Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06DARESSALAAM1089
2006-07-03 10:11:00
SECRET
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:  

(CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL EAID 
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DE RUEHDR #1089/01 1841011
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031011Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4256
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3016
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0013
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0149
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0054
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCQSOC/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 001089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2026
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL EAID
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAY 23-24 RSI CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly, Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 001089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2026
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL EAID
SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAY 23-24 RSI CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly, Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S REL AUS UK CAN) SUMMARY: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and
other Mission representatives from Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen,
Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Nairobi May 23-24 to
discuss regional counterterrorism strategy with
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism Hank Crumpton,
Commander CJTF-HOA Admiral Richard Hunt, and other senior
U.S. interagency representatives. The third of its kind in
a geographic region, this Regional Strategic Initiative
(RSI) meeting sought to promote a coordinated regional CT
strategy for the Horn of Africa, maximizing efforts of all
USG agencies including CENTCOM, CJTF-HOA, USAID and the
National Counterterrorism Center. The COMs found it
impossible to agree on an overarching regional
counterterrorism strategy because there was no consensus on
Somalia-specific recommendations. There was, however,
general agreement by all present that the following elements
would be valuable components of a regional counterterrorism
strategy for the Horn of Africa:

1) establishing comprehensive programs to eliminate
regional terrorist safe havens (both actual and potential),
and to address social-economic-political conditions that
terrorists exploit;

2) building international partnerships to support these
goals


2. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Key programs Chiefs of Mission
endorsed were: strengthened Rule of Law programs in each of
the countries of the region; greater Muslim outreach programs
including an immediate increase of quick return,
high-visibility assistance programs such as the Ambassador,s
Self-help Program; and programs to limit terrorist mobility
by enhancing border and coastal security. Follow-up meetings
in the coming months, as well as a Regional (CT) Program Plan
being drafted by AmEmbassy Dar Es Salaam in coordination with
other Missions and their country teams, will measure progress
on these objectives and ensure continued focus on a common
regional CT strategy. END SUMMARY.


--------------
TERRORIST THREAT IN THE HORN
--------------


3. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Chiefs of Mission agreed that the
Ogaden, the Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, and the
Swahili Coast including Tanzania were low-level or potential
terrorist safe havens. Parts of Yemen could be termed proto
safe havens. Somalia is the epicenter of terrorist activity
in the region, an active safe haven qualitatively different
from others in the world because it overlays a failed state.
The al Qaida presence in Mogadishu is part of a larger
network, al Qaida East Africa (AQEA),which maintains
operatives, facilitators and associates in Somalia, Kenya,
Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia and probably Sudan and Eritrea.
AQEA has close ties to al Qaida core leadership in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and has links to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and
Yemen and appears to be funded by sources in these
countries as well as the Somali diaspora.


4. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Kenya and Djibouti are primary attack
venues. The Kenyan AQ cell is rebuilding after the release
from Kenyan custody of key AQ operative Aboud Rogo. We are
unsure of the AQ presence in Ethiopia, but AQ operatives may
attempt to take advantage of grievances and instability
resulting from the ongoing insurgency in the Ogaden. Yemen
serves as a source country for terrorists and a transit point
for people and weapons. The government has had considerable
success in tackling terrorist leadership, but has had little
success in dampening the spread of radical Islam. The
Government views instability in Somalia as the biggest
cross-border threat to Yemen. However, the fragility of
the Yemeni government remains a serious concern.

