A YEAR AFTER HARIRI'S ASSASSINATION: ASAD STRIKES

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000625

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON SY LE
SUBJECT: A YEAR AFTER HARIRI'S ASSASSINATION: ASAD STRIKES
A TOUGHER POSE

REF: DAMASCUS 0594

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: One year after the murder of Rafik
Hariri, the Syrian regime seems both confident and,
increasingly, willing to adopt a more confrontational stance
towards the West, making moves such as receiving Iranian
President Ahmadinejad in Damascus and facilitating the
violent demonstrations that took place in early February to
protest the caricatures of Mohammed. While much of this
confrontational approach has been carefully modulated,
especially towards the UNIIIC, Syria's approach to Lebanon
has been consistently marked by the use of violence and
intimidation. The controversy over the caricatures of
Mohammed offered the regime the perfect opportunity to
showcase its confrontational politics and reap further
political gains internally and regionally. The perception
that its more combative posture has thus far succeeded seems
to have buoyed the mood of the regime in the past few weeks.
Nonetheless, several liabilities remain for the SARG that may
undercut these policies in the coming months. End Summary.


2. (C) EMBRACING CONFRONTATION: The signs from Damascus on
the anniversary of the assassination of Rafik Hariri point to
a regime that has decided to opt for a more confrontational
approach to its relationship with the U.S. and much of the
rest of the international community. For the foreseeable
future, Bashar al-Asad seems to have given up on the pretense
of looking for common ground where he could negotiate with
the U.S. in return for an easing of the pressure against his
regime. At the same time, he seems emboldens to make
gestures designed to signal his disregard for international
efforts to isolate his regime. Contacts who know the regime
well insist that some of these confrontational gestures are
tactical and, except with regard to Lebanon, could be
abandoned quickly if the SARG felt there was an opening to
the U.S. promising better relations and addressing some of
its interests. Given that such a meeting of the minds is
unlikely, we assess that Syria's more confrontational posture
is likely to continue.


3. (C) GETTING IT STARTED IN NOVEMBER: The SARG's more
combative stance became apparent in November, when the regime
settled on its posture of reluctant cooperation with the
Hariri investigation, in tandem with a harsh nationalistic
campaign against the UNIIIC and the U.S.-led international
pressure. This stance was highlighted by the President's
jingoistic, anti-Lebanon demagoguery in his November 10
speech, language that resonated very well with a Syrian
public eager for strong leadership to restore national
dignity wounded by persistent international criticism of
Syrian policies. The December 12 assassination of Gibran
Tueni, on the same day as the release of the second Mehlis
report, signaled in the most brutal way possible that the
Asad regime had decided that it would not permit Lebanon to
slip out of its orbit and become a surrogate for US and
French interests.


4. (C) KHADDAM AND AHMADINEJAD: It should be noted that
former VP Kaddam's increasingly negative press campaign from
Paris in late December and early January rattled the regime
and seemed to reinforce the SARG's decision to adopt a more
confrontational posture. The President received Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on a very high-profile state
visit January 19-20. The visit took place just as Iran's
confrontation with the international community over its
nuclear program was reaching another crisis stage. The two
countries sought to use the visit to demonstrate a united
front against pressure from the United States and the West
and to advance foreign policy goals linked to Lebanon, Iraq,
and the Palestinians. While there was some second-guessing
outside the regime about the wisdom of embracing the Iranians
just when their leader seemed headed for full pariah status,
the signals we got indicated little or no ambivalence inside
the regime. Analysts close to the regime insisted that the
SARG, in addition to showing that it had a friend and
protector it could turn to, wanted to use the visit to remind
the U.S. that it also had options, i.e., it could create
mischief in a variety of places, if the U.S. chose to deal
with it exclusively with pressure and isolation, or if it
chose to try to unseat the regime.


5. (C) ASAD'S SECOND HARD-LINE SPEECH: Shortly after
Ahmadinejad's visit, Asad delivered a second hard-line
speech, this one dropping some of the threatening language he
had previously directed at Lebanon but otherwise repeating

his attacks on the UNIIIC. Using the forum of an
international Arab lawyers conference in Damascus, Asad
insisted that the international pressure on Syria was not
just a campaign directed against Syria (or the regime) but
was targeting the entire Arab and Islamic world. Asad also
made clear that any internal reforms were a mere footnote, an
indulgence that Syria could not afford to any significant
degree in the current confrontational environment. He
dropped broad hints that he would not accept being questioned
by UNIIIC. (Note: We have heard subseqQtly that, in fact,
Asad will meet with Brammertz under certain conditions.)


