KHADDAM'S STREAM OF CRITICISM PUTS THE SARG BACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: KHADDAM'S STREAM OF CRITICISM PUTS THE SARG BACK
ON THE DEFENSIVE

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. Summary: (C) A range of contacts have described former
VP Khaddam's December 30 interview with al-Arabiyya TV
network as tremendously damaging to the regime. They
characterize him as a very smart and highly experienced
politician and statesman who would be unlikely to make such
explosive remarks out of mere personal spite and without the
backing of significant players. They believe his intent is
to create "a UNIIIC problem for Asad," timed for maximum
effect at a moment when external -- and UNIIIC -- pressure,
on Syria had seemed to ease, and after the SARG had seemingly
completed an extensive campaign to attack Mehlis and whip up
nationalist sentiment. The consensus is that Khaddam plans
to escalate with further attacks.(Note: Additional interviews
this week would appear to corroborate this view.)


2. (C) Summary continued: One indicator of Khaddam's
success will be whether he manages to prod other former
regime figures to step forward and join him, say some
contacts. A key dissident and opposition figure welcomed the
remarks as a "quarrel among thieves" and a positive sign that
the regime is slowly falling apart. A minority view insisted
that Khaddam had said his piece, that the regime had already
absorbed the blow (and reacted),and that there would be
little further impact. While one should not prematurely
count out a tenacious regime that has shown repeatedly that
it has lots of fight left, it made a tremendous mistake by
letting Khaddam leave the country, and has now begun to pay
the price for that mistake. End Summary.


3. (C) DEEP CONCERN FROM REGIME SYMPATHIZER: Foreign policy
analyst Imad Shueibi, who is close to the regime, expressed
deep concern about the Khaddam interview, insisting that
Khaddam is attempting to create a problem for President
Bashar al-Asad with the UNIIIC investigation. In Shueibi's
view, Khaddam's remarks and the UNIIIC demand for an
interview with Asad "were coordinated" ahead of time,
probably with U.S. and French involvement, in tandem with
Sa'ad Hariri, from whom Khaddam had allegedly received some
30 million USD. Khaddam was also coordinating with former
Syrian military chief Hikmat Shihabi and had met with
Israel's Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Uri Lubrani, said
Shueibi. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on the other hand, had made
clear to the SARG that the stability of the Asad regime was a
redline, and hence they were not involved with Khaddam,
assessed Shueibi.


4. (C) KHADDAM PLOTTING TO KILL ASAD? Khaddam's precise game
plan was not clear, said Shueibi, but could possibly involve
coordination with disaffected military officers and other
elements inside Syria plotting to assassinate Asad. Such a
move could open the way for an eventual return to power by
Khaddam. Without such a move "aimed at the top," it would be
highly unlikely that Khaddam could affect the internal
situation in a critical way. Shueibi pointed to serious
obstacles in front of Khaddam, however, including powerful
Syrian intelligence services and what he termed a total lack
of support for Khaddam from the Syrian street, alienated by
his and his family's corruption and by Khaddam's unconvincing
attempt to served as a standard-bearer for political reform
after 30 years of unquestioning involvement with a deeply
authoritarian regime.


5. (C) THE TIMING: Ihsan Sankar, Sunni businessman and
former MP (with political ambitions) focused on the timing of
Khaddam's remarks, noting that they came as pressure on the
regime seemed to have eased and certain countries, including
"Sunni countries in the region like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Turkey" appeared to be moving toward helping Syria. "He
wanted to freeze that movement," said Sankar, largely by
creating a problem for Asad with the UNIIIC. He also waited
until the Syrians had expended their anti-Mehlis,
pro-nationalism campaign, before "sweeping all of it away"
with his remarks.


6. (C) WILL KHADDAM SAY MORE? Sankar predicted (correctly,
as subsequent interviews have demonstrated) that Khaddam will
continue speaking out, escalating gradually. Now, after the
campaign against him in Syria, he has a credible reason to
speak out again, to defend himself, and turn up the heat even
more, said Sankar. Khaddam is putting himself forward as "a
bridge to the future" for Syria, an opening for political
opposition to the regime, though he probably knows that he
himself is not likely to achieve political power in Syria,
insisted Sankar. In addition, Khaddam is motivated by a
desire to settle accounts with the Asad regime.



