REACHING OUT TO SYRIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 005422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: REACHING OUT TO SYRIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

REF: DAMASCUS 5030

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires William Roebuck, for reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary: While we continue to meet with and provide
whatever support we can to political opposition figures and
human rights activists in this very repressive atmosphere, we
are also attempting to reach to Syria's wider civil society.
This wider civil society in Syria may provide a significant
opportunity for U.S. influence but equally presents some of
the greatest challenges. The opportunities occur because
openings in society since 2001 have permitted the increase of
activities, such as the formation of many new NGO's (albeit
with limited mandates),the activities of business groups
unconnected to the corrupt establishment circles and
Internet-based networking and publicizing activities. While
Bashar pursues limited economic reforms which may encourage
these trends, the SARG realizes the danger from civil society
and has increasingly used the security services to intimidate
anyone who engages in political activity. The SARG realizes
our interest in engaging civil society and over the past 18
months has sought to limit opportunities for the USG to
engage publicly or privately with Syrian citizens. In
addition to fear of the security forces, rising
anti-Americanism, incited by the regime, has clearly become
an issue in Syria, and some parts of civil society refuse to
engage with the US. Despite these obstacles we see
opportunities in activities involving graduates returning
home from overseas study, U.S.-trained doctors,
person-to-person diplomacy and outreach to activists in
non-traditional fields such as the sciences. End Summary.


2. (C) FIRST PRIORITY: THE OPPOSITION. . .: Our first
priority remains meetings with opposition activists to offer
whatever help is possible in this repressive environment.
Opposition figures are active in several ways. Former
political prisoner and MP Riad Seif, for example, meets
relatively openly with diplomatic contacts, encouraging their
governments to maintain pressure on the Syrian regime,
especially in the areas of human rights and Lebanon. He
heads the Damascus Declaration (DD) steering group, which
meets regularly to plan modest public protests and other
activities, including issuing statements, aimed at keeping
their agenda for democratic change and protection of basic
human rights in Syria in the public eye. Activists like Seif
have experienced the full panoply of Syrian government
repression since 2000 as the SARG has sought to intimidate
them and shut their voices. Arrests, show trials based on
trumped up charges, and long prison sentences have been used
for those identified as the political or intellectual
leaders, such as Seif, who served more than four years in
prison for his Damascus Spring activities. More modest but
effective tactics are also used, including systematic
surveillance, harassment of activists and threats to them and
their family members, beatings at protests, and repeated
summons to security services facilities for intimidating
interrogations. These moderately less coercive tactics have
been practiced over the past six years through periods of
crackdown as well as during periods of relative easing, such
as in 2005, when the Damascus Declaration group managed to
issue its original manifesto without experiencing arrests or
trials.


3. (C) . . . GIVING IT FURTHER SUPPORT: Although severely
constrained in what we can offer to the opposition from
within Syria, we continue to look for ways to increase
support. Some activists suggest we consider doing more, such
as: technical training in areas such as Web design and
election monitoring; USG assistance for members of
Syria-based organizations to hold meetings with expatriate
Syrians; English language training for activists; the
development of a strong USG media strategy toward Syria,
including increased reporting on SARG policies and human
rights violations. For example, several Kurdish activist
commented recently that Al-Hurra rarely covers arrests,
detentions without charge, and the banning by security
services of planned protests in Syria. Although Al-Hurra
would have difficulty operating on the ground in Syria it
would be possible to cover events over the telephone with
Syrian analysis and observers, they said. The family of
political prisoner Kamal Labwani has also noted the absence
of coverage human rights violations in Syria.


4. (C) SOME GROWTH IN CIVIL SOCIETY. . .: Although not
moving at anywhere near the speed of civil society in other

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countries in the region, civil society in Syria has developed
significantly in the last six years in Syria, with the
formation or growth of women's groups, NGO's tied to First
Lady Asma al-Asad, businessmen's groups, social welfare
organizations of the type that responded so actively during
the refugee crisis provoked in Syria this summer by the
fighting in Lebanon, environmental groups, bloggers (with
All4Syria founder Ayman Abdul Noor leading the field),and
others. There has also been an important increase in the
number of Sunni groups doing charity work for the poor, an
apparent SARG nod to the growing Islamist religious fervor in
Syria. Even the more controversial human rights activists
who publicize political trials and other abuses began and
greatly expanded the scope of their activities during this
six-year period (although the latest wave of repression in
2006 has silenced most of them and severely cramped their
activities).