6. (C) On the foreign policy front in January, Syria adopted
a more conciliatory posture while it courted its once
reluctant allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While leaders of
the two counries continued to urge Asad to cooperate fully
with UNIIIC, some of the urgency and pressure seemed less
intense after the second Mehlis report, which had been read
in Syria and throughout the region as weak and indicative of
a lack of compelling evidence. Asad's trip to Saudi Arabia,
followed by the much-discussed Saudi initiative to improve
relations between Syria and Lebanon, also lent support to the
view that the weak Mehlis report, the confrontational optics
of Bashar allying himself so closely with Ahmadinejad, and
fears about potential instability in Syria if the regime
fell, all combined to overcome lingering Saudi hostility over
the Hariri assassination.


7. (C) HAMAS WIN REINFORCES CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE: Hamas's
overwhelming electoral victory in the Palestinian territories
in late January provided the perfect vehicle for Syrian
leaders to convince themselves and others that their decision
to fight U.S. pressure with pressure of its own had been
vindicated. Asad met with Damascus-based leaders of Hamas,
including external leader Khalid Misha'al, reinforcing the
embrace Asad gave all the rejectionist groups last fall, when
he met their leadership, encouraging them to continue with
the resistance. Hamas' victory has permitted the SARG to
play its Palestinian-rejectionist confrontation card, while
Asad acts statesmanlike, urging the world to respect the will
of the Palestinian people. Inside Syria and in the Arab
world, the regime's long-standing use of Hamas and other
rejectionists as proxies to emphasize its own steadfast
rejection of any accommodation with Israel paid a big
dividend, offering the regime a rare opportunity to
demonstrate that it had anticipated events correctly and
"picked a winner." Given those benefits, it is unlikely the
SARG will join the international community in urging Hamas to
recognize Israel and lay down its arms.


8. (C) CARTOON CONTROVERSY MARKS FURTHER STEP: The
controversy over the caricatures of Mohammed offered the
regime the opportunity to showcase its confrontational
politics and reap further political gains internally and
regionally. Quietly channeling intense Islamic anger in
Syria towards demonstrations that it was confident it could
whip up to a level appropriate for sending political
messages, the SARG set events in motion that resulted in four
embassies being damaged or destroyed. Afterwards, the SARG
has maintained its hard-line publicly and privately with our
diplomatic colleagues from Denmark and Norway, claiming that
the responsibility for the events of February 4 lies with the
nations whose media have published the offensive images.
While there remains some doubt about the precise level of
violence that the regime wanted, SARG officials have not
expressed regret or offered any compensation.


9. (C) The regime is persuaded that its pre-emptive action
ensured that any Islamic anger in Syria would be directed
away from it, towards the Europeans, while simultaneously
sending the message in the region that Syria is at the
forefront, protecting Arab and Islamic dignity. To certain
regimes in the region, like the Saudis and Egyptians, and to
the international community, the Syrians also used the riots
to send the message that the secular Asad regime is the last
bulwark holding back the Islamic fundamentalists. The
"cartoon" riots demonstrate that Syria's new willingness to
confront the West extends beyond the U.S. , with the SARG
putting on the table its relations with the Europeans, long
one of its tightly-grasped aces, wagering that its bluff will
not be called, or calculating that in the current high-stakes
posturing over the fate of the regime, ties with Europe may
be a necessary sacrifice in the short term. The SARG also
reaped the benefits from the shudder of instability in
Lebanon the next day, stoking at least to some extent the
outbreak of violent rioting and sectarian tensions in Beirut
over the ongoing caricatures controversy.


10. (C) CABINET RESHUFFLE SHOWS NO RETREAT: The recent
cabinet reshuffle reinforces these perceptions, as does the
extended visit to Damascus of maverick Shiite leader Moqtada
al-Sadr. The new cabinet, even with the promotion of Walid
Mu'allim to foreign minister, promises little except for an
endorsement of the status quo: modulated confrontation
abroad and repressive internal policies dressed up with a bit
of economic reform and periodic discussion of political
reform (without implementation). Sadr's visit allows the
SARG to once again flourish one of its wild cards, this time
an Iraqi one, and make the case that it has more options
available to assert its influence, either to assist the U.S.
(if Syria's interests can be addressed) or to make mischief.
The visit also reinforced the optics of Syria's
confrontational policies, with Sadr visiting Iran before
arrival in Damascus, departing here for Lebanon, and speaking
to the press about "resistance" and "occupation" in Iraq and
the "cartoon controversy" as "proof of Western hate for
Islam." (See reftel).