7. (C) SUNNI AND ALAWITE SUPPORT FOR KHADDAM: According to
Sankar, Khaddam has some Sunni support in Syria, largely
outside Damascus, in towns like Idlib, Hama, Tartous, and
Lattakia. A powerful Alawite cadre of disaffected, former
regime heavyweights, including Ali Duba, Ali Zeyout, Ali
Haydar, Izzedine Nasser, and (to a lesser degree) Mohammed
Khouli (all military or security officers except Nasser)
sympathize with Khaddam and share his view that regime
decision-making under Bashar has been disastrous. In
addition, they all deeply despise Mohammed Makhlouf, the
financial advisor that Khaddam alluded to in his remarks as
having amassed an eight-billion-dollar fortune. Sankar
believes the situation in the country is in flux and the
regime is very nervous. The street has not completely
dismissed Khaddam because he is corrupt. People recognized
that Khaddam's corruption is small-time compared to the
billion-dollar fortunes amassed by people like the Makhloufs
and Jamil Asad. Many also see him as "dirty or harmful, but
powerful medicine, like chemotherapy, needed to cure a
malignant, cancerous regime," said Sankar.


8. (C) OPPOSITION WELCOMES REMARKS: Dissident intellectual
Yassin Haj Saleh, imprisoned by the regime for 16 years, told
Polchief the opposition in Syria is happy with Khaddam's
remarks, "welcoming a quarrel among thieves as good for the
people." The remarks and the subsequent fallout in Syria are
also viewed as another step towards the dismantling of the
regime. In Saleh's view, Khaddam's intervention, like Ghazi
Kana'an's "suicide," shows that the regime is slowly losing
its grip on its own key people. The regime, however, has a
secret weapon, "its own weakness" (and the West's fear of

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chaos),assessed Saleh. Saleh repeatedly expressed fears
that the U.S. would waver and step in to give the regime an
extension, "a la Lahoud," prompted by fear of instability and
a takeover by fundamentalists, fears he believes are
exaggerated.


9. (C) KHADDAM SEEN AS USEFUL WEAPON: Like Sankar, Saleh
viewed Khaddam as "not really an alternative to the regime,
but useful in weakening it." Saleh also mentioned Khaddam's
Sunni background as significant but noted that he needed "to
solve his Alawite problem" by getting at least one key
Alawite leader to side with him. Saleh told Polchief that
the key questions arising from Khaddam's remarks are "What
are his plans and who are his partners?" In his view,
Khaddam is too clever and experienced a politician to have
embarked on such a course alone, out of a fit of pique.
Saleh ticked off Sa'ad Hariri, the Saudis (who, he noted, own
al-Arabiyya network),and the French as possible Khaddam
co-conspirators.


10. (C) "A LATE CHRISTMAS PRESENT:" Human rights activist
Anwar al-Bunni described Khaddam's remarks as "a late
Christmas present" for Syia's political opposition. He also
took the view that the question now is whether others
formerly in the regime, including some inside Syria, would
"begin talking."


11. (C) ASSESSING DAMAGE TO THE SARG: Taking a minority
view, Sunni gadfly economist and former SARG official Dr.
Riyad Abrash dismissed any long-term impact from Khaddam's
remarks. In his view, the regime has already absorbed the
blow and moved on. He did not expect the Parliament to
continue to deal with the issue, since the MP's, led by his
cousin, Speaker Mahmoud Abrash, had already issued all the
necessary denunciations and insults. Like other observers
here (many of them regime proxies),Abrash pointed to Khaddam
and his sons' reputations for corruption and ill-gotten
wealth as having discredited him completely in the eyes of
Syrians on the street and hence undermined the significance
of the remarks. The harsh SARG reaction was not because it
felt threatened but rather because in Arab political culture,
a stage of vicious insulting is expected after a major
political quarrel, assessed Abrash.


12. (C) OPPOSITION'S WISHFUL THINKING?: Abrash dismissed as
the opposition's wishful thinking the view that the U.S.
(possibly with others) was somehow cooperating now with
Khaddam and had encouraged the former VP to make the
comments. While some of them would try to magnify the
significance of the remarks, the opposition inside Syria was
so weak that critical commentary about the regime would not
provide any significant support or make any difference, he
said. Abrash was equally dismissive as to whether Khaddam
could influence the UNIIIC inquiry in a way that might be
harmful to Syria's interests. Abrash argued that the SARG

has already managed, with the help of Saudi Arabia and Egypt,
to shield Asad and limit any potential damage, and the regime
is ready if necessary to sacrifice lower-level officials to
UNIIIC.


13. (C) Comment: The majority opinion, that Khaddam's
remarks are damaging to the regime, particularly as he
escalates his attacks, seems the more persuasive view. It is
true, as Abrash points out, the opposition is weak and unable
to extract much benefit from Khaddam at present. But the
real impact will be if Khaddam's continued public criticism
emboldens other former regime pillars to abandon their code
of silence and speak out, further weakening a regime already
struggling to retain its legitimacy and continue to function.
Already, Khaddam's remarks appear to have rejuvenated a
flagging UNIIIC probe, dissipating in the process the
regime's smug sense of having bested the investigation, and
putting the SARG - at least momentarily - back on the
defensive. End comment.

SECHE