5. (C) . . .AND SARG-IMPOSED LIMITS: This growth has been
possible for a number of reasons including the Internet,
greater economic opening (and the modest political opening
that led to the short-lived Damascus Spring in 2001),efforts
of the EU and UNDP, and the return of Syrian graduates from
studies in the U.S. Of course, few of these groups cross any
political redlines. If they do, they are certain to face the
repressive measure listed above for political activists. The
SARG has created an environment of public intimidation and
repressive nationalism, with President Asad warning in
interviews that any cooperation with foreign governments
would be considered a sign of disloyalty. The Embassy has to
be careful about efforts to reach out to civil society. In
November, the SARG closed AmidEast, an NGO closely affiliated
with the U.S. Embassy, which has been operating for 30 years
in Syria, on the pretext that it did not have a license.


6. (C) PERMITS REFUSED IN MOST CASES: Civil society
activists in apolitical fields must be careful. They face
the prospect of regular summons for intimidating
interrogations, travel bans, warnings -- if the focus is even
slightly political or controversial -- to stop their
activities because they do not have (and cannot obtain)
permits from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
authorizing their activities and meetings. (Note: Although
the Ministry possesses formal authority to issue such
permits, it is the security services, activists tell us, that
usually signal to the Ministry which groups get permits and
which do not. Most do not get them.) The majority of civil
society activists are forced to operate in situations of
illegality or quasi-legality, which the SARG officials
tolerate when its suits them, and uses to crack down when
deemed necessary. There is considerable fear of the security
forces, which leads to significant self-censorship.


7. (C) SEEKING NEW AREAS OF INFLUENCE: Despite the current
crackdown and pressure on Embassy outreach efforts, Post is
continuously seeking new areas to influence in the civil
society arena. We see particular promise in Syrian graduates
of U.S. universities, women business leaders, scientists,
environmentalists, and others.


8. (C) NEW INITIATIVES: Post's building upon its past
strategy, with an increased focus on "Civil Society Strong"
initiatives, will include:

-- Increased outreach to individuals and groups active on
non-political issues, which impact a wide range of Syrians
but have typically been monopolized by the entrenched regime
elements. For example, we are developing strategies to
broaden our outreach to and support of Syrian-American
medical society, which is trying to reform the selection
process for medical training currently monopolized by Ba'ath
Party candidates.

-- Strengthening of our civil society contact base outside
the capital. For example, reporting officers plan in the
coming months to travel to coastal cities, as well as
northeastern Syria, to meet with a range of businessmen an
civil society contacts. Consular staff made a similar trip
to Aleppo in late November to meet with wardens and other
consular contacts (and plan similar trips in the future).
Charge is exploring the option for trips to smaller Syrian
cities such as Homs. The idea here is that civil activism in
one area bleeds into others.

-- Organizing creative, cultural events such as the October

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16 "Sahour" (reported reftel) that emphasize respect for
local tradition.

-- Expanded people-to-people contacts. As one example, we
have sought out more opportunities for consular staff to give
informational lectures to young Syrians who are seeking
student visas to the United States. Separately, Post brought
an American photographer this fall to participate in an
international photo exhibition in Aleppo He also gave two
successful series of photography workshops in Damascus and
Aleppo. Additionally, PAO developed and is teaching an
American film forum studies at the American Language Center.

-- Seeking ways to do capacity building within the human
rights community, including the fall 2006 enrollment of 11
activists in English language training at the American
Language Center.

-- Seeking out civil society contacts who work in fields with
fewer direct political overtones. For example, over the past
year, Post has facilitated the creation of a women's business
group which meets regularly for presentations, meals, and
discussions. Post is working on the next session for the
group, which would include a tour of a boutique hotel built
and run by one of the businesswomen, followed by a lunch
focusing on her presentation of lessons learned from starting
up a business without paying a single bribe; and

-- Maximizing the impact of Post's limited grants for the
biggest possible effect. For example, this year Post
obtained a USD 20,000 Ambassador's Fund grant for the Syrian
Red Crescent, headed by a prominent Sunni businessman, to buy
x-ray equipment for a new clinic serving the neediest of the
estimated 450,000 displaced Iraqis and other Damascus-based
refugees.


9. (C) COMMENT: For almost two years now, the SARG has
responded to the USG-led isolation of Syria by seeking to
limit official contacts between Embassy officers and private
Syrians. The SARG seems to be more sensitive to some
contacts than others, calibrating its methods of pressure to
what it sees as potential risks. Based on our experience,
the SARG has been particularly sensitive to contacts with
religious authorities, high-level opposition figures, and,
increasingly, business notables. Despite these obstacles
and given our long-term regional objectives, we see important
potential and value in building bridges between the U.S. and
Syria by engaging with graduates returning to Syria from
overseas training and with U.S.-trained doctors and by
beefing up our person-to-person diplomacy and outreach to
activists in non-traditional fields such as the sciences. We
will continue to look for new opportunities that do not
endanger the individuals with whom we seek to engage.









ROEBUCK