar Dieng
--------------

5. (C) When asked whether the GOR is considering requesting
Registrar Adama Dieng to resign, Mutabingwa said it is up to
Dieng's colleagues to decide what to do with him and that
Dieng was acting as anyone else would in the circumstances.

Immunity of ICTR employees
--------------

6. (U) While the ICTR cited the immunity granted to
employees of the ICTR in an agreement between Tanzania and
the United Nations as the reason Gakwaya should be released
from custody, Mutabingwa said the term "immunity" is being
abused. He pointed out that an attachment to that agreement
specified that immunity would not apply when it would make
the Tribunal a hiding place for suspected criminals.
Mutabingwa also noted that the agreement provides immunity
for acts committed by ICTR employees during the course of
their employment and not for prior acts. "How can the ICTR
grant immunity for acts committed before it even existed,"
Mutabingwa asked.

Effect on witnesses
--------------

7. (C) The presence of suspected genocidaires at the ICTR
creates an intimidating atmosphere for witnesses, Mutabingwa
said. Witnesses are bribed to not testify and if they refuse
the bribe, there may be repercussions, Mutabingwa said,
adding that a few witnesses have been killed when they return
to Rwanda. "The presence of suspects at the ICTR terrorizes
witnesses," Mutabingwa said, adding the ICTR has become a
place to face terrorists, as genocide is one form of
terrorism. "The situation encourages criminals to become an
international network of terrorism and as a nation, we cannot
tolerate this," Mutabingwa said.

Next issue to address
--------------

8. (C) Mutabingwa identified the ICTR's finances as the
next problem that the GOR wants to address, noting that "it
all comes back to money." He elaborated that the ICTR has
implemented only selected recommendations from its audit
report, refusing the recommendations that it use a lump sum
system of paying attorneys and conduct reference checks of
potential employees. Mutabingwa hinted at a financial motive
regarding the employment of suspected genocidaires, saying
the gap between that problem and the ICTR's finances was not
as large as one might think. Ambassador Retzer identified
the upcoming visit of the Friends of the ICTR to Arusha as an
opportunity for the ICTR to show where the money goes.

Friends of the ICTR to visit Arusha
--------------

9. (C) The Friends of the ICTR plan to visit the ICTR on
September 25 and have proposed the following agenda items for
their meeting with ICTR President Mose:

Status of completion strategy;
Extension of time for Ad Litem judges;
Suspects still at large, especially outside Rwanda (including
Kabuga);
Possible contact with AU about conversion to the African
Court for Human and Peoples Rights; and
Relationship between ICTR and Rwanda.

The Ambassadors of the U.S., Norway, Belgium, France, Sweden,
Germany and the Netherlands and the High Commissioners of
Canada and the U.K. plan to attend.


10. (U) Ambassador Retzer recommended that Mutabingwa and
Mutimura visit with the Chiefs of Mission planning to visit
the ICTR in advance of their September 25 meeting in Arusha.
Though Mutabingwa and Mutimura said they were not aware of
the Friends' upcoming visit, in addition to meeting with
Ambassador Retzer September 15, they met with the British
High Commissioner on September 14, and had an appointment
with the French Ambassador the week of September 18. In
addition, Mutabingwa met with Justin Seruhere, Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' United
Nations Security Council Unit, in Dar es Salaam the week of
September 4.

New spokesperson at ICTR
--------------

11. (C) The ICTR changed its spokesperson on September 12,
replacing Tim Gallimore, Information Officer in the ICTR's
External Relations and Strategic Planning Section, with
Acting Deputy Registrar Everard O'Donnell. The ICTR has not
announced this change or offered an explanation, but it was
noted in the Kigali press. In a September 13 messate to
Poloff, Gallimore (please protect) described it as a "quite
sudden and unexpected change" and his future with the ICTR
was still unclear September 19. In response to Poloff's
inquiry regarding the Gakwaya matter, Gallimore advised to
"stay tuned" as he was told it "will get very nasty with
repercussions of nuclear proportions for ICTR!"

COMMENT
--------------

12. (C) The ICTR's swift reaction to Gakwaya's arrest but
subsequent silence regarding him and the other alleged
genocidaires employed at the ICTR may force the GOR to take
the unfortunate step of severing ties with the Tribunal. A
decision by the GOR to terminate its cooperation with the
ICTR would have a number of implications. It could affect
the Tribunal's completion strategy and the start-up of the
African Union Court of Justice which plans to assume the
physical space at the Arusha International Conference Centre
utilized by the ICTR. Additionally, Rwanda has argued
steadfastly that it has the right to receive both the
unfinished cases of, and persons convicted by, the Tribunal.
While these issues are by no means resolved, the GOR severing
ties with the ICTR likely would be a factor in these
decisions--an indication of how seriously the GOR considers
this situation.
DELLY