-------------- --------------
STRATEGIC GOAL ONE: ELIMINATING TERRORIST SAFE HAVEN

-------------- --------------


5. (S REL AUS UK CAN) A key objective of regional CT
programs must be to deny terrorists the ability to conduct
military training, plan operations, recruit, and transit
within the region. Such programs must further, over the
long term, create the social-political-economic conditions
and underlying stability inimical to terrorist networks.
COMS also noted the importance of following through on
promised programs, quick delivery, and personal diplomacy
(meaning that short TDYs were less effective and language
ability essential). Chiefs of Mission noted the importance
of "changing the conversation" about current events in
Somalia away from fighting in Mogadishu to positive U.S.
steps to support the TFG and restore Somali institutions.
Specifically, the group recommended:

Immediate
--------------
A) Immediately increase budget for high-impact,
quick-delivery assistance programs in safe haven areas
across the region (including the Swahili Coast and
Tanzania),particularly:

-- the Ambassador's Self-help Program in RSI participant
countries. This program enjoyed considerable success under
the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (FY03-04); and

-- CJTF-HOA civil affairs (CA) programs in RSI participant
countries, including Tanzania. COMs urged closer integration
of CA teams with USAID and other Embassy elements, possibly
to include interagency-led CA programs in the future

B) Increase Muslim outreach efforts, focusing on areas of
instability:

-- Upgrade VOA programming in the Horn. In addition to
countering an extremely successful jihadist propaganda
campaign, the restoration of Somali language programming
after a nine-year hiatus would have an important symbolic
effect.

--"Add Zeroes" to existing successful programs (e.g.
program not 8 but 80 International Visitors). Increase
regional programming coordination to achieve economies of
scale with American speakers and other programs.

-- Chiefs of Mission expressed interest in partnership with
private organizations; e.g., a State Department-sponsored
effort to connect American Muslims with their East African
counterparts, perhaps by connecting U.S. mosques or Islamic
Associations to East African counterparts. COMs suggested
such partnerships were a potential area for exploration by
U/S Hughes, Brain Trust.

-- Chiefs of Mission also noted the importance of calibrating
programs so that Muslim communities did not perceive that
the USG was bearing down on them.

Specific Short-term Recommendations Included:

A) Increase collection and analytical efforts to "map" the
East African safe haven, to include Somalia as a whole, as
well as tertiary safe havens of the Somali Coast, tribal
areas in Yemen, the Ogaden, and Eastleigh, noting both
potential sources of extremism and potential USG partners,
extremists, funding sources, Saudi and other foreign
influence, and potential new safe havens if the primary
safe haven in Mogadishu is eliminated. We also need
additional information on activities of the Somali
diaspora, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. We need to
overlay GIS data with information from the Somalia Aid
Coordinating Body;

B) Engaging all regional embassies in reporting on and
providing local government views on how to deal with
terrorism in the Horn and in Somalia. One possibility is to
provide Somalia watcher positions at all regional embassies,
including locally engaged staff.


Short to Medium Term
--------------
A) Improve Rule of Law programs throughout the region,
focusing on police and prosecutorial training,
implementation of effective CT legislation, regional legal
cooperation (e.g. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition
treaties between Horn countries),assistance to TFG efforts
to draft a constitution for Somalia, and prisons.

B) Improving land and maritime border control and port
security is key to restricting terrorist travel and to
developing regional prosperity. Coordinated international
donor and U.S. interagency assistance could facilitate host
nation controls over the Gulf of Aden and Somali and
Swahili coasts, significant areas of terrorist transit,
piracy, and arms and human trafficking. Potential programs
include:

--Department of Homeland Security, including its Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard
could assist host nations with training programs for local
border officials to improve monitoring and interdiction of
terrorists. Training should include officials from across
the region.

--Immediate steps should be taken, facilitated by the U.S.
military where appropriate, to encourage better cross-border
cooperation between Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

--A regional ISPS Port Security Training Program conducted
in the IMO Regional Office in Mombassa would make an
important contribution to border security. (Potential
funding sources: S/CT, EB, INL, and AF)

--Chiefs of Mission also recommended increased TIP/PISCES
funding to fully implement and interconnect programs in
countries in the region.

C) Participants acknowledged both the urgency and the
difficulty of encouraging better intelligence sharing
between countries in the region.

