SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICIES PAYING OFF, SAYS REGIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000888

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL LE IR SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICIES PAYING OFF, SAYS REGIME
INSIDER

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: Longtime Embassy contact and regime
insider Imad Shuebi asserted that the SARG is feeling
confident in its standoff with the U.S. and is looking ahead
with renewed assurance. Syria has correctly played its
foreign policy cards on Lebanon, Hamas and Iran, and is
reaping the benefits, Shuebi stated. Shuebi tends to
interpret most of Syria's foreign policy moves as signals to
U.S. policy makers for dialogue and compromise with Syria on
regional goals. That being said, Shuebi's view that the SARG
has played its foreign policy cards well has been repeated
recently by other contacts in Syria. End Summary.


2. (C) Longtime Embassy contact and regime insider Imad
Shuebi told us March 1 that the SARG is riding high in its
standoff with the U.S. and that it will not return to the low
levels of confidence it experienced in 2005. Syria had
correctly played most of its foreign policy cards and was
reaping the benefits, Shuebi asserted.


3. (C) LEBANON: Syria does not see its influence in Lebanon
ever reverting back to the pre-Lebanese civil war days when
the SARG was weak and when external powers such as Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Libya felt free to intervene in internal
Lebanese affairs, Shuebi stated. Syria is now the most
essential of Lebanon's "three lungs," which also include the
border with Israel and the sea route to the West.


4. (C) When asked about newspaper reports of efforts to
remove Emile Lahoud from the Presidency, Shuebi noted that if
the U.S. and others want to change the Lebanese president,
they must compromise with the SARG and recognize Syria's
strong influence there. The March 14 forces will not succeed
at replacing Lahoud without Syrian consent, said Shuebi,
adding that the SARG would only accept a few names as
potential Lahoud replacements. The SARG previously had
reservations about former FM Jean Obeid but would probably
find him acceptable now, Shuebi claimed. The SARG might also
accept Michel Aoun as President, noted Shuebi without
elaboration. Nassib Lahoud would not be acceptable because
of his Sunni wife, whose sister is related by marriage to
Saudi King Abdullah and whose relatives have ties to Rifat
al-Asad.


5. (C) HAMAS: Syria,s long-time support for the
Damascus-based Palestinian rejectionist groups had paid off
with Hamas' victory in the Palestinian Legislative elections,
Shuebi said. The presence of Hamas leader Khalid Mish'al in
Damascus meant that anyone wanting to deal with Hamas would
also have to deal with Syria, Shuebi claimed. The SARG
exerted important influence on Hamas, asserted Shuebi, adding
that Syria's FM Walid Muallim advised Mish'al in their
February 27 meeting to be "hard but flexible -- like Syria"
when dealing with the West.


6. (C) Over the past five years, Mish'al had moved from
purely ideological stances, which included a complete
rejection of Israel's existence, toward more pragmatic views
that would eventually include recognition of Israel, Shuebi
predicted. In the immediate future, the Hamas leadership
would recognize past agreements as part of the logic of
running a government, he added. The renunciation of violence
would take much longer, as Hamas considers its actions as
"resistance" and because Israel also employs violence against
the Palestinians. (Note: Shuebi didn't indicate Hamas
flexibility on this issue as he had on the recognition of
Israel and past agreements.)


7. (C) IRAN: The SARG has sought to raise the profile of
its relationship with Iran to signal the U.S. that Syria can
either play a moderating influence on Iran in favor of the
West or take a hard-line position detrimental to U.S.
regional goals.


8. (C) Comment: As he spoke, Shuebi made frequent, vague
references to his ties with key SARG decision-makers,
including with the Syrian President. He tended to interpret
most of Syria's foreign policy moves as signals to U.S.
policy makers, presumably to make the case for U.S. dialogue
and compromise with Syria on regional goals. He asked at the
end whether there was any change in U.S. policy toward Syria
that would offer promise of dialogue and engagement, to which
Polchief responded in the negative. Shuebi's view that the
SARG has played its foreign policy cards well has been
repeated recently by other contacts in Syria.
SECHE