11. (C) A POLICY OF SMOKE AND MIRRORS?: To a degree, this
confrontational optic is smoke and mirrors. But in foreign
policy as in politics, perceptions count. Syria is
projecting, with some degree of success, protection by a
regional power, influence with a newly-legitimized terrorist
group poised to take power in the Palestinian territories,
and defiance in Lebanon, balanced slightly with some
carefully measured cooperation with UNIIIC. This
confrontational posture has been enhanced by the regime's
success moderate success in wooing back its reluctant
regional allies. This wooing seems to have been enhanced by
the widely held perception in the Arab world that the UNIIIC
inquiry -- weakened by the departure of Mehlis and the SARG's
vigorous use of recanting witnesses -- does not have the
evidence needed to sustain an international pressure campaign
that could unseat the regime. (Saudi/Egyptian fears that any
regime collapse could unleash instability in Syria and
enhance Iran's growing regional influence are also factors.)


12. (C) REGIME'S MOOD BUOYED: This successful projection of
a tougher, more combative regime seems to have buoyed the
mood of the SARG, persuading some of its key officials that
they have turned the corner, or at least made the best of a
very tough situation. That mood has been reinforced by the
one area, Lebanon, where Syria's foreign policy is based less
on perceptions and more on the raw, even brutal exercise of
power and influence, leavened by strategic dollops of
political manipulation and support for maneuvering by its
allies and proxies there. People here are convinced that
Syria's influence in Lebanon is on the rise again, and they
do not question very closely the violent tactics and
intimidation that have been used in the past year to reassert
it. The regime also feels it has wriggled around the
isolation policy the U.S. has tried to use to pressure it to
end its interference in Lebanon's internal affairs.


13. (C) SENSE IT CAN OUTLAST THE U.S.: The mood of the
regime has also been buoyed by the perception that U.S. has
not managed to assert complete control in Iraq and is looking
for an exit strategy that eventually will lead Washington to
look to Damascus. That reading, combined with the regime's
assessment that it can outlast the Bush Administration, has
bolstered regime confidence and reinforced its decision to
send a signal that it has suspended all efforts to come to
some kind of accommodation with the U.S.


14. (C) SANCTIONS: On the economic side, SARG officials
believe there is no international will to impose broad
economic sanctions on the country. They largely discount the
effectiveness of new unilateral sanctions the U.S. might
apply and believe that, internally, they are well-positioned
to blame the U.S. for any ensuing economic suffering, rather
than be blamed themselves. While they seem more concerned
about the damage that targeted UN sanctions could inflict,
they appear to have convinced themselves that their allies
will help to limit their severity.


15. (C) CONTINUING VULNERABILITIES: Despite the SARG's
upbeat mood, some liabilities remain that may undercut its
ability to sustain a more confrontational foreign-policy
approach in the coming months. UNIIIC may yet develop and
reveal evidence sufficient to submit to an international
tribunal and create a critical mass of pressure on the regime
that it will find difficult to bear. Despite all the current
bravado, we pick up signals that among SARG officials there
remains tremendous sensitivity to the danger that the UNIIIC

investigation poses and recognition that the pressure could
ratchet back up rather quickly. On the political side,
Syrian allies Hamas and Iran may respond to international
pressure, or find themselves at policy impasses that will
negatively impact on the SARG's sense that it is playing a
winning hand. Hamas, in particular, faces a tricky, daunting
task in trying to translate its electoral victory into
political leverage. In addition, the Syrian economy has
shown its vulnerability each time political pressure on the
regime has mounted. The Syrian pound devalued dramatically
in the fall when pressure was most intense on the regime and
can be expected to do so again as soon as Syria comes under a
negative international spotlight. Economically, at least,
the SARG's new-found confidence could soon prove short-lived.



16. (C) ONE YEAR LATER: Given a year of sustained U.S.-led
international pressure that forced it to withdraw its troops
under nearly humiliating circumstances, we might have
expected the SARG to be back on its heels and in a defensive,
cautious posture. The short-term successes of its current
confrontational stances have instead boosted regime morale
and made it likely that it will continue to seek appropriate
opportunities in the coming months to demonstrate its
willingness to respond to external pressure with pressure of
its own. Wherever possible, it will use its proxies to
assert that defiance, in order to avoid being dragged into
any unwanted, direct confrontations with the U.S.


SECHE