Somalia Specific Recommendations included:

A) One program which should be funded immediately is USG
assistance to the Government of Kenya to help speed up
Kenyan training of Somali police. The Kenyans have
sponsored 200 Somalis, participation in police training in
Kenya and have offered to train a total of 5,000, but lack
the resources to do so. (Potential funding source: S/CT
ATA funds). Chiefs of Mission noted that these programs
would provide important governance as well as CT benefits,
particularly in countries with poor human rights and
corruption records. Potential international partners
include UNODC and the International Association of
Prosecutors.

B) USAID noted and Chiefs of Mission agreed that Rule of Law
programs were extraordinarily difficult to implement in
Somalia when, for example, Somali primary school enrollment
was only 20%. Chiefs of Mission strongly supported USAID,s
request for $20 million in FY-07 funds for programs focused
on Muslim youth in the region to address the conditions
that terrorists exploit.

Long Term
--------------
-- Expand development assistance programs to address the
underlying conditions for terrorist recruitment. Such
activities would include: working with governments to help
them become more effective and responsive to citizens'
needs; helping governments better respond to social service
needs, particularly in the areas of education, health, and
sanitation; and rehabilitating basic infrastructure
associated with such service delivery.

--------------
STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: ENCOURAGE REGIONAL

AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
--------------


6. (S REL AUS UK CAN) We should facilitate regional and
international cooperation to restore political stability in
troubled areas of the Horn (especially Somalia),stem the
tide of Islamic radicalism, and eliminate environments
conducive to hatred and violence throughout the region.
Such cooperation may include coordination through the Arab
League to establish links with moderate Islamic bodies,
cooperation with the UN on reconciliation efforts inside
Somalia, and work with IGAD countries plus Tanzania to
develop necessary regional support mechanisms for the TFIs.
Chiefs of Mission noted that African peacekeeping
assistance would likely be key to restoring Somalia's
stability, but most African militaries lack the capacity
to deploy there now, and there are sensitivities about
which African countries may participate. Chiefs of Mission
discussed the impact of Ethiopian insurgencies on regional
stability and safe havens, and the possibility of providing
counterinsurgency training (including human rights training)
to the GOE.

--------------
Next Steps
--------------


7. (C) Chiefs of Mission agreed to meet again on the
margins of the Africa COMs Conference in October and
suggested AmEmbassy Asmara,s inclusion in future meetings.
The next meeting will assess the regional terrorist threat,
examine RSI efforts to date, and discuss the applicability
of a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative
(TS/CTI)-like program to the Horn of Africa. Embassy Dar
Es Salaam will draft a Regional (CT) Program Plan (a
&Regional MPP8),with specific programs, timelines and
metrics to measure the impact of programs on the terrorist
enemy. S/CT will fund a meeting to finalize the draft if
required.

--------------

8. Meeting Participants
--------------

--Nairobi: Ambassador Mark Bellamy (did not clear); Chris
Bane, Regional Affairs

--Djibouti: Ambassador Marguerita Ragsdale; Nicholas
Siegel, Regional Affairs

--Sanaa: Ambassador Thomas Krajeski

--Addis Ababa: Charge Vicki Huddleston; Brent Bahl,
Regional Affairs

--Dar Es Salaam: Charge Purnell Delly; Mark Andersen,
Regional Affairs

--Khartoum: Keith Kelly, Regional Affairs

--Department of State: S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Hank
Crumpton; AF/FO Ambassador Don Yamamoto; Virginia Palmer,
S/CT Deputy Coordinator; David Kilcullen, Chief Strategist;
Eunice Reddick, Director, Office of East African Affairs

--DOD: Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander CJTF-HOA;
Brigadier General (Select) Mark Schissler, Joint Staff;
Michael Dumont, Special Assistant, OSD OSD/SOLIC; Rear
Admiral (Select) Ed Winters, SOCOM

--NSA: Lonny Anderson

--NCTC: Carol Burans, Deputy Director, Strategic
Operational Planning

--CTC: Edward Gistaro, Sarah Pease

--CIA: Stephan Milliken, Africa Division

--DOJ: Carl Alexandre, Director, Overseas Prosecutorial
Development Assistance and Training Office

--USAID: Andrew Sisson, REDSO